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Abstract
Ecological Economics (EE) is a novel, wide and heteroge-
neous branch of research which aims at studying the rela-
tionships between Ecological and Economic Systems, which
are composed of large number of entities (state variables or
stocks), that interact through the flows of matter, energy, and
information passing through the systems’ boundaries. The
two systems are strictly interwoven and each one have an im-
pact on the other, i.e. the exploitation of natural resources for
productive purposes and the potential economic losses due
to environmental disasters (e.g. climate change). The cur-
rent dissertation provides a set of both theoretical and empir-
ical studies to tackle the problem of natural resource scarcity
(e.g. water), climate change, economic growth, international
agreements and environmental consciousness with different
methodologies, in line with the purposes of EE.
The dissertation is composed by two main blocks: the first
one based on empirical investigations of water resource ex-
ploitation and the other based on theoretical studies. The first
block (chapters 2 and 3) employs a sector-level approach to
investigate, at Global level, the main drivers of (Blue) water
exploitation and the vulnerability of inter-sectoral linkages to
external shocks (chapter 2), and the extent to which OECD
GDP growth forecasts are sustainable under the current wa-
ter resource availability and future climate change (chapter
3). The second block (chapter 4) describes a novel theoret-
ical framework to analyse the International Environmental
Agreements, combining a static 2x2 game (macro-level) with
an Evolutionary Game (micro-level). The Appendix A pro-
vides the Supplementary Materials in which are explained in
xv
depth the mathematical details of the models employed in the
Chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, it has been introduced a brief
survey, part of a work in progress, that touches some of the
basic principles, epistemological assumptions and method-
ological issues underpinning Ecological Economics.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 discusses the empirical distribution of Blue virtual
water trade and it assesses the vulnerability of inter-sectoral
trade by integrating the Input-Output tables with Network
Theory. This paper applies the Global Multi-Regional Input-
Output (GMRIO) model to quantify the interdependencies
of different sectors, within the global economy, and to de-
termine the overall Blue water consumption of each coun-
try. This procedure allows the measurement of Virtual Wa-
ter Trade (VWT), that is the volume of water embedded in
traded goods. Firstly, I present the results from the Structural
Decomposition Analysis (SDA) at different level of aggrega-
tion: spatial and sectoral. This procedure allows to identify
and quantify the impact of the main drivers of Blue water
use: technological development, international trade, evolu-
tion of production functions, population growth and changes
in the product mix of final demand. SDA is integrated with
the analysis of the topology of the inter-sectoral Blue VWT
in order to assess the vulnerability of the system to external
shocks. This paper offers a novel framework because it com-
bines two different, but analogous, methodologies that allow
to set up a broad framework in which assessing the effect of
the key factors in water exploitation and the resilience of the
system to (micro–level) shocks.
All in all, SDA showed a substantial contribution to reducing
water demand exerted by the composition of final demand
and by improvements in the water efficiency of production,
xvi
while demographic and economic growth and changes in the
intermediate input mix has more than compensated such re-
duction. Network theory extends the information provided
by the IO assessment, confirming that the system is particu-
larly exposed to the propagation of local (supply-side) shocks
due to ‘cascade effects’. The ‘duality’ of trade is determined
by the apparent minor role played, evidenced by the SDA,
coupled with the potential risks related to the propagation
of shocks in water supply. The main policy implication of
these findings is that a cross-country coordination of water
management policies is needed to increase the resilience of
the water supply system to negative shocks to some crucial
sector, that would otherwise propagate to a large number of
countries.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 integrates measures of social water scarcity and
physical renewable water constraints, in order to structure
a consistent set of scenarios under which evaluate the likely
economic impacts caused by future water scarcity, the techno-
logical development needed to follow a sustainable growth
and the role of VW trade in providing an extra-amount of
(virtual) water per capita. The problem of quantitatively
evaluate water resources vulnerability derives from the fact
that is also used, both directly and indirectly, in produc-
tion processes across many different sectors of the economy,
through supply chain. This is simulated with an assess-
ment of very long-run implications (2100), using a Dynamic
Multi-Regional Input-Output (D-MRIO) model. I simulate
the joint impact of climate change, economic and population
growth, as provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC), under four alternative scenarios. In or-
der to overcome the limitations of the Falkenmark indicator,
xvii
I assess both the direct water footprint of national consump-
tion and total water footprint that also allows for VW water
trade between different regions of the world.
Results suggest that under OECD GDP growth rates, there
should be an over-exploitation of available freshwater re-
sources (Wa) in almost every country across all scenarios. It
is shown that, for most countries, water-stress is mostly af-
fected by socio-economic variables rather than directly from
climate change. The comparison of the results using alterna-
tive, internally consistent, climate change scenarios is essen-
tial to guide future environmental policy decisions, both at
national and international levels, to achieve sustainable and
equitable water management strategies.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 contributes to explain the observation of two facts
at odds: starting from the meeting held in Stockholm in 1972
till the last one arranged in Lima on December 2014, the num-
ber of signatories of international environmental agreements
(IEA) has grown in time. Meanwhile, the aggregate global
level of greenhouse gas emissions is increasing at exponen-
tial rate worldwide. I propose a novel multi-scale framework,
composed by two tied games, to show under which condi-
tions a country is able to fulfil the IEA: Game 1 is an Evolu-
tionary Game that models the economic structure of ‘isolated’
economies, where the interaction of households and firms’
strategies determine the level of greenhouse gas discharge.
Game 2 deals with the IEA with a 2x2 static one-shot game,
in which two asymmetric nations bargain on the maximum
level of emissions.
Countries might have different environmental performances
based on their economic structure, without the need to im-
pose any ‘free–riding’ behaviour. Consumer’s environmental
xviii
consciousness (micro level) together with global income (and
technological) inequality (macro level), are found to be the
key variables towards the green transition path. IEA alone
appears to be a weak incentive, unable to stimulate a green
transition if not paired with local action and high level of en-
vironmental awareness among consumers. Due to the com-
plexity of the game, not any result can be showed analyti-
cally, therefore I run four simulations. The current approach
is able to offer a multi-scale level of analysis necessary to deal
with the complex issues at stake, that is climate change and
global/local actions.
Appendix A
This chapter is a brief methodological note on the models
employed in Chapter 2 and 3, in particular it offers the de-
tailed mathematical system of equations at the base of the
Structural Decomposition Analysis (Chapter 2), the algo-
rithm with which I computed the sustainable rate of tech-
nological progress (Chapter 3) and an extension of Chapter
3 based on the computation of the potential economic losses
in case of un-sustainable exploitation of water resources. Fi-
nally, I provide a brief overview of the epistemological and
methodological foundations of Ecological Economics. I pass
through some key concepts (i.e. entropy law, incommensu-
rability, complexity and irreversibility) in order to frame the
strengths and the limits of this novel, wide and heteroge-
neous branch of research.
xix
Chapter 1
Introduction
Increasing international trade, at global level, motivates the elaboration
of critical information about the direct and the indirect effects of inter-
sectoral linkages and increasing consumption on resource exploitation,
in particular water use. Recognizing water as an important factor of pro-
duction, required for economic output and growth, is crucial when deal-
ing with the vulnerability of future economic activity to climate change
and resource constraints. Globalization of economic activities implies
that countries should deal with the issue of resource exploitation and
climate change through international agreements in which coordinating
their activities in a sustainable manner. The current dissertation touches
some of these aspects with both a theoretical and empirical perspective.
Content of the dissertation
Chapter 2 reports the measurement of direct and indirect (through trade)
Blue water (BW) use, which refers to the consumptive use of ground or
surface water, the identification and the evolution of the main drivers of
BW exploitation, through the SDA, and the analysis of the topology of
the inter-sectoral Blue VWT, with Network tools, in order to assess the
resilience of the system to external shocks.
The focus of chapter 3 is, instead, an ex-ante simulation, based on
1
a Dynamic Multi Regional Input–Output Model, of the sustainability of
the OECD GDP growth rates forecasts when water constraints are in-
cluded. Moreover, I integrated measures of social water scarcity and
physical renewable water constraints in order to frame a consistent set
of scenarios under which to evaluate the likely economic impacts caused
by future water scarcity.
Chapter 4 moves to the theoretical perspective to offer a novel ap-
proach when studying the success of IEA. The ‘micro’ (country’s eco-
nomic structure) and ‘macro’ (international agreements) levels are cou-
pled to offer a multi-scale perspective, necessary to deal with the com-
plex issue of climate change and global/local actions. In particular, I
combine two games: the first one is an Evolutionary Game that show the
dynamic evolution of each economy (country-level), while the second
one is a classical one-shot Game with 2 asymmetric countries.
Research questions
To summarize, the current dissertation aims at dealing with the follow-
ing research questions:
1. Which are the key drivers of blue water use and what is their im-
pact over time? (Chapter 2)
2. Does International Trade make the inter-sectoral exchanges more
vulnerable to exogenous shocks? Which are the most critical geo-
graphical areas? (Chapter 2)
3. Is economic growth (based on OECD’s forecasts) hampered when
water constraints are taken into account? (Chapter 3)
4. Which is the rate of technological progress needed to follow a sus-
tainable economic growth? On the other hand, what is the poten-
tial economic loss due to the impact of climate change on water
resources? (Chapter 3)
5. Under which economic conditions a country fails to respect the
IEA? (Chapter 4)
2
6. Are local actions and environmental consciousness relevant for the
success of international environmental agreements? (Chapter 4)
Main results
The theoretical results and the empirical evidence related to the previous
set of research questions of each chapter is summarized as follows.
Chapter 2
An important features observed is that international VWT, in many cases,
does not follow the spatial pattern of fresh water resource availability,
as confirmed by two water abundant countries, such as USA and Rus-
sia, which are net (virtual) water importers. SDA allowed to disentangle
and quantify the main drivers of water use over the time span consid-
ered. Overall, improvements in water efficiency of production activities
and changes in the mix of consumption bundle allowed to reduce world
water footprint by about 50 percent. On the other side, these beneficial
effects, were superseded by changes in per capita level of affluence (in
real terms), demographic growth and in the mix of intermediate inputs
that required, jointly, an increase of more than 80 percent of blue water.
Network theory revealed the heavy-tail behaviour of the in– and out–
node strength, of virtual water of intermediate goods, which follows a
power law distribution. The fat-tail and scale-free behaviour are further
confirmed by the results from the first– and second– order connectivity
measures, which show that the potential benefit of water redistribution
through international trade might carry the risk of propagation of local
(supply-side) shocks due to ‘cascade effects’.
Chapter 3
Numerical simulations showed that climate change alone seems to have
a smaller impact than socio-economic drivers for most countries, ex-
cept Turkey, Mexico and Brazil. Countries already experiencing water
3
stress will be the most impacted in the future under the combined ef-
fects of socio–economic shifts and climate change. China and India must
deal with severe and imminent water shortage problems, to which they
are not able to pursue economic growth without over-exploiting natural
water resources. The same holds for the most advanced economies, al-
though this occurs later in time (around 2050), while only Russia, Japan
and Brazil seem to be the less vulnerable. It appears that water con-
straints represent a physical limit to economic growth in both develop-
ing and developed countries. A possible alternative to these pessimistic
scenarios is to boost technological progress via investment in water effi-
ciency, even though the speed of progress must be far greater than what
observed in the recent years.
The Falkenmark indicator is found to be a misleading indicator, there-
fore I extended the analysis to assess the actual countries ability to alle-
viate social water stress through virtual water trade. The use of I-O data
allowed to trace different sources of virtual water consumption, for each
water category, economic sector and country. Finally, international trade
seems efficacious in redistributing the water resources, allowing to al-
most each country, with the exception of India, to provide at least 1700
m3 of water per capita.
Chapter 4
This mathematical framework shows that ‘global solutions’ negotiated at
international level, if not backed up by a variety of efforts at national, re-
gional, and local levels to prompt environmental consciousness, are not
guaranteed to work well. From themicro point of view, the model is able
to identify five alternative Regimes under which each economy reaches
different equilibria. Each of them defines the possibility of success of
global standards bargained between countries. From the macro point of
view, I define, both analytically and with numerical simulations, the im-
pact of inequality, asymmetric risks and opportunity costs distribution
among countries. Given a certain level of inequality countries will es-
tablish more environmental friendly standards inasmuch the benefit-risk
4
ratio is high. Moreover, historical inequality, in terms of different level
of profits generated by the industries and different technological devel-
opment of both green and polluting firms, and heterogenous risks play a
key role to the establishment of sustainable environmental standards.
All in all, increasing environmental consciousness could reduce the
costs of environmental policy, while increasing global inequality has a
negative influence on the level of environmental standards.
Contribution to the literature
This last section of this introductory chapter aims at stressing the most
important innovative contributions to the economic literature of the cur-
rent dissertation chapter-by-chapter.
Chapter 2
The economic empirical literature on virtual water trade has followed
two separate, but analogous, strands of research, such as Input-Output
(IO) Analyses and Network Theory. Chapter 2 is, to my knowledge,
the first attempt to fill this gap. The novelty introduced by the present
study is given by the combination of the SDA with Network measures
of systematic vulnerability to exogenous (climatic) shocks. It goes be-
yond the previous contributions because I ground the analysis on inter-
sectoral (virtual water) trade, and not simply on final consumption. This
step is essential to understand whether the current global supply-chain
is vulnerable to external shocks and whether the evolution of interna-
tional trade is yielding riskier systems of VW exchanges. Moreover, the
analysis is based on the most recent tools developed in the literature of
Complex Economy.
Chapter 3
The main innovative contributions of chapter 3 are: the consistent inte-
gration of different databases coming from different fields, such as hy-
drology, economy and climate science; the combination of both social
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and physical indicator of water-stress in the simulation of several eco-
nomic and climatic scenarios; the use of a dynamic MRIO with which
building a set of different economic path consistent with the OECD GDP
forecasts and, more importantly, the quantification of the (expected) im-
pact of each driver of water stress.
Chapter 4
The innovative contribution to the Game Theory literature of chapter 4
regards the model I employed. To my knowledge, chapter 4 is the first
attempt to consider at the same time the micro and the macro level by
combining, in a consistent manner, two different games. It differs from
the previous literature in three respects. First, the analysis is not based on
a stylized model where parties are modelled ‘as if’ they were individual
rational agents, but I ground their actions on a given economic structure.
Second, I offer a micro-foundation of the economic system with an Evo-
lutionary Game where consumers and firms interact, determining the
level of emissions for any given level of environmental standards fixed
by the IEA. Finally, the complexity of the model limits the possibility to
analytically derive every results, therefore I provide (parameterise) nu-
merical simulations, using a handy Maple algorithm, to determine the
alternative evolutionary equilibria that each country reaches when IEA
is enforced.
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Chapter 2
Integrating Structural
Decomposition Analysis
with Network Theory. The
Blue Water case study.
2.1 Introduction
Global trade virtually transfers large amounts of water resources from
areas of production to far consumption regions, a phenomenon that has
been named ‘the globalization of water’ (Hoekstra and Chapagain, 2008),
that is especially important for food security (Konar et al., 2012), conflicts
for water (Barnaby, 2009) and overpopulation (Schade and Pimentel,
2010). Antonelli et al. (2012) notice that VW is an ‘inherently economic
concept’, which is consistent with standard international trade theory
(Reimer, 2012). Water is cheap where it is abundant, but the opposite
is not necessarily true: water resources may not be correctly priced and
property rights may not be adequately enforced, so that the cost of water
could be kept inefficiently low. The capacity to engage in trade enables
water-scarce countries to achieve food security and, more generally, to
satisfy its demand of water-intensive products. The quantification and
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assessment of VW and the evaluation of the vulnerability of the VW net-
work are particularly relevant as climate change is likely to alter the ge-
ographical distribution of water availability and to cause shocks to the
VW network.
The two major methodological approaches to assess and evaluate VW
are Input-Output (IO) Analyses and Network Theory. IO tables express
the value of economic transactions occurring between different sectors
of an economy, so that it is possible to account for sectoral interdepen-
dencies in the economic system. In the vast literature of environmentally
extended input output analysis, the attention has been directed towards
the attribution of the responsibility of producers and consumers for the
exploitation of natural resources and the release of pollutants, by com-
puting the net balance of pollution and of resource ‘embedded’ in traded
goods. In contrast to the bottom-up accounting, which only considers di-
rect water withdrawal in production, input-output models include both
direct and indirect water use along the complex supply chain of pro-
ducing a specific product for final consumption (Lenzen et al., 2013).
Serrano and Dietzenbacher (2010), using a multi-regional input-output
(MRIO) model, demonstrate that the trade emission balance and the re-
sponsibility emission balance yield the same result. MRIO models have
been widely used to calculate footprints and to analyse the environmen-
tal consequences of trade (Lenzen et al., 2013, Wiedmann et al., 2010). Al-
though these models have been mainly used to analyze CO2 emissions,
there are also some applications to water footprint and virtual water em-
bodied in trade of specific countries. An important contribution is repre-
sented by Arto (2012) who quantified the environmental responsibility in
a production and in a consumption-based approaches. WIOD data and a
Multi-Regional Input-Output model have been used to estimate the Use,
the Footprint and the Virtual Trade of Water, GHG Emissions, Materials
and Land for 41 world regions in the period 1995-2008. As noticed by
Hoekstra et al. (2011) these studies are particularly useful as they assess
the effect of international trade on domestic water resources, the effect of
water availability on international trade and the role that the latter can
play in increasing global water-use efficiency.
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Extending the findings based on input-output models, the literature
has developed a variety of Structural Decomposition Analysis (SDA)1 in
order to unravel and quantify the main drivers of change in pollution
or in resource and water use. There are several examples of studies on
structural decomposition analysis of energy use (Ang and Liu, 2001, Su
and Ang, 2012), emissions (Serrano and Dietzenbacher, 2010, Xu and Di-
etzenbacher, 2014) or water use Cazcarro et al. (2013), Roson and Sartori
(2015) in a specific region or macro-area. European countries are charac-
terized by very different patterns of water consumption. Roson and Sar-
tori (2015) showed that the productive structure in most economies has
shifted away from water intensive industries (most notably agriculture),
that changes in the water footprint induced by changes in the pattern
of consumption are generally negative and remarkable, and that fast-
growing countries are also countries in which the share of agriculture
shrinks at a faster pace, possibly because of the expansion in manufac-
turing and services (e.g. China).
On the other hand, Network Theory has been extensively used to
analyse bilateral trade flows (Carvalho, 2012, Zhu et al., 2014) because
it enables to find non-linear relationship among the nodes involved in
international trade and to grasp useful information on the topology of ex-
changes. Network Theory is particularly suitable to deal with economic
complexity, where hierarchies of economic sub-systems and the synergic
interactions between sub-systems can be detected (Sonis and Hewings,
1998). Classical Macroeconomics have got rid of the possibility of cas-
cade effects, based on the alleged diversification argument Lucas (1977).
However, the recent bulk of economic studies have shown that the in-
terconnections between different firms and sectors play a key role in the
potential propagation of idiosyncratic shocks throughout the economy.
This Chapter extends this approach to study the potential impact
on the water resource management. A number of papers applied net-
work analysis to study Virtual Water Trade as a global network (Barrat
et al., 2008), unveiling the main characteristics of its topological structure
1See Rose and Casler (1996), Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) and Hoekstra and van den
Bergh (2003) for overviews of the literature.
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(D’Odorico et al., 2012, Konar et al., 2012, Tamea et al., 2014), as well as
its temporal and geographical evolution (Carr et al., 2013, Dalin et al.,
2012). They find that the total volume of virtual water trade is likely to
shrink as a consequence of climate change due to higher crop prices un-
der scenarios of declining crop yields and due to decreased virtual water
content of crops under high agricultural productivity scenarios. More-
over, they show that international trade in food-related commodities has
contributed to substantial savings in global water resources over time.
The current approach is in line with the recent studies that integrate the
information provided by IO table with Network indexes (Aldasoro and
Angeloni, 2015, Carvalho, 2012, Hewings et al., 2009), particularly useful
for a deeper understanding of the vulnerability of a system to external
shocks (Acemoglu et al., 2012, Contreras and Fagiolo, 2014). As many
other global networks, the global VW trade system has the feature of be-
ing both interconnected and interdependent, which poses a problem of
network vulnerability to exogenous perturbations (Sartori and Schiavo,
2014). Another key property of networks is the community structure,
i.e. the partition of a network into clusters, with many edges connecting
nodes in the same cluster and few connecting nodes between different
ones. Communities in networks are groups of nodes that share a close
relation. The identification of the communities of a network leads some-
times to non-trivial clustering between nodes which helps in describing
the topology of the network. D’Odorico et al. (2012) is the only attempt
to define a Community Structure analysis of the virtual water embedded
in crops and animal products. Differently from them, I included data on
inter-sectoral intermediate trade providing an additional contribution to
the current literature.
The novelty introduced by the present study is given by the combi-
nation of the SDA with Network measures of systematic vulnerability
to exogenous (climatic) shocks. It goes beyond previous contributions
because I grounded the current analysis on inter-sectoral (virtual water)
trade and not simply on final consumption. This step is essential to un-
derstand whether the current global supply-chain is vulnerable to exter-
nal shocks and whether the evolution of international trade is yielding
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riskier systems of VW exchanges. In particular: (i) I take into account
the heterogeneous composition of each country with a 35-sector level of
disaggregation, (ii) I assess the evolution of blue water use and the key
drivers of its evolution, (iii) I evaluate the stability of the Blue IO Net-
work, and (iv) the geographical distribution of trade, through the Com-
munity Detection analysis.
The present research is organised as follows: Section 2.2 describes
the World Input Output Database (WIOD) and introduces the main con-
cepts. Section 2.3 explains the Input-Output methodology, while Sec-
tion 2.4 discusses the drivers of blue water use by means of a Struc-
tural Decomposition Analysis (SDA). Section 2.5 introduces the Network
methodology and the fundamental topological properties of the global
virtual water trade. In particular the Community Detection describes
the geographical distribution of inter-sectoral exchanges, giving further
information on the spatial distribution of trade and risks. Finally, Section
2.6 discusses the results and the potential for further research.
2.2 Data and definitions
The World Input Output Database (WIOD2 gives the opportunity to as-
sess the environmental impact of economic activity in terms of water,
material, land and energy use and a series of air emissions, by exploiting
information on world interindustry flows of intermediate goods. The
database contains data for 40 countries (EU, USA and other important
developing country, i.e. India, China and Brazil among others), plus the
Rest of the World, and 35 sectors for each country. For every year it pro-
vides the square matrix of 1435x1435 bilateral (industry-country) flows
of intermediate inputs (input-output). WIOD is composed by a set of
harmonized supply and use tables and symmetric I-O tables, valued at
current and previous year’s prices. Sectoral water use is derived from
2World Input Output Database, http://www.wiod.org, updated to May 2013. The
most recent version proposed on November 2013 does not contain the values in previ-
ous year’s price, then for the sake of consistency here it is used the previous version. For a
description of alternative IO databases see Andreoni and Miola (2014).
11
the estimations of Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2010)3, FAOSTAT (2010) and
EXIOPOL. Population data are available from the World Bank website
(http://data.worldbank.org/).
Before moving to the set of empirical applications, it is useful to dis-
cuss the most common definitions of Virtual Water present in the existing
literature. In the early 1990s, the geographer Tony Allan coined the term
‘Virtual Water’ (henceforth VW) to draw attention to the total volume of
water needed to produce and process a commodity or service. Recently,
Chapagain and Hoekstra (2007) referred to it as to the amount of wa-
ter ‘embedded’ in traded goods within and across national borders. The
concept has both an intensive and an extensive component (Allan, 2003).
The former describes the role of water in food production and the role of
trade in providing food security; the latter refers to the ‘invisible’ link be-
tween the source of water demand and the site of water consumption.4
Note that the actual ‘direct’ water content of a product is generally far
lower than the virtual water content, which includes the volume of wa-
ter required by the manufacturing, transformation or processing of the
product (Zimmer and Renault, 2003). There is no standard methodology
to compute such indicator. The traditional approach to assessing VW
embedded in a product is to multiply the trade volume of the product
by the product’s water intensity. Both water withdrawal and water con-
sumption embedded in VW can be analysed within this framework by
using different water withdrawal or consumption coefficients per unit
output. The sum of direct and indirect water use coefficients gives a vec-
tor of total water demand multipliers, equivalent to virtual water content
in m3/$. The total water demand multipliers are indicators of total water
use that take into account supply chain effects, in contrast to the direct
water coefficients that focus only on water use intensity from local pro-
3There are uncertainties related to input data used and limitations on the estimations
taken from Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2010) who explain that the uncertainties related to
unit water footprints are in the range of ±10-20% compared to observed data and ±5-
10% compared to the other modelling exercises. They claim that the differences are due to
data regarding cultivated and irrigated areas, growing periods, crop parameters, soil and
climate used in their model.
4See Antonelli et al. (2012) and Velazquez et al. (2011) for a review of the literature on
VW concept.
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duction activities using local water resources.
The adoption of water footprint (WF), originally proposed by Hoek-
stra and Hung (2002), in analogy to the ecological footprint (Rees, 1992),
originates from the concept of virtual water proposed by Allan (1993).
The methodological relation between VW and WF is summarised by
Van Oel et al. (2009). VW is defined as the amount of water needed to
produce an unit of good, while WF is the sum of the VW in each produc-
tion process and of the VW related to the ‘distribution’ phase.
Blue water (henceforth BW) refers to the consumptive use of ground or
surface water and, normally, its supply is costly, because it requires in-
frastructure. Blue water is mobile, it can be abstracted, pumped, stored,
treated, distributed, collected, and recycled, thus each m3 saved can be
directed toward alternative uses by industry and households. Finally, as
a proxy of Water Availability (Wa),5 following Chapagain and Hoekstra
(2007), I used the Total Actual Renewable Water Resources6 which shows
the maximum theoretical yearly amount of water actually available for a
country at a given moment.
Table 1 compares the total amount of water used both at absolute
level and per capita. Given the stability of the distribution and of the
ranking across countries in terms of water use during the considered
time span, Is present the amount of Blue water consumed in years 1995
and 2009. These volumes stem from the estimation of water used by
households, on the basis of the average domestic water supply, and
industry, reported in Hoekstra et al. (2011). There are three facts that
emerge from the results reported by the table:
1. there is an uneven distribution of direct water use both in terms of
absolute level and per capita. The first three countries in the rank-
5The issue of analysing green water scarcity is largely unexplored mostly because there
is no consensus on how to measure green availability. For a deeper discussion see Chapa-
gain and Hoekstra (2007) (pag.34) and Hoekstra et al. (2011).
6It is the sum of internal renewable water resources (IRWR) and exter-
nal actual renewable water resources (ERWR), in particular it is computed as
the sum of total renewable surface water and total renewable groundwater,
minus the possible overlapping. For more information see FAO AQUASTAT
(http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/query/index.html?lang=en).
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Table 1: Total and per capita blue water use (column 1 and 2) and Wa at
country level in 2009.
BLUE Water Statistics 2009
km3 1000m3 per capita Wa in Km3
China 315 (16.22%) Canada 2.76 BRA 8647
India 305 (15.71%) Sweden 1.75 RUS 4508
USA 182 (9.39%) Austria 1.21 USA 3069
Brazil 113 (5.80%) Australia 0.63 CAN 2902
Canada 93 (4.80%) Finland 0.61 CHN 2840
Russia 61 (3.15%) USA 0.59 IDN 2019
Turkey 25 (1.32%) Brazil 0.58 IND 1911
ing, China, India and USA, were responsible of the 41.31% (39.18%)
of the total amount of blue water use worldwide, in 2009 (1995);
2. the rank of countries in terms of absolute water use and per capita
water use remains rather stable over the period 1995–2009;
3. blue water use (absolute and per capita) has increased substantially
over time.
In what follows I assess the impact of inter-sectoral exchanges, inter-
national trade, technological shifts and change in size and composition
of final demand to explain the above facts, providing further policy in-
sights.
2.2.1 Methodology
The Russian economist Wassily Leontief won the Nobel Prize due to the
introduction of the Input-Output (IO) system to describe the economic
process; it is composed by a matrix summarizing the inter-sectoral rela-
tionships existing between several industrial activities. A modern defini-
tion is provided by Miller and Blair (2009): “The input-output modelling
approach consists of a system of linear equations, each one of which de-
scribes the distribution of an industry’s product through the economy”
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(pag. 1). The input of energy and matter transformed into final out-
put, within an economy, are used to describe the links across sectors,
industries, products and final consumption. The main hypothesis is that
in the short-term the production system is fixed and that total produc-
tion is constrained by existing capacities, equipment and infrastructures.
Among its strengths I recall the possibility to recover feedback effects
through simple linear algebra and to incorporate socio-environmental
variables to shed a light on the extra-economic effects of industrial pro-
duction.
I opted for an input-output model because it offers a variety of
tools to ascertain several features of economic activity both at local and
global level. Input-output analysis does not incorporate any specific be-
havioural assumption for individuals, firms or the government. More-
over, it offers the possibility to trace the trade structure between coun-
tries and the related impacts on economic systems, environmental pres-
sures and society. Input-output analysis permits the determination and
quantification of key drivers that cause changes over time in economic,
social or environmental variables and the evaluation of the economic
(and other) consequences of shocks that hit an industry (short-run anal-
ysis) or of natural disasters. Recently, the literature on footprint has fo-
cused on the calculation of the volume of emissions, employment, or
value added that is embodied in exports and imports to provide a sys-
tematic view of the impact of global production/value chains (Andreoni
and Miola, 2014) on environmental resources (e.g. water). However, any
analytical model stands on a set of assumptions which necessarily bring
about some limitations. Andreoni and Miola (2014) identify the follow-
ing shortcomings for what concerns input-output models: i) limited flex-
ibility given by linearity and rigid structure with respect to input, import
substitution and price changes; ii) lack of explicit resource constraints
and lack of responses to price changes, and iii) reliance on constant tech-
nical coefficient which limits the suitability of input-output model for
long run scenarios.
Though designed to keep track of the inter-industrial links, the IO
system has been extensively applied in the field of network science. The
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MRIO system can be viewed as an interdependent complex network,
where nodes are thought as country-sector pairs in different economies
and edges are the flows of (virtual) water between industries. Complex
networks has been proved to be fruitful for the description of a vari-
ety of economic issues (Carvalho, 2012, Zhu et al., 2014). In this Chap-
ter, I considered the global MRIO system as a world input-output net-
work, in order to assess the evolution of VWT and the vulnerability of
the system to (potential) exogenous shocks. The field of input-output
networks, though relatively new, is fast expanding. The recent bulk of
literature in economics stresses that the structure of this production net-
work is key in determining whether and how microeconomic shocks,
affecting only a particular firm or technology, can propagate throughout
the economy yielding aggregate outcomes. Studying the mechanisms
through which shocks diffuse, in economic and ecological systems, is
of a foremost importance to devise policy measures that can help wa-
ter management strategies. Whereas most papers have analyzed the
mechanisms of contagion in financial (Elliott et al., 2014, Glasserman and
Young, 2015) and economic networks (Acemoglu et al., 2012, Contreras
and Fagiolo, 2014), much less is known about how the topology of inter-
dependencies between the sectors of an economy could affect the access
and the distribution of natural resources. An interesting feature, found
in many networks, is the presence of a highly heterogeneous structure,
with degree distributions characterized by large variability and heavy
tails. This feature, in a context of inter-sectoral input-output linkages,
has been proven to be fundamental to understand how microeconomic
idiosyncratic shocks may lead to aggregate effects. Acemoglu et al. (2012)
showed that higher-order interconnections capture the possibility of cas-
cade effects whereby local shocks propagate to the rest of the economy.
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2.3 International VWT
2.3.1 Global Multi-Regional Multi-sectoral Input Output
Model
Global trade involves all countries, each of which has a technology of
production given by the different mix of sectors. A natural approach
to deal with this framework is the application of Global Multi-Regional
Multi-sectoral IO Model (Miller and Blair, 2009) (G-MRIO) in which there
are R regions (countries in this case) composed by the same number (S)
of sectors s. The matrix of intermediate exchanges is composed by (R·S)2
elements. This approach allows to exploit both information about the ex-
change within a country from sector i to sector j (zRRij ) and international
trade from country B to country M (zBMij ), with possibly i = j.
7 In what
follows, I describe the logic of the MRIO model, the notation and the
main equations derived in Section 2.4, which define the evolution of the
international trade structure and final demand, and their impact on Vir-
tual Water.
Let assume, without loss of generality,8 that there are two countries
(M ,B) composed by two sectors each (i,j). The aggregate IO table Z
of intermediate exchanges has, on the diagonal, the square matrices
ZMM and ZBB which represent domestic interindustry flows, while off-
diagonal matrices ZMB and ZBM record the interindustry flows across
countries (i.e. international trade in intermediates). In particular, each
element zij indicates the amount of intermediate exchange from sector
i to sector j, i.e. the entry zBMij is the volume of trade from sector i of
country B to sector j of country M .
7In the present case, given the high level of aggregation, each sector is actually com-
posed by several firms and sub-sectors. For this reason, positive (and large) values are
found in the main diagonal.
8See Miller and Blair (2009) for a full description of the IO methodology.
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Let x be the vector of total output, given by the row sum of intermediate
exchanges (Z) plus the matrix of final demand (F ) which includes do-
mestic consumption and international trade of final goods. It is possible
to split the system among different regions, hence also x is composed by
xB and xM given the presence of two countries. The vector f of total final
demand (row sum of F ) is composed by domestic demand and exports.
The matrix of technical coefficients (A) shows how the product of each
row is distributed across other sectors, that is A = Z · xˆ−1, where xˆ is a
diagonal matrix composed by the inverse of the elements in x, 1xi ∀ix.
Given that A has the same structure of Z, it is split into the domestic
matrix block ABB , AMM and those with the international intermediate
trade: AMB and ABM . The Leontief matrix L solves the linear system:
x = A · x + f , and it is thus given by L = (I − A)−1. Each element lijL
indicates how much the production of sector j must increase given an
unitary increase in the demand of good i. Matrix L captures not only the
direct links (A) but also the indirect ones. In order to compute the indi-
rect use of water at the global level, let define the water intensity vector γ
with respect to total output (x) and to the vector of total water consump-
tion of each sector (w), then γ = w · xˆ−1. Total water use of each sector
can now be defined as:
w = γˆ · L · f (2.2)
that is the vector of water intensity coefficients which expresses the
amount of water (m3) in terms of (1000 dollar worth of) total output.
Combining γ and L, I define the matrix of the indirect use of water due
to to intermediate exchanges, that is:
Θ = γˆ · L (2.3)
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Each element θji of the matrix Θ measures the overall water impact of
an increase of final demand for each sector in each region. Therefore, the
row sum returns the global increase that sector j must satisfy to supply
all other (intermediate) sectors.
2.3.2 VWT: evidence
In what follows, I show how the international trade of intermediate and
final goods, with the relative water footprint, allows some country to in-
directly use water coming from other countries. As expected, only the
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (AFF) sectors and the Elec-
tric, Gas and Water supply (EGW) sectors show a great direct usage of
blue water, where the first represents in 2009 (1995) 56.15% (57.82%) of
total and the latter 41.02% (40,02%) of total. Let define the water foot-
print of exports (ΘExp) and imports (ΘImp) of both intermediate and fi-
nal goods, from which the water trade balance ΘBAL = ΘExp - ΘImp is
derived, e.g. for country C:
ΘCExp =
R∑
k=1
ΘCk · (fk − fkC) (2.4)
ΘCImp =
R∑
k=1
(Θ˜k −ΘCk) · fkC (2.5)
where
Θ˜k =
R∑
j=1
Θjk (2.6)
where R is the number of countries (40 + ROW). Here fCC is the domes-
tic final demand, while fkC represents the vector of export from coun-
try k to C, and fk is the row sum for each sector in country k. Let Θij
be a square sub-matrix which shows the Leontief inverse for country i,
when it exports to j, multiplied by their water usage, as in equation 2.3.
Note that ΘCC ·
∑N
k 6=C fk returns the water needed in country C when
producing goods and services for final use which are exported to all the
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other countries. Whilst, given k 6= C, it is possible to recover the water
needed in country C when producing the intermediate exports that are
used abroad to produce final goods and services consumed by country
k: ΘCk ·
∑N
k 6=C(fk − fkC). Country C is a ‘water debtor’ if and only if
ΘImp,C > ΘExp,C .
Figure 1: Global Blue water export dynamics: 1995 to 2009.
Figure 1 shows the increasing relevance of export of blue water that grew
from 238 to 365 km3 over the 1995-2009 period. The impact of the inter-
national crisis is evident since export reaches the peak in 2008, showing
a decrease of more than 10% in 2009 with respect to 2008. The figure
shows the non-linear dynamics of the level of export of virtual water. An
important conclusion from studies on VWT is that international VWT in
many cases does not follow the spatial pattern of fresh water resource
availability. Indeed, Figure 2 tells that international trade has an high
impact on the possibility of a country to face its domestic requirements.
The findings of Arto (2012) are confirmed, with a progressive diversion
of virtual water from the developing (Asian) to developed countries (see
Table 14 in Appendix A.2). There is a tendency of globalization to move
the production from the wealthier countries to emerging countries mak-
ing them the core of production and, consequently, export. The main net
importers are: USA, Japan, Germany and Great Britain. Note that, once
compared with water availability (Wa), there are only few largely water
endowed countries (China, India, Canada and Brazil) which cover the
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greatest part of the export of virtual water. Bigger countries are rather
heterogeneous: some of them are net exporters (Brazil, China, India and
Canada) while USA imported an amount of (virtual) water of almost 40
km3 in 2009. Interesting to note the case of Russia which was an impor-
tant exporter in 2001 (+13.39 Km3) but became a net importer (-1.38 Km3)
in 2009, although it is a water abundant country.
Inasmuch a country is less endowed with water, it becomes more de-
pendent on foreign freshwater resources. From a systemic point of view,
these facts raise the question about the vulnerability of VW trade in case
negative (climatic) shocks hit the main nodes of the virtual water net-
work. In what follows, I assess the evolution of industrial structure and
final demand and their impact on virtual water through SDA. This anal-
ysis will be complemented by network-based measures to unravel the
topology and the connections between the industrial sectors and thus
the resilience of VWT network.
Figure 2: Relation between Water Availability and net trade balance (BAL)
of BVW in 1995, 2001 and 2009.
Note that, in Figure 2, points above zero stand for ‘net’ exporter of Blue
(virtual) water, while the ‘water debtors’ lie below. BIG stands for wa-
ter abundant countries (> 1000 km3 of Wa), MEDIUM stands for coun-
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tries endowed with an amount of renewable freshwater between 100-
1000 km3 and LITTLE are countries with less than 100 km3 of Wa.
2.4 Structural Decomposition Analysis
As discussed in the previous section, trade in virtual water has increased
substantially in recent years. The existing literature (e.g. Arto et al., 2012)
agrees that this dynamic has been driven by a variety of factors such as
changes in ‘water efficiency’, structural change, composition of final de-
mand and scale effects. In this section I dig deeper into the drivers of vir-
tual water by decomposing recent trends of virtual water in their various
components. I apply a simplified version of the structural decomposi-
tion analysis (SDA) used by Xu and Dietzenbacher (2014) to quantify the
contribution of various driving forces to changes in water embodied in
exports. Differently from Xu and Dietzenbacher (2014), I do not evaluate
changes in environmental pressures embodied in export (either of final
goods or of intermediates) but I evaluate directly the water footprint of
final demand of each country. This is particularly suitable for purposes
of this Chapter as it grasps the importance of the different driving forces
of total water footprint. Methodological details about the decomposition
are discussed in the Appendix A.1. The change of total water footprint
from time t to t + 1, ∆w = wt+1 − wt, is a function of the above drivers,
that is:
∆w = Θ(IE, T,H, POP,QC , Qcap, D
∗) (2.7)
where the intensity effect (IE) stands for change in water intensity coef-
ficients (γ), T and H are the impact of trade and change in the ‘sectoral’
composition of intermediate inputs, respectively, captured by the Leon-
tief inverse. The impact of final demand is decomposed into four com-
ponents: impact of international trade (D), change in the product mix
(QC) and change in consumption per capita (Qcap) and population size
(POP ). Here, the results at the global level (figure 15) are compared with
those derived for a selection of countries: United States, India, China,
Italy, Russia, Brazil and Japan. These countries represent together 51.78
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percent of global GDP (source: World Bank) and 52.06 percent of total
blue water direct use (source: WIOD) in 2009. The selection of countries
includes both high-income and emerging countries which allows to com-
pare the drivers of changes in water demand across rather heterogeneous
regions.
The ‘water intensity’ component IE describes the role played by
changes in the vector of direct water use per unit of produced output.
More specifically, this component describes how changes in water inten-
sity in all countries affect the water footprint of a specific country. Over-
all (Figure 15), improvements in water efficiency of production activities
allowed to reduce world water footprint by about 40 percent over the pe-
riod 1995-2009. The contribution of this component has been rather small
in the first years of the series (1995-1999) and then accelerated substan-
tially up to 2008. Results for specific countries (figure 16) show that the
water footprint of China’s final demand would have increased by about
60 percent over the period 1995-2009 in absence of improvements of wa-
ter efficiency in production occurred in China and in its trading partners.
Changes in water intensity contributed to an overall reduction in water
footprints for all countries (at least for the period 1995-2008, while the
water footprint for Brazil and Italy in 2009 would have been higher than
in 1995 due to worldwide changes in water intensity) but with much
smaller magnitudes than for China (in the order of 10-20 percent). It is
also interesting to note that while the overall cumulative trend goes in
the direction of a negative contribution (i.e. smaller water use) of wa-
ter intensity, many years have been characterized by (even substantial)
increases in average water use per unit of output.
There are several institutional barriers that might impede a more effi-
cient use of water: regulatory uncertainty, cross-country heterogeneity in
water-related regulation (including property rights), high upfront costs,
and principal-agent issues in water markets. Another possible explana-
tion is that water is not always priced effectively (if not at all) resulting in
many countries not considering water as a scarce limited resource. Note
that IE includes, for each country, the effect of an (in-)efficient water
management of all the other countries. Therefore, to overwhelm those
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institutional barriers, a global coordination is needed, as suggested be-
low.
The component H should be interpreted as the contribution to wa-
ter footprint of changes in the technical coefficient matrix (i.e. mix of
intermediate inputs) with no consideration of the geographical origin of
intermediate inputs. A positive sign reveals a systematic increase in the
relative importance of water-intensive (above average) sectors. Over-
all, this component has driven up the world water footprint by about
8 percent over the period 1995-2009: virtual water related to final con-
sumption has increased due to a systematic shift of intermediate inputs
towards more water-intensive sectors. Results for single countries, re-
ported in figure 17, highlight a substantial degree of heterogeneity. The
component is positive, in the order of 15-20 percent over the period 1995-
2009, for Brazil and China and in the order of 5-10 percent for Italy. It is
interesting to note, however, that for Brazil and Italy the contribution
of the component H has been steadily increasing since 1995 while for
China it is estimated a substantial increase starting form 2003. At the
other extreme, there is a negative contribution of the component in the
order of 15-20 percent for India, Russia and the United States and basi-
cally no change due to H for Japan. Overall, the production technology
has changed, in recent years, in the direction of requiring an increasing
amount of virtual water.
The component T accounts for changes in the ‘geographical’ compo-
sition of the mix of intermediate inputs for a fixed average mix of inter-
mediates (i.e. H). A positive sign should be interpreted as a system-
atic shift of the purchase of intermediates towards more water-intensive
countries. At the aggregate level, this component is very small and con-
tributed positively to water footprint. Results for selected countries, re-
ported in figure 18, denote a generally smaller contribution of this com-
ponent relative to the H component. Similarly to the ‘water efficiency’,
trends are not systematically upward or downward. Looking at the
overall 1995-2009 cumulative contribution of the T component, the only
country that shifted its demand of intermediate inputs towards system-
atically less ‘water efficient’ countries is China, with a predicted increase
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in the order of 10 percent of its water footprint. The contribution of this
component is very small (smaller than 5 percent) for India, Brazil, Japan
and the US, while it is negative and in the order of 5 and 10 percent
for, respectively, Italy and Russia. Quite surprisingly, the composition
of trade of intermediates has remained rather stable in the considered
period, especially when compared to changes in production technology
(H). Trade links seem to be persistent in time and are likely to be strictly
linked to bilateral relationships between countries, comparative advan-
tages, trade costs, factor endowments and historical bilateral links. This
is particularly interesting as shocks in water availability, that might dras-
tically reduce the supply of water-intensive goods of a specific country
hit by the shock, are likely to influence the demand for water quite sub-
stantially due to the ‘rigidity’ of bilateral trade patterns.
Final demand is split into four different components to capture both
the scale and the intensity effects. The first two components, QC and D∗,
are the counterparts for final demand of the components H and T , re-
spectively. The component QC quantifies the role played by changes in
the product mix of final demand for a given level of final demand and
for a given ‘geographical’ composition of final demand. The aggregate
result (Figure 15) highlights a negative contribution of this component
to total water demand, in the order of about 18 percent over the period
1995-2009. Results for selected countries, reported in figure 19, confirm
a general transition of final demand towards sectors with a systemati-
cally smaller water footprint per dollar, the only exception being Japan,
for which basically no change is visible. The component is particularly
big in magnitude for China and India, for which changes in the sectoral
composition of final demand contributed to a reduction of water foot-
print of about 45 percent over the period 1995-2009. As highlighted in
the recent literature (Arto, 2012, Roson and Sartori, 2015) this evidence
is linked to the relative decrease in the share of final demand directed to
food products, which are particularly water-intensive. The magnitude of
the reduction is much smaller for the United States and Russia (about 15
percent) and even smaller for Italy and Brazil (about 5-10 percent).
The role of changes in the ‘geographical’ distribution of final demand
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is described by the component D∗. Results for this component are very
similar to the ones found for T , that described the geographical com-
position of intermediate consumption. The geographical distribution of
final demand contributes positively to the overall demand of virtual wa-
ter, even though the effect is rather small. Looking at the evidence for
selected countries (Figure 20), China was the only country that experi-
enced a big increase in water use due to shift of demand (now of final
goods) towards more water-intensive countries. The size of the effect is
here much bigger than for T , accounting for about 20 percent increase
in water footprint of China (about two times the contribution of factor T
for the same country). For five other countries the contribution is close to
zero while the contribution is negative and between 5-10 percent for Italy
and Russia. These results are in line with the ones discussed for the com-
ponent T , denoting a substantial rigidity of the geographical distribution
of trade patterns.
The last two components refer to more aggregate driving forces, that
are: changes in per capita total final demand (in real terms) and demo-
graphic growth. The role played by changes in total final demand per
capita, strongly correlated with affluence, is by far the biggest component
that drives virtual water, accounting for a 55 percent increase (world-
wide) in virtual water over the period 1995-2009. This effect was particu-
larly important for emerging countries (Figure 21) such as China (about
+120 percent), India (about +80 percent) and Russia (+60 percent) over
the period 1995-2009, while the increase due to affluence in Brazil, Italy
and the United States has raised the water footprint by about 20 percent
and no change is observed for Japan. These differences reflect asymmet-
ric macroeconomic growth across countries, with evidence of a substan-
tial convergence of emerging countries towards high-income countries
both in terms of affluence and in terms of water demand.
Finally, the role of demography has been very stable over the period,
contributing to an increase in water footprint of about 20 percent world-
wide. When looking at the selected of countries (Figure 22), the contribu-
tion of the demographic component was about 20 percent for India and
Brazil, 15 percent for the United States and China, 5 percent for Italy and
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Japan and basically no change for Russia, over the period 1995-2009.
To summarize, the structural decomposition has highlighted
that while size-related components (population and affluence) and
technological-structural components (water intensity and structure of fi-
nal demand and intermediate input mix) have contributed substantially
to changes in the demand for water, while the geographical-related com-
ponents (both in terms of final demand and intermediate inputs) had
very little influence on the demand for water. The interpretation of this
last result is that heterogeneity in water availability and water efficiency
across countries played a minor role as determinant of trade patterns vis-
a-vis other determinants such as trade policy, comparative advantage,
and factors (other than water) endowment. However, there is another
possible implication: if the geographical structure of trade patterns was
not responsive to differences in water endowment and efficiency across
countries, what would happen in case of shocks to water availability that
are likely to occur due to climate change? How would these shocks prop-
agate across different countries and sectors and how vulnerable is the
VW trade network? To answer these questions a comprehensive knowl-
edge about the topology and the property of the VW trade network is
needed as classic input-output analysis, with its strong assumptions of
linearity, perfect complementarity and immediate adjustment of supply
to demand, is not an utterly suitable methodological tool.
2.5 Network Analysis of Virtual Water Flows
The topology of the VWT network is described by the matrices Ω and Φ,
both containing the amount of direct virtual water exchanged for inter-
mediate and the final consumption, respectively as:
Ω = γˆ · Z (2.8)
Φ = γˆ · F (2.9)
such that the row sum of both matrices must be equal to the total amount
of water used in each sector: Ω · e + Φ · e = w, where e is the summa-
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tion vector. I investigate the Directed and Weighted Graph of the actual
exchanges,9 among the sectors of all the countries, of (virtual) water em-
bedded in each product. In this way it is possible to complement the evi-
dence arising from the SDA, which quantifies the role played by a variety
of drivers of virtual water at the aggregate level, with useful information
on the topology of the linkages among countries and sectors. Each com-
bination of country-sector pair is considered as a node of the Network.
Links between nodes are directed on the basis of the flow of trade, e.g.
from exporter to the importer, and they are weighted by the volume of
virtual water traded. In particular, in line with Acemoglu et al. (2012), I
present the results for matrix Ω only, assessing the topological structure
of intermediate trade, giving a better understanding of the technological
evolution and its spatial distribution.
Ω is the weighted adjacency matrix whose elements ωij represent the
links between node i and j, that is the flow of VW that goes from i to
j. Strictly-positive self loops ωii > 0 captures the idea of a sector us-
ing its own products as inputs (in case of heterogeneous firms’ activity).
Directed networks are typically asymmetric, meaning that ωij 6= ωji, so
they allow to recover the information both from the importer and the
exporter side. Let kin,i be the in−node degree, that is the number of
sectors that are exporting to sector i; while Sin,i = Σjωij is the in−node
strength of node i, that is the total amount of intermediate input pur-
chased by sector i.10 Symmetrically, I define the out−node degree kout,i
and strength Sout,i, of node i, by summing the entries in the row i of ma-
trix Ω. These indicators provide a first overview, albeit incomplete, of the
structure of VWT network and of the presence of hubs (big importer or
exporter), which influences the resilience of the whole system. Results in
table 2 refer to the Graph composed by 1400 nodes, each of which trades
virtual water. ROW has been removed because, by definition, it includes
a great variety of countries, and then it does not represent an homoge-
neous entity. The topological structure is not affected by that, with the
9I filter the edges such that the minimum amount of virtual water traded is 1000 m3.
This simplifies the computation without affecting the results in a substantial way.
10This computation reminds the backward linkage index which returns the column sum
of matrix L to assess the importance of a node.
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exception of the ranking, because ROW covers a big share of the virtual
water globally traded. In what follows I showe some statistics of interest
for the whole graph Ω, while the last part of this Section is focused to an
higher level of aggregation in order to assess the evolution of the com-
munity structure of VWT. It is also offered a comparison with the ‘pure’
international trade (IT), that is by excluding each domestic trade in the
matrix Ω. Table 2 shows some statistics of interest that give important
information about the topological structure of the Network.11
Table 2: Fundamental properties of BVWT Network for intermediate
goods in 1995, 2001 and 2009.
Ω BW1995 BW2001 BW2009 BW
IT
1995 BW
IT
2001 BW
IT
2009
VWT Km3 621.05 655.48 837.61 25.83 32.29 32.14
VWT % 41.00 41.07 42.72 4.15§ 4.92§ 3.86§
edges 99864 110122 117595 90847 101015 108479
density 5.10 5.62 6.00 90%§ 91.7% § 92.2% §
max(kin) 238 243 241 230 235 233
max(kout) 1202 1237 1260 1168 1203 1203
max(Sin) Km3 43.30 49.54 52.67 2.35 (5.3% ]) 2.64 (5.33% ]) 2.48(4.70% ])
max(Sout) Km3 90.03 87.80 143.86 6.69 (7.4% ]) 6.86 (7.8% ]) 8.86 (6.16% ])
LogNSin : µ 10.18 10.23 10.27 7.28 7.65 7.78
(σ) (2.84) (2.90) (2.85) (2.38) (2.36) (2.22)
LogNSout : µ 9.99 10.09 10.19 7.79 7.96 8.16
(σ) (3.44) (3.44) (3.44) (2.9) (2.97) (2.91)
FIT Sin vs kin (ξ) 2.38 2.42 2.41 2.15 2.16 2.16
(σ) (0.056) (0.055) (0.059) (0.064) (0.069) (0.082)
FIT Sout vs kout (ζ) 1.99 2.00 1.98 1.73 1.77 1.74
(σ) (0.076) (0.08) (0.078 ) (0.07) (0.08) (0.097)
It appears a great increase in the volume of blue VWT of intermediate
goods, which represents more than 40% of total blue water. Although the
number of edges (or links) is quite large, the share of active linkages, with
the respect to all possible combinations (14002) is very low, that is around
5.5%. This is not surprising because many sectors are characterized by a
null direct water intensity coefficient.12 The weight of links ranges from
11In Table 2 σ stands for the standard deviation, § stands for percentages computed with
the respect to intermediate exchanges only, while ] means percentages of max(Sin−/out−).
12This is a specific feature of the data collected in WIOD, with the bulk of direct water
usage concentrated in a reduced number of water-intensive sectors. If also direct water
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103 m3 to a maximum of 52 Km3 in case of in−node strength and up
to 143 Km3 in case of out−node strength, indicative of high link weight
heterogeneity. The main importers (with higher Sin) and exporters (with
higher Sout) are almost the same during the whole time span consid-
ered.13 When looking at the whole network the main importer was the
Food and Beverage (Fd) sector of USA, India and China representing the
18% of the whole BVWT (intermediate goods). The main exporters were
the AFF and EWG sector of China and the AFF sector of USA and India
representing more than 50% of the whole BVWT (intermediate goods).
However, when the focus is narrowed toward ‘pure’ international trade,
the picture is barely different: the Fd sector of China superseded the USA
and Japan in 2009 as the main importer, with a share of almost 8% (the
three together represents again the 18% of the whole BVW from IT in in-
termediate goods). The main exporters were the AFF sector of USA and
India and the EWG sector of Canada (again with a share slightly above
the 50%, confirming the scale-free behaviour of the system).
It is now worth to investigate the distribution of in− and out− node de-
gree and strength to assess the heterogeneity of the network connectiv-
ity. As expected max(Sout) > max(Sin) always, because only few sectors
are providing virtual water to all the others. Figure 3 draws the natural
logarithm of nodes strength as a function of their degree. It emerges a
power-law relationship that follows the form Sin ∼ kξin and Sout ∼ kζout
(estimated coefficients are reported in Table 2). The power law coeffi-
cients of the in− degree distribution is relatively stable (less than 10%
change) and of about 2.4. The same holds also for ζ which, in all cases,
floats around 2, revealing a highly non-linear relationship. This high
values indicate that there is a strong relationship between the volume
use of much less water-intensive sectors was considered, the number of active links would
have been greater, even though these additional links would have been characterized by a
very small average ‘weight’.
13Note that by including self-loops and intra-country trade, the terms import and export
not necessary refer to transfers abroad but in most of the cases they are led by domestic
exchanges.
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Figure 3: Plot of Sin against kin (above) and of Sout against kout (below).
of virtual water that each nation trades and the number of commercial
partners. In other words, the weight in−/out− degree grows faster than
simple in−/out− degree, so the more trade connections a country has,
the much more it is able to participate in the exchange of virtual water in
a highly nonlinear way. This finding suggests a remarkable policy impli-
cations: more ‘openness to trade’ is an efficacious channel for countries
to improve access to water resources. On the other hand, the rate of de-
cay is far slower than in a Gaussian distribution (where the exponent is
0.5), meaning that shocks to sectors, that take more central positions in
the inter-sectoral network, have a more than proportional effect on the
whole system.
The distributions of both Sout and Sin are well fitted by a lognormal14
distribution (see Figure 23 and 24 in the Appendix A.4). These results are
in line with the findings of Konar et al. (2012), despite the fact that this
14It was applied the Kernel density smoothing function given in Matlab. It returns a
probability density estimate, f , for the sample in the vector x. The estimate is based on a
normal Kernel function, and is evaluated at 100 equally spaced points, xi, that cover the
range of the data in x.
31
study accounts for self-loops and that it focuses on inter-sectoral trade
only (Ω). Given the stability of the distributions over time, I report only
the fits for three years of interest (1995, 2001 and 2009). The scale-free
behaviour allows to conjecture similar findings even when more data
and details for the ROW will be available. Indeed, the system is stable
at different levels of aggregation and the absence of the half of the VWT
(represented by the ROW) does not affect the topology. The scale-free
property is further confirmed below when ‘pure’ international trade is
considered. Although it accounts for roughly 5% of the whole blue VWT,
it has most of the features in common with the large-scale network. In
what follows, I introduce additional measures to understand whether
benefit of trade is counterbalanced by greater systemic risks.
To provide a clear picture of the systemic vulnerability of the network, I
compute the first- and second- order network characteristics. Note that
two networks with identical first−degree distributions might exhibit
considerably different levels of vulnerability, because of the so called
‘cascades’ effects. Indeed, a country-specific idiosyncratic shock affects
not only those countries immediately connected to it, but also those in-
directly connected. The second−order degree of sector i is defined as the
weighted sum of the degrees of the sectors that use sector i’s product
as inputs, with weights given by the corresponding input shares. In the
current context they are derived by the following system of equations:
Ψ = Ω · (Sˆin)−1 (2.10)
d = Ψ · e (2.11)
q = Ψ · dˆ · e (2.12)
where Ψ is the matrix of weights, such that e′ ·Ψ = e, where e is the sum-
mation vector. Vector d is the so called weighted first order-connectivity
(out-) degree which shows a fat-tail distribution (see the left panel of
figure 4), which confirms that extreme events are more probable than
in the Gaussian distribution. (Acemoglu et al., 2012) show that the dis-
tribution of d provides only partial information about the structure of
the network, it is thus necessary to compute the weighted second order-
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connectivity (out-)degree to assess the levels of vulnerability as this also
considers the indirect connections between sectors and countries. Figure
4 (right panel) confirms the heavy tail (see Table 18 in Appendix A.4 for
the statistical tests) behaviour even for q which means that the indirect
inter-sectoral links potentially propagates the impact of a shock that hits
a node (most notably if it is a ‘big’ exporter). Because of the scale-free be-
havior, confirmed by Tables 2 and 3, the same considerations hold in case
of international trade only. International input trade transmits shocks
across borders in much the same way as domestic input trade transmits
shocks across sectors, they are passed downstream through the produc-
tion chain directly in other countries and may generate remarkable vari-
ations in the amount of VW traded. Thus, the network of international
input flows, although its tiny fraction, might be a risky channel of water
redistribution.
Figure 4: Empirical Density distribution and Countercumulative Function
of q in 1995, 2001 and 2009.
The extreme heterogeneity of the connectivity patterns, together with
the large fluctuations observed (σ2in and σ
2
out, Table 3), are additional sig-
nals that is present a scale-free distributions. Recent literature shows that
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the heavy-tailed nature of the degree distribution has also important con-
sequences on the network resilience in case of removal of vertices or ex-
ogenous shocks to vertices. The relevant parameter for these phenomena
is the ratio between the first and the second moment of the distribution.
In case of directed networks, as those analyzed so far, this heterogeneity
parameter has to be defined separately for in− and out− degrees as:
λSin =
< S2in >
< Sin >
(2.13)
λSout =
< S2out >
< Sout >
(2.14)
(2.15)
If λSin >> 1 (and/or λSout >> 1) the network manifests some properties
that are not observed for networks with exponentially decaying degree
distributions. Table 3 confirms the heavy-tailed behaviour when com-
paring the heterogeneity parameters and their high variances. Because
most of the analyzed degree distributions are heavy-tailed, fluctuations
are extremely large so that the linear correlation coefficient is not well de-
fined for those cases. A full account of the connectivity pattern and of the
system vulnerability requires further non-linear indicators of degree cor-
relations. First, I compute the so called one-point degree correlations (kin.out
and Sin.out) for individual nodes, in order to understand whether it is
present a relation between the number of incoming and outgoing links
in single nodes. These are computed as:
kin.out =
< Σikin,i · kout,i >
< kin > · < kin > (2.16)
Sin.out =
< ΣiSin,i · Sout,i >
< Sin > · < Sin > (2.17)
A significant positive correlation between the in-degrees and the out-
degrees of single nodes is found in each year, as summarized in Table
3. This implies that sectors that have a higher number of input-demand
relations, i.e. a high in-degree, also tend to supply their output to a rela-
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tively higher number of other sectors. This information is crucial to bet-
ter understand the structure of international trade shown in Figure 2. To
best of my knowledge the assessment of these values for environmental
variables is novel in the literature.
Table 3: Degree Correlations statistics of BW Networks for 1995, 2001 and
2009.
Ω BW1995 BW2001 BW2009 BW
IT
1995 BW
IT
2001 BW
IT
2009
< kin >=< kout > 71.33 78.66 83.99 64.89 72.15 77.48
σkin 50.18 52.05 52.54 48.71 50.54 50.99
σkout 191.96 207.72 219.72 182.22 197.80 209.69
< Sin >=< Sout > (Km
3) 0.443 0.468 0.592 0,018 0.023 0.023
σSin(Km
3) 2.13 2.25 3.11 0,104 0.109 0.116
σSout(Km
3) 4.43 4.63 6.47 0,23 0.28 0.287
λkin 106.61 113.08 116.84 101.43 107.52 111.02
λkout 587.55 626.83 658.35 576.24 614.019 644.58
λSin(Km
3) 10.67 11.32 16.91 0.611 0.54 0.62
λSout(Km
3) 44.73 46.21 71.13 2.894 3.394 3.642
kin.out 1.62 1.56 1.51 1.68 1.62 1.56
Sin.out 23.27 23.16 30.39 12.71 8.28 9.69
rωi→j - 0.0235 - 0.0228 - 0.0215 -0.0125 -0.0203 -0.0186
Finally, the assortativity index measures the similarity of connections
in the graph with respect to the node strength, hence it is a correlation
coefficient between the strengths (weighted degrees) of all nodes on two
opposite ends of a link. It is a natural candidate to investigate the correla-
tions of the degrees of neighboring vertices. Through this index, I assess
whether relatively high degree nodes have a higher tendency to be con-
nected to other high degree nodes. A positive assortativity coefficient
indicates that nodes tend to link to other nodes with the same or similar
strength. This property was defined by Newman (2002) for un-weighted
networks, while here I introduce the version as explained in Leung and
H (2007) as:15
15The code is a modified version of what is given by MIT Strategic Engineering web site
(http://strategic.mit.edu).
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rωδ→ι =
∑
j δj ·ιj
P − (
∑
j δj+ιj
2P )
2
(
∑
j δj
2+ι2j )
2P − (
∑
j δj+ιj
2P )
2
(2.18)
whereP is the sum of the weighted edges of the Network and δj , ιj repre-
sents the out−node and in−node strength of the two vertices connected
by the jth link. For the sake of completeness I computed the assortativ-
ity index for each of the 4 possible combinations (out-out, in-in, in-out
and out-in), finding very similar findings (Table 3 reports an average
value). The values, in contrast with the findings of Konar et al. (2012),
are slightly negative in each period, remarking a slight disassortative be-
haviour even when weights are taken into account (also in case of IT),
suggesting that high degree (strength) country-sector pairs tend to have
trade relationships with small country-sector pairs more often than ex-
pected in a random network, suggesting a potential benefit of redistri-
bution of VWT from big (high endowed) countries toward water scarce
regions. In other words, the disassortativity indicates that nations that
trade large volumes of water are ‘open’ to trade with many other na-
tions, so that large volumes of water can be reallocated among several
countries, representing a potential water security tool.
The above analysis, together with the disassortative structure of the
Network, highlights the duality of VWT. The global network of virtual
water might benefit from increasing exchanges, however although inter-
national VWT is still a tiny fraction of the whole exchanges, it might be a
risky channel because it facilitates the propagation of shocks. The topo-
logical properties of the current Blue VWT network bring about some
relevant implications that call for policy action aimed at reducing and
mitigating the propagation of shocks in the supply of water due to the in-
creasing climatic risks. Action should necessarily involve a coordinated
set of measures across countries due to the high degree of dependence
on foreign water resources for most countries. Not only ‘big’ countries
but also smaller ones should be included, indeed Figure 2 shows a posi-
tive relation between the endowments of Wa and the level of net import
of VW (and thus of higher level of external ‘dependency’ and thus ex-
posure to external shocks). Being part of the VWT network increases a
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country’s vulnerability to crisis that occur in other countries involved in
the network, due to the cascade effects; or in other words, there is a po-
tential trade-off between the need to import water-intensive goods (and
the associated potential saving in water resources) and the vulnerabil-
ity to external shocks. Moreover, from the inter-temporal comparison of
the first− and second− order connectivity degree and of the indeces of
degree correlations (at both a binary and weighted level) it emerges an
increasing tendency of the blue water networks to be more vulnerable
in time. These are remarkable results about the possibility to incur in
imminent crisis.
All in all, these results highlight the necessity to start off a serious
program of local and global water management strategies to reduce the
risks coming from water stress. Therefore, understanding the structure
of this production network can inform policy-makers on how to prepare
for and recover from adverse shocks that alter the provision and distri-
bution of Blue water.
2.5.1 Community Detection
Within the International Trade Network literature it is possible to ob-
serve a growing interest in studying how the process of globalization is
changing the topology and the spatial distribution of trade, in particu-
lar how and which ‘communities’ of countries are emerging, with many
edges connecting nodes in clusters. I applied the modularity optimiza-
tion16 introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004), based on the idea that
from a comparison between the density of the edges in a sub-graph and
that one would expect in a random graph (which would not have any
communities), it is possible to detect cluster structures.
Given the big number of edges, I decided to aggregate, without loss of
coherence, some sectors of particular interest into 5 macro-sectors in or-
der to have comparable results with the previous IO analysis, in particu-
16Modularity optimization consists into optimizing the function Q =∑
ij(Aij−Pij)δ(Ci,Cj)
2m
, where A is the adjacency matrix, P is the random graph with the
same degree sequence of A, m is the total number of edges and the δ function returns zero
in case if node i and j belonging to the same community.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 5: Community Structure for Blue VWT in 1995 (a), 2001 (b) and 2009
(c).
lar I considered: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (AFF), Food,
Beverages and Tobacco (Fd), Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (EWG),
Textile, Chemicals, Metallurgic and Paper industries (DUS) and all the
others gathered together (Othd). This simplification allows us to unravel
the evolution of the connections among different sectors and their evo-
38
lution over time. This new graph is composed by 200 nodes that trade
both domestically and with foreign partners. In what follows, I discuss
the evolution in the emergence of communities by comparing three years
of interest: 1995, 2001 and 2009. Note that by allowing intra-national
trade, the domestic exchanges result to be the most important compo-
nent, although the emergence of international communities, whose are
not always explained by geographical proximity, is confirmed. Figure 5
describes graphically the various communities for years 1995, 2001 and
2009.
Despite the increasing globalization of value chains, it is observed
an increasing tendency of big countries (USA, Japan, China, India and
Brazil) to rely more on regional-national VWT than to create interna-
tional communities. This might be explained by the fact that the do-
mestic amount of virtual water traded is much higher than what they
exchange at the international level. Moreover, these countries are also
linked to a variety of trading parties without forming any significant
cluster. Most communities were based on a single economy. One the
other hand, the biggest multi-country community in 1995 was formed by
central-eastern European countries (including Germany, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Slovenia). This big community
disappeared in 2001, giving rise to different multi-country communities.
The biggest was lead by Germany that also included Austria, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Canada. Figure 5 depicts this latter big community
in violet. Other important communities grouped together mostly Baltic
countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and, quite surprisingly, the UK in
2009) on the one hand and central-eastern European countries on the
other hand.
All in all, European countries tend to create more communities, es-
pecially so Central and Eastern European countries, than countries in
other continents. A second remarkable result is the fact that many com-
munities are only composed by sectors belonging to one single country:
this result highlights the importance of domestic water supply in many
countries as opposed to the supply of water coming from other countries.
Finally, the composition of the communities sometimes reflect links that
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go beyond the geographical proximity of countries (e.g. the presence of
Canada in an European community) but depend more on comparative
advantage of some country in water-intensive products and historically
strong trade ties between countries. As seen, the community detection
help us to understand the emergence of linkages at international level,
providing further information about the effect of technological change.
In particular it helps to define the source of variation (given by ΘTECH
and ΘIE) unravel through the SDA.
2.6 Discussion
In this Chapter I defined a novel conceptual framework to study the
global blue VWT by integrating IO and Network methodologies. It
proved to be a fruitful choice because it provides a wider picture of the
issues at stake, to wit assessing an efficient allocation of water resources
such as to prevent the propagation of local (climatic) risks. The present
work contributes to the debate on the potential benefits and risks asso-
ciated with openness to trade. SDA allowed to unravel the main drivers
of VW their evolution over time. There was a substantial contribution
to reducing water demand exerted by the composition of final demand
and by improvements in the water efficiency of production, while de-
mographic and economic growth and changes in the intermediate input
mix has more than compensated such reduction. Interestingly, the role
played by changes in trade patterns was rather marginal, contributing
only to a moderate increase in virtual water. Besides the aggregate pic-
ture, there are some peculiarity in specific countries that seems to be re-
lated to their level of affluence and their trajectory of structural change
and economic growth.
Network theory extends the information provided by the IO assess-
ment because it captures the non-linear relationships between in− and
out− node strength and degree distributions that follow a power law.
This finding has important implications for the trade policy of water-
scarce countries looking to increase their water availability because, as
showed above, the amount of VW increases more than proportionally
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with the number of commercial partners. The fat-tail behaviour of the
first– and second– order connectivity measures confirms that the system
is particularly exposed to the propagation of local (supply-side) shocks
due to ‘cascade effects’ (Acemoglu et al., 2012). The main policy implica-
tion of these findings is that a cross-country coordination of water man-
agement policies is needed to increase the resilience of the water supply
system to negative shocks to some crucial vertix, that would otherwise
propagate to a large number of nodes.
When looking at both SDA and Network analysis it turns out that the
component ‘international trade’ is still marginal, while the technologi-
cal components (H and γ) has ensured to save almost the 30% of water
at global level. It means that the impact of a shock can be mitigated by
a proportional improvement of water efficiency. This important feature
has been captured by the combination of the two methodologies that, in
isolation, cannot describe effectively both the systematic risks and the
dynamic evolution of the VWT. The duality of trade is determined by the
apparent minor role played, evidenced by the SDA, coupled with the
potential risks related to the propagation of shocks in water supply, ev-
idenced by Network analysis. In other words, there is still large room
for reducing the water footprint by reallocating intermediate and final
consumption towards more water-efficient countries. Such reallocation,
however, would come at the cost of greater exposure to propagation of
shocks in the supply of water from specific countries. This duality is par-
ticularly challenging for what concerns the negotiation of international
trade agreements and of international agreements aimed at promoting
water security and an efficient use of water. A reduction of trade bar-
riers may help, in principle, in improving the allocation of production
of water-intensive products in water-efficient countries. However, in ab-
sence of a pricing mechanism for water, especially in emerging countries,
the incentive to promote an overall improvements in water efficiency
through trade may be limited. Moreover, as highlighted in this analy-
sis on the topology of the trade network, coordination mechanisms are
needed in order to mitigate the risks related to the propagation of shocks
to water supply. Finally, Community Detection gives further insights, to
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be integrated with the results given by SDA, unravelling the evolution
of international trade of intermediate goods. Results reveal the presence
of different kinds of communities, mostly between European countries
or composed by single countries. However, geographical proximity is
not enough to explain this phenomenon, as the presence of Canada in
the European communities for blue water demonstrates. Current find-
ings call for coordinated actions in favour of a wiser management of wa-
ter scarcity through the development of transboundary agreements and
policies both at global and regional level. The process of globalization
should then be matched with a process of international cooperation be-
cause countries’ actions are not confined to their territorial jurisdiction,
but they might interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the
right to (virtual) water in other countries. Currently, there is an imbal-
ance between international trade agreements (under the WTO system)
and international agreements on sustainable water use, being the former
strong, detailed and binding, whereas the latter are weak, unsophisti-
cated, and with low enforcement power. There is the need to widening
of WTO rules on trade in virtual water such as allowing export bans on
water intensive products on the basis of serious concerns over conserva-
tion of their domestic water resources or introducing tariffs that consider
the amount of water that has been used to produce imported products.
This approach may look similar to the one proposed to tackle the issue
of carbon leakage in the context of climate change by means of so-called
carbon tariffs. However, it may be difficult to implement it within the
WTO rules (Moore, 2011) and it would require specific international ne-
gotiations. At European level the EU members have strengthen their
relationships over the past decades. The Water Framework Directive
(2000/60/EC) sets the objective of achieving the ‘good ecological status’
of all water bodies in the EU (surface as well as groundwater) by 2015
and the strong recommendation of full cost recovery for water services
including environmental and resource costs. Nowadays, this system has
changed through ‘decoupling’ payments to farmers from production and
requiring environmentally-friendly nature protection actions from farm-
ers for getting the payments. Moreover, the 2012 Blueprint to Safeguard
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Europe’s was an important, albeit partial, step towards an integrated and
sustainable path of water management.
This Chapter offers a wide framework in which assessing the vir-
tual water content across the life cycle of the products and the potential
diffusion of negative shocks. BW is crucial to understand the effects of
agricultural subsidies towards a more efficient water resources’ manage-
ment because, with increasing scarcity, the opportunity cost of choosing
one use over another increases as well. Given the remarkable results
form SDA, that is the high impact of product mix consumption, it might
be suggested to implement a ‘labelling scheme’ to make the consumer
aware about the water footprint of different products. It would represent
a powerful channel to recompose the consumption bundle from high wa-
ter intensive products (e.g. meat) toward less water charged (e.g. veg-
etables). A better understanding of the economic impact and feasibility
is postponed to future researches, when more disaggregated data will be
available.
This empirical analysis, while interesting on its own right, provides a
new point of view in the development of models to forecast resource sus-
tainability and to help the management of resources. Currently, the main
hurdle to achieve an efficient use of water consists in reducing the gap
between international trade agreements and international agreements on
sustainable water use, because the former are strong and the latter weak.
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Chapter 3
Are we in deep water?
Water scarcity and its limits
to economic growth
3.1 Introduction
Freshwater availability in sufficient quality and quantity is one of the
major challenges that human societies will face this century. Freshwa-
ter, even though it represents only the 2.5% of Earth’s water, is a vital
resource that is threatened by human (economic) activities and climate
change. Many studies have confirmed that the pressure on water re-
sources will increase significantly over the coming decades and this will
bring problems for food security and environmental sustainability (Al-
camo et al., 2007, Ercin and Hoekstra, 2012, Hoekstra, 2014). Recently
there has been growing interest in the use of scenarios for exploring
the long-term relationships between complex socio-ecological and eco-
nomic systems under uncertain conditions. Rosegrant et al. (2003) ad-
dressed three global water scenarios for the year 2025 for 69 river basins
using three economic activities: Agriculture, Industry and Household
consumption. They showed that in many regions poor irrigation man-
agement has markedly lowered groundwater tables, damaged soils, and
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reduced water quality. Alcamo et al. (2007) analyzed the change in blue
water (surface and groundwater) withdrawals for two alternative trajec-
tories for population and economic growth, based on the A2 and B2 IPCC
scenarios, finding that the principal cause of increasing water stress is
growing domestic water use stimulated by income growth. Rockstrom
et al. (007a) had its focus on population growth and how to meet the
longer-term millennium development goal (MDG) of hunger alleviation
in 92 developing countries given projected water availability constraints.
De Fraiture (2007) elaborated four possible alternatives scenarios for 115
countries in order to provide alternative strategies for meeting increas-
ing demands of water and food in 2050. Energy production control, local
actions and climate change are found to be crucial variables for a safe wa-
ter management. Rothausen and Conway (2011) highlighted the relation
between energy production and water management to understand and
describe more effectively their role in greenhouse-gas emissions. Ercin
and Hoekstra (2012) developed four water footprint scenarios for 2050
based on population and economic growth, production/trade patterns,
consumption patterns and technological development. The main conclu-
sion is that reducing humanity’s water footprint to sustainable levels is
possible even with increasing populations, provided that consumption
patterns change.
The objective of the present study is to identify the main drivers of
water pressure under climate change and to assess the social and eco-
nomic effects, by country and sector, under four alternative narratives.
I proceeded by using a multi-regional input-output model (MRIO) ex-
tended with water intensity coefficients, to calculate direct and indirect
water use. Sectoral production functions and trade data are available
for all major OECD countries, their major trading partners and a selec-
tion of large emerging economies. Application of input-output analysis
to ecological footprints (EFs) is shifting from an ex-post static calculation
toward an ex-ante scenario analysis for enhancing the policy relevance of
EF analysis Ferng (2009). Previous studies were mostly based on green-
house emissions, for example, Lutz and Wiebe (2012) estimated a times
series of past UK consumption emissions (1993-2010) and future emis-
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sions (out to 2050) under five scenarios. They used a global MRIO with
data on final demand, carbon intensity and trade balances. They found
that under each scenario there were declining UK consumption-based
emissions. Scott et al. (2013) applied a MRIO extended with carbon in-
tensity coefficients to build a scenario of the global GINFORS model in
line with the Copenhagen pledges for 2020 to calculate the distribution
of future consumption-based carbon emissions around the globe using
the Global Resource Accounting Model (GRAM). Finally, Dellink (2013)
assess the effects of climate change impacts on economic growth through
a dynamic global general equilibrium model.
The novelty introduced by the present study is given by the combination
of two measures of water scarcity: social (water per capita) and phys-
ical (water availability). It goes beyond the previous global water de-
mand scenario studies because I exploited a MRIO database to recover
the whole supply-chain, both at national and global level, and to cal-
culate the indirect impacts and feedback effects due to inter-industrial
linkages. Departing from Ercin and Hoekstra (2012), I do not impose
any relationship between trade variations, intermediate good exchanges
and GDP growth; rather the dynamics of each of these factors is endoge-
nously determined through the system of equations described below. I
distinguished three categories of water: blue (ground and surface), green
(rainfall) and grey (volume of water required to assimilate pollutants).
This research is based on the comparison of four alternative economic-
climate scenarios developed on the base on the most recent projections
of GDP and population growth1, up to 2100, it explicitly accounts for the
variation of total renewable freshwater resources. This Chapter offers
the possibility to ground a broad political debate for wise water gover-
nance, helping policy makers to understand the long-term consequences
of different economic choices. In particular: (i) I take into account the
1See ‘Supplementary note for the SSP data sets,’ Edenhofer (2012) offers a full descrip-
tion of the assumptions and models used by the OECD to project GDP and population
growth. Future GDP projections are conducted using an ‘Augmented Solow growth model’
using two sectors. The OECD model, ENV-Growth, places special emphasis on the drivers
of GDP growth over the projection period rather than projecting convergence directly on
income levels. The ENV-Growth model features additional input-specific factor productiv-
ity for labour and energy. See Appendix B.3 for a description.
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heterogenous impact of climate change on precipitation (P), evapotran-
spiration (PET) and, thus, on renewable fresh-water resources, (ii) I re-
port both social and physical water stress indeces, (iii) I assessed the
sustainability, in terms of the virtual water required for production, and
compare four GDP and population growth scenarios as provided by the
IPCC, (iv) in case of unsustainable scenarios, I derived the technolog-
ical progress required to meet economic growth projections, (v) I eval-
uated under which conditions international virtual water trade (VWT)
redistributes water resources towards scarce countries, (vi) I disentan-
gled and quantified the impact of social, economic and climate variables,
and finally (vii) it is disaggregated the virtual water index into 35 major
sectors.
The Chapter proceeds in Section 3.2 with a discussion on data
sources, the indicators used and on the framework adopted for imple-
menting the four scenarios. Section 3.3 describes the mathematical mod-
els and compares the main results for each scenario. Section 3.4 assesses
the technological change required to meet economic growth projections
given limited water endowments. The Chapter ends with a discussion
on the main outcomes and implications for future water policies.
3.2 Data and Definitions
WIOD2 contains data on 40 countries (EU, USA and other important
developing countries, i.e. India, China and Brazil among others) and
35 sectors for each country. Sectoral water use, reported in WIOD, has
been derived from the estimations provided by Mekonnen and Hoekstra
(2010), FAOSTAT and EXIOPOL. The International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the National Center for Atmospheric Re-
search (NCAR) provide data on the reference scenarios for each Shared
Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP). GDP projections are computed by the
teams from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment(OECD). Data on future changes in precipitation (P), potential evap-
otranspiration (PET) and water availability (Wa) are taken from FAO
2World Input Output Database, http://www.wiod.org, last November 2013.
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GAEZ3.
Hoekstra et al. (2011) define different types of water based indicators
used in this research. This preliminary step is required to frame the sus-
tainability analysis and to determine when environmental water needs
are excessively exploited. The virtual water (VW) content of a product is
the whole amount of freshwater required for production, measured over
the full production chain. The water footprint (WF) of a nation is equal
to the use of domestic water resources, minus the virtual water export
flows, plus the virtual water import flows. Green water (GN) indicates
the consumptive use of rainwater stored in the topsoil and used for veg-
etative and agricultural purposes. Blue water (B) refers to the consump-
tive use of ground or surface water, while grey water (GY) represents
water contamination and is measured as the volume of water required
to assimilate pollutants caused by human activity. As a proxy for Water
Availability (Wa), following Chapagain and Hoekstra (2007), I used Total
Actual Renewable Water Resources4. It must be admitted here that the
issue of analysing green water scarcity is largely unexplored mostly be-
cause there is no consensus on how to measure green availability. For
a deeper discussion see Hoekstra et al. (2011), Chapagain and Hoek-
stra (2007) (pag.34) and Hoekstra and Chapagain (2011), which show the
maximum theoretical yearly amount of water available to a country at
a given moment. By including Wa in this analysis, I overcame a limita-
tion of Ercin and Hoekstra (2012) who excluded countries’ endowments.
Due to the lack of consistent data, non-conventional sources of water are
not included, although they account for separately to natural renewable
water resources as they are considered as non-renewable sources. They
include: the production of freshwater by desalination of brackish or salt-
water (mostly for domestic purposes); the reuse of urban or industrial
waste water (with or without treatment), which increases the overall effi-
3http://www.fao.org/nr/gaez/en/
4It is the sum of internal renewable water resources (IRWR) and exter-
nal actual renewable water resources (ERWR), in particular it is computed as
the sum of total renewable surface water and total renewable groundwater,
less any overlapping. For more information see the FAO AQUASTAT website
http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm.
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ciency of fresh water (extracted from primary sources), mostly in agricul-
ture, but increasingly in industrial and domestic sectors, and agricultural
drainage water. Finally, groundwater bodies (deep aquifers) have a neg-
ligible rate of recharge and are therefore considered as non-renewable for
the purposes of this analysis.
The issue of water scarcity (WS), which can be broadly understood
as the lack of access to adequate water supply for human and environ-
mental uses, is widely discussed in the literature. However no consensus
on how it should be defined or measured has yet been achieved. One of
the most commonly used measures of water scarcity is the Falkenmark
indicator, that defines water scarcity in terms of the total renewable wa-
ter resources that are available to the population of a region in any given
year. In this context it is simply given as the ratio WaPOP . However, this
indicator has been criticised because it does not allow for alternative wa-
ter uses nor minimising impacts through VWT. A range of alternative
indicators for assessing the adequacy of a nation’s water resources have
been put forward.5 Due to the complex relation between water resources
and social needs, relying on a single indicator may give a misleading
impression of water scarcity. For these reasons I ground this analysis
over two interrelated dimensions: i) the amount of virtual water nec-
essary to meet social consumption needs (WSSOC), and ii) the physical
constraints (WSP ) resulting from limited renewable freshwater endow-
ments. In particular, I compute the actual virtual water scarcity per capita
as:
WSSOC =
WF
POP
(3.1)
where WF is the water footprint of national consumption and POP stands
for population size. This index is able to overcome the main shortcom-
ings of the Falkenmark indicator because it accounts for alternative eco-
nomic uses of water and the exploitation of external water resources
through international VWT. WF returns the total footprint, that is the
virtual water embedded in domestic consumption minus (plus) the net
5For an extensive discussion see Brown and Matlock (2011) and Ridoutt et al. (2009).
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virtual water embedded in international exports (imports). The mathe-
matical computation of WF, in a MRIO context, is provided in the next
section. Based on the Falkenmark classification, the water conditions in
an area can be categorized as: no stress (WSSOC > 1700 m3 per capita per
year), stress (1000 < WSSOC < 1700m3), scarcity (500 < WSSOC < 1000
m3), and absolute scarcity (WSSOC < 500 m3). In addition, I calculate
the direct pressure on renewable water resources6 as the ratio between
total domestic water consumption (necessary for domestic consumption
and exports) and available renewable water.
WSP =
B +GN +GY
Wa
(3.2)
The numerator of Eq. 3.2 returns the sum of total domestic consumption
within a country. B is mostly used for Agricultural and food (AFF) pro-
duction (more than 50%) and Energy (40%), GN is exclusively used in
the AFF sector, while GY is distributed among AFF (more than 65%) and
other polluting sectors (Chemical, Pulp and Paper, Textile, Basic Metals
and Fabricated Metal). Water intensity coefficients for each sector and
water use category are kept constant, as given by WIOD, it is therefore
not possible to assume that B, GN and GY water are perfectly substi-
tutable. Indeed, GN water cannot be used for alternative purposes; B
and GY water can be directed towards alternative uses, the latter once
it has been recycled. The thresholds of water stress are provided by
Smakhtin et al. (2005): Over-exploitation (WSP > 1), High exploitation
(0.6< WSP < 1), Moderate exploitation (0.3< WSP < 0.6) and no stress
(WSP < 0.3).
In general, projections of freshwater-related impacts caused by climate
change are compared to historical conditions (initial conditions of the dy-
namic system) which, in this Chapter, are grounded on the ex-post analy-
sis of Global Virtual Water distributions Distefano et al. (2014), topology
Konar et al. (2012) and evolution Dalin et al. (2012). Table 4 resumes the
values of the main variables in 2009 for the environmental factors and
6When data for Wa were not available (for Canada, Ireland and Taiwan), I used the per-
centage of total actual renewable freshwater resources withdrawn, expressed in percentage
of the actual total renewable water resources, as provided by FAO AQUASTAT.
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Table 4: Socio-ecological ‘Initial Conditions’ in 2009.
COUNTRY GDP (Tr) GDP per capita $ Population (M) Wa (Km3) WSP WFALK
BRA 1.97 (2.95%) 10090 195 (2.84%) 8647 (16.17%) 8.46 % 26.58
CAN 1.21 (1.80%) 35330 34 (0.50%) 2902 (5.43%) 9.61 % 51.02
CHN 9.10 (13.61%) 6880 1337 (19.43%) 2840 (5.31%) 59.47 % 1.27
IND 3.60 (5.38%) 2980 1205 (17.51%) 1911 (3.57%) 70.38 % 0.95
JAP 3.93 (5.87%) 30820 127 (1.85%) 430 (0.81%) 11.03 % 2.02
MEX 1.47 (2.19%) 12430 117 (1.71%) 461 (0.86 %) 32.11 % 2.35
RUS 2.01 (3.01%) 14100 142 (2.07%) 4508 (8.43 %) 12.06 % 19.01
TUR 0.90 (1.35%) 12540 72 (1.05%) 211 (0.40%) 59.31 % 1.76
USA 13.04 (19.52%) 42160 309 (4.49%) 3069 (5.74%) 38.46 % 5.95
EU27 13.31 (19.92%) 26500 502 (7.30%) 2055 (3.83%) 33.70 % 2.45
2010 for the socio-economic variables. Brazil, Russia, China, Canada and
USA are the biggest countries in terms of Wa, however when economic
and demographic factors are taken into account the rank changes dras-
tically. China and India are facing water scarcity as measured by the
Falkenmark indicator, confirming that water endowments are unevenly
distributed, as well as income per capita. Furthermore China, India and
Mexico are approaching over-exploitation of renewable freshwater avail-
ability. As it will be shown in the next section, rich arid countries will not
suffer from water poverty as their high water supply costs are more than
matched by their high ability to pay and/or to import goods and there-
fore virtual water. This information, neglected by the Falkenmark index,
is encoded in the footprint indicator. Finally, I show that increasing water
scarcity does impact significantly upon economic growth of both devel-
oping and developed, confirming that limited water resources is a global
issue.
The simulations are based on the so called Shared Socioeconomic Path-
way (SSPs), as described by Edenhofer (2012). Table 5 resumes the
assumptions made about the speed of growth (or change) of the key
drivers: GDP and population growth, urbanization, technological de-
velopment, globalization, inequality and environmental sustainability
as the main drivers. I run numerical simulations over four pre-defined
SSPs. Under the assumptions given for each of the Representative Con-
centration Pathways (RCP), with respect to preindustrial conditions,
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global temperatures averaged in the period 2081-2100 are projected to
likely exceed 1.5◦C for RCP4.5, and are likely to exceed 2◦ for RCP6.0
and RCP8.5. SRES does not assume any policy to control climate change,
unlike the RCP Scenarios. The radiative forcing of RCP2.6, which as-
sumes strong mitigation action, yields a smaller temperature increase
than any of the previous SRES scenarios and is not included in the cur-
rent study. RCP4.5 (RCP8.5) and SRES B1 (A1FI) have similar radiative
forcing at 2100, and comparable time evolution. RCP6.0 lies in between
SRES B1 and SRES A1B; the radiative forcing of SRES A2 is lower than
RCP8.5 throughout the 21st century, mainly due to a faster decline in the
radiative effect of aerosols in RCP8.5 than SRES A2, but they converge to
within 0.1 W m−2 at 2100.
Table 5: Trends of the main variables for each SSP.
SSP GDP POP TECH SUST ∆◦C Title RCP
1 M-H L H H 1.7-3.2 Sustainability 4.5
2 M M H M 1.8-3.4 Middle of the Road 4.5/6.0
3 L H L-M M 2.4-4.4 Fragmentation 6.0/8.5
5 H M L-M L 3.2-5.4 Conventional 8.5
The density of population in a given area, including the migration flows,
is the basic factor which determines the intensity of water stress/scarcity
in a particular region. Economic growth represents a double-edge sword
since it might accelerate the development of more efficient technologies
but, on the other hand, it likely damages the ecological systems through
pollution and over-exploitation of the resources. International Trade in-
fluences patterns of (virtual) water use and scarcity, however the reverse
does not always hold because water is generally underpriced (Hoekstra,
2010). Water scarcity appears to affect trade patterns only when absolute
water shortage force water-scarce countries to import water-intensive
products, because they simply cannot be produced domestically, poten-
tially increasing water stress elsewhere Lenzen et al. (2013).
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3.3 Simulating Input-Output Scenarios
Each Scenario is built upon a different set of assumptions which deter-
mines and constrains the evolution of the key variables. IO analysis
provides an appropriate and consistent mathematical structure for fram-
ing reasonable future scenarios through simple linear algebra computa-
tion. It offers a framework in which dealing with both feedback effects
and industrial needs, where the latter factor is fundamental in assessing
whether consumption patterns are grounded on sustainable industrial
(and trade) structure. Because of the lack of data on sectoral growth, the
structure of the matrix of technical coefficients (A) is kept fix,7 while the
possibility of its dynamic updating can be the subject of further research.
3.3.1 Model 1 - Population Growth and Climate Change
The baseline scenario is grounded on population growth and climate
change in order to assess the evolution of the Falkenmark indicator over
time (i.e. change in population and Wa). Figure 7 shows the amount
of sustainable renewable water resources per capita in each period (5-
year length) from 2010 to 2100, for selected countries of interest. The
endowment of each country is limited to 60% of Wa in order to ensure,
at most, a moderate exploitation of renewable freshwater, whilst leaving
sufficient freshwater for environmental and ecosystem purposes. This
simple representation neglects any economic effects which will be mod-
elled next. The trend of population greatly differs within each country
under different SSPs and between countries (see Table 20). Global warm-
ing is expected to modify Wa through changes in precipitation (P) and
projected evapotranspiration (PET). Due to the unavailability of data on
Wa projections under different RCP scenarios, I compute changes to Wa
directly as percentage changes to the ratio of P/PET which are available
7Let Z be the square matrix of inter-industrial exchanges of intermediate goods and x
the vector of total output, included final consumption, for each sector. I derive the matrix
of technical coefficients as A = Z · xˆ−1, where the hat stands for diagonal matrix. Each
entry aij returns the share of good produced by sector j in the total intermediate input use
of firms in sector i, that is the percentage of trade of intermediate goods with the respect of
total output of importer’s production (per sector).
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as RCP model outputs. The P/PET ratio can be treated as an index of
aridity/humidity and thus represents changes in precipitation and the
evaporation of surface water due to increased temperatures. Therefore
the percentage change in Wa follows the same percentage changes in the
ratio of precipitation and evapotranspiration over time for any given re-
gion or country.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 6: Global map of expected Wa variation due to climate change
under SSP1 (a), SSP2 (b), SSP3 (c) and SSP5 (d). Red regions are expected to
be drier while blue ones would be wetter.
Figure 7 shows the most critical developed (top) and developing (bot-
tom)8 countries that face water shortages due to population growth and
change in Wa. Combining Figure 7 with Tables 20 and 21 is necessary to
identify the origin of the projected variation of the Falkenmark indica-
8The definition of developing economies follows the International Monetary Fund’s
World Economic Outlook Report (2014) and World Bank data: High Income per capita
(DEV): USA, JPN, ITA, CAN, AUS, GBR and ESP among others; Low-Medium Income per
capita (LDC): CHN, IND, RUS, BRA, MEX, TUR and IDN among others.
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tor. It sheds a light on how geographical and social conditions shape the
amount of water available per capita.
Figure 7: Social Water Scarcity under SSP1-2-3-5 for some of DEV (top) and
LDC (bottom) countries, where the bubbles are proportional to the
population size.
They report the results for the main critical (with an index close to or
below the water stress level) countries, both developed and developing,
which show heterogeneous paths. Japan is expected to have an increas-
ing amount of Wa per capita under each scenario because the reduction
of population size overwhelms the expected negative impact of climate
change on Wa, with a peak of -33% over the period 2050-2080 (SSP3).
Italy shows diverging and heterogeneous paths depending on the SSP
being considered. Under SSP2 and SSP3 Italy remains above the water
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stress threshold because the reduction in Wa due to Climate Change is
more than compensated by a contraction in the population size, which
is particularly evident (-26%) over the period 2020-2050 (SSP3). Un-
der SSP1 Italy is predicted to face a period of vulnerability due to the
combined effect of increasing population size and decreasing Wa, wav-
ing around the water stress threshold. Spain and Great Britain follow a
similar (negative) trend in each scenario, except for SSP3. In Spain the
main problem is represented by water shortages (up to -18% over the
period 2050-2080), while in UK there is a sharp increase in population
(up to +32% over the period 2020-2050). As expected China and India
are among the most impacted countries, however only China seems to
overcome the WS threshold, over the long term (after the 2070s), due to a
large predicted reduction in population size. In both countries the impact
of climate change on water resources seems small, with both positive and
negative impacts. Under SSP3 China might not be able, before the end
of the century, to overcome the threshold of 1700 m3 per capita because
smaller reductions in the number of inhabitants are paired with a cor-
responding reduction in Wa. India continues to suffer water shortages
mostly because the population continues to grow at a faster rate (with a
maximum of +39% under SSP3) than Wa which is expected to increase
(up to +30% under SSP5). The worst case is represented by SSP3 where
the population is expected to grow up to 2.6 billion by 2100, and thus
the Falkenmark drops below absolute scarcity levels (500 m3 per capita).
Mexico seems able to provide more than 1700 m3 to its population under
every scenario, except for SSP3 where it drops below the water scarcity
threshold (1000 m3) due to the joint effect of increasing population (up
to +36%) and a reduction in Wa (up to -7%). Finally Turkey’s social wa-
ter scarcity index follows a U-shaped path between the water stress and
scarcity thresholds under every SSP, with the exception of SSP3 in which
it linearly decreases up to 623 m3 per capita. Here again social dynam-
ics are paired with physical constraints, even though Turkey seems more
vulnerable to climate change effects (up to -18% of Wa under SSP5). To
summarize, these preliminary results tell us that:
• physical conditions, though important, produce their effect on so-
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cial water scarcity in the long-run;
• the distribution of water per capita is rather independent from the
level of economic development because, in most scenarios, severe
conditions would be faced also by advanced economies (e.g. UK
and Spain);
• this oversimplified model simply replicates a modern version of
the Malthusian problem with water resources. Though interesting
because based on physical quantities, it has severe shortcomings
in terms of policy relevance because it neglects the economic vari-
ables. It does not offer any insight about the kind of good that
should be preferred (or avoided) nor what would be the possible
saving impact of technological progress or the (re)distributive ef-
fects of international trade. These reasons lead me to offer an al-
ternative framework to integrate the information provided by the
Falkenmark indicator.
3.3.2 Model 2 - GDP growth and Water efficiency
The first oversimplified model was unable to capture the crucial role of
economic factors on water exploitation. Model 2 includes the impact
of GDP growth and technological improvement under the assumption
of constant economic and trade structure. I assume that the global ma-
trix of technical coefficients is kept constant over the modelling period.
Note that structural changes (i.e. sectoral transitions) are not modelled,
i.e. more industrialization or services at the expense of agriculture, that
developing countries might follow when their incomes rise. By follow-
ing Ercin and Hoekstra (2012), I assumed that the technological progress
occurs directly through water intensity ratios (γ), that is the amount of
direct water use per unit of sectoral output. However, this Chapter goes
beyond the oversimplified assumption of a single and homogeneous in-
dustrial sector, rather, the technical coefficients are endogenously deter-
mined through the IO model. In this framework, different rates of techni-
cal progress for each country-sector pair and water category (B, GN and
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GY) are taken into account.9 In what follows, I described the system of
equations that describes the dynamic evolution of the climate-economic
system. Let GDPt be the level of GDP at time t, the rate of growth from
year t to t+1 is given by:
gt+1 =
GDPt+1
GDPt
− 1 (3.3)
In a context of no structural change, the Leontief inverse is kept con-
stant.10 When updating countries’ GDP, I used the matrix of final de-
mand F , which includes domestic and international consumption, and
matrix Z of IO trade.11 Let gi,t be the GDP growth rate of country i from
time t-1 to t and fi,t the vector of total final demand (row sum of F ), then:
fi,t+1 = fi,t · gˆi,t+1 (3.5)
for i = 1,2,..,N where N is the number of countries. The new level of
sectoral output (xt+1) is computed through the Leontief inverse L and
the new final demand as:
xt+1 = L · ft+1 (3.6)
Note that F is composed of both domestic and international trade in fi-
nal goods, in particular each row returns the share of exports from each
9See the Appendix B.1 for a full description of the values and assumptions made.
10In order to be consistent with the data provided by IPCC, I select the table of the
year 2010 which is the starting year of the population forecasts. The Leontief inverse is the
matrix L which solves the system x = L·f, where it can be shown that L = (I-A)−1. See Miller
and Blair (2009) for a detailed description of Input-Output Economics.
11There are at least two procedures to compute the GDP through IO tables. Let N coun-
tries with s sectors, then the first method is to compute the GDP as the sum of the Value
added of each sector within the country. In the second method, by abstracting from the
time variable t, we have that the GDP of country C as:
GDPCi =
s∑
i=1
(fCi + Z
C
i. − ZC.i ) (3.4)
where Zi. stands for the sum of row i, that is the value of domestic and exported inter-
mediate goods, while Z.i stands for the sum of column i, that is the amount of domestic
and imported intermediate goods. Their subtraction returns the net amount of export of
intermediate goods of each sector i in country C. fi is the vector of total final demand, per
each sector i, in country C.
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country-sector pair to each other country. This information enables to
allocate the variation of final demand (∆f = ft+1 - ft) using the distribu-
tion coefficients (ϕ) of final demand, for each country-sector pair, at the
first year (2010). In particular, if one neglects the temporal dimension, in
case of sector i:
ϕi =
Fi.∑N
j Fij
(3.7)
where Fi. is the vector of final demand (domestic + export) for sector i,
and the denominator is the row sum of Fi.. In this case ϕC of country
C is a matrix of 35x41, then for each country C, the new matrix of final
demand, including domestic consumption and exports, independently
from the population growth, as:
FC,t+1 = fˆC,t+1 · ϕC (3.8)
The vector of water intensity coefficients γt accounts the amount of water
per unit of production and it is updated at a constant rate (β ≤ 1) as
described in Appendix B.1.1: γt+1 = γt · β in the case of no technological
change (β = 1), otherwise one would observe a more efficient use of
water if β < 1. The vector of sectoral water use, in each period, is:
wt+1 = γt+1 · xt+1 (3.9)
The vector of households water use (WH) is led by the beta coefficient:
WHt+1 = WHt · (1 + ρt+1) · β (3.10)
where ρ is the rate of population growth. The net balance of virtual water
trade which, given by ΘBAL = ΘExp - ΘImp12, is taken into account in
order to trace the actual water scarcity of each country. The total water
Footprint of national consumption (WF ) is given by the sum of domestic
use plus the water balance, for instance for country C:
WFCt+1 = γ
C
t+1 · LCCt+1 · fCCt+1 +WHCt+1 −ΘCBAL (3.11)
12For a description see equations from 2.4 to 2.6, Ch. 1, pag. 19.
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Note that the first member on the right hand side is driven by the GDP
growth and water efficiency change, while WH is determined by the
population growth and β. The last term provides the effect due to both
heterogeneity in growth rate across countries and the structure of inter-
national trade. The aim is to estimate, for each period t, the physical
water scarcity index (WSpt ) which returns the degree of exploitation of
renewable freshwater resources.
Figure 8: WSP under different Scenarios, when it overcomes 1
it means that a country is using more than 100% of its Wa.
Figure 8 shows the results, under four different numerical simula-
tions of WSpt , while Table 25 to 28 report the percentage changes in to-
tal (virtual) water use, for sectoral needs, due to both the technological
progress (γ) and the economic growth. This study represents the first
attempt isolating the impacts from each of the different socio-economic-
ecological factors.13 This sheds a light on the implications of alternative
13From equation 3.9 it is possible to disaggregate the variation of total water use (∆W)
through an additive polar structural decomposition analysis (SDA). For simplicity I com-
pute it by making the difference from the last and the first year of the any sub-period
considered (2020-2010, 2050-2020 and 2080-2050). Assuming L constant, it can be showed
that:
∆W = wt+1 − wt = 1
2
· [∆γˆ · L · (ft + ft+1) + (γˆt + ˆγt+1) · L ·∆f ] (3.12)
where the the hat stands for diagonal matrix. For a description of the method see Miller
and Blair (2009).
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water management strategies towards: investments in R&D, economic
growth, adjustments to water use per capita either through reductions in
demand or reduced population growth rates.
In each scenario India and China overwhelm renewable freshwater re-
sources by the year 2025 which is followed by an increasing, yet unsus-
tainable, rate of economic growth. India will need more than 20 times
its Wa by 2100 (SSP5) in order to satisfy its production needs. Overall,
any saving on water, though substantial (up to -55% under SSP1), ob-
tained through a reduction in water intensity coefficients (γ) is more than
compensated by a growth in GDP. For China there are large variances be-
tween each of the different scenarios. Under SSP1 and SSP2 the impact of
GDP is significant which peaks during the 2050s where production cre-
ates an additional +207% (SSP1) of water use with the respect to present
day demand. In SSP3 and SSP5, where technological improvements are
assumed smaller, the main difference is given by the rate of GDP growth
which is higher under SSP5. In both countries the change in Wa due
to climate change is negligible when compared with the impact of eco-
nomic growth. USA and EU27 attain a very similar path, again, in each
Scenario: 2050 represents a crucial year because the USA begins to over-
exploit Wa and then it faces worsening environmental conditions. Un-
der SSP5 the USA crosses the 100% threshold before the 2040s exceeding
the extreme over-exploitation’ threshold, that is 200% of Wa (Vorosmarty
et al. (2000)). Finally, Russia and Brazil can cope with agro-industrial
needs without crossing any stress threshold (60% of Wa = WST ) due to
their considerable Wa endowments. The main exception is SSP5 where,
starting from 2050, they overcome WST up to the 97% and the 118% of
Wa, respectively.
When economic variables are included, most countries face an (extreme)
over-exploitation of Wa, confirming that water scarcity is an economic
problem that both developed and developing countries must deal with in
order to avoid considerable economic loss14 and environmental damage.
Before going ahead it is worth to clarify the meaning of over-exploitation
in this context. When a country needs more than 100% of its own Wa it
14See the Appendix B.3.1 for an assessment of potential GDP losses.
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still can afford the production needs through non-renewable water re-
sources. I do not model the impact of over-exploitation, for several peri-
ods, on the quality of freshwater resources because there are no available
data on the stock of non-renewable resources. What the simulations sug-
gested is that the current (2010) global supply chain is not sustainable
when renewable water resources are taken into account. It should be
expected, and promoted with adequate policies, a reduction of γ world-
wide and a modification in the composition of trade of intermediates
(matrix A) and final goods toward less water intensive products. Water
abundant countries may play an important role in providing additional
resources to water scarce region, and the latter should invest in more
R&D and in a redefinition of consumption habits.
Figure 9 confronts the share of virtual water use for B, GN and GY wa-
ter between 2010 and 2100 for each of the main countries and sectors
(see Table 22 and 23 of Appendix B.2). SSP1-2 and SSP3-5 are reported
together because they share common assumptions over the pace of tech-
nological progress (γ). GN is the dominant category, even though it has
a skewed distribution: Indonesia, Australia and Brazil show the highest
percentages (more than 80%), while Sweden and Japan (less than 40%)
are the smallest (also in absolute terms, 8 and 19 km3, respectively). At a
global level the largest GN water consumers are India, China, USA and
Brazil (at least 588 km3), both at the beginning and at the end of the cen-
tury, across all scenarios. The highest values of B, both in 2010 and in
2100, are in Sweden (63%) and Japan (44%) mostly due to the Electricity,
Gas and Water Supply sectors (EWG) that absorb more than the 87% of B.
These values are stable over the whole period for each Scenario. Agricul-
ture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing with Food, Beverages and Tobacco sec-
tors (AFF) are dominant, in terms of B water, in Spain, India and Turkey
(more than 60%), while EWG in Italy covers the 69%. Though these
percentages are stable in Japan and Sweden, there are some exceptions
depending on the projected economic growth. Brazil, Spain, China, In-
dia and Italy, among others, have diverging trajectories and reach higher
shares under SSP1, due to the AFF sectors, hence they should experience
a structural change, shifting toward more energy-intensive technologies
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of production for SSP3, SSP4 and SSP5. At the global level most B water
users are China, India, USA and Brazil (from 113 km3 to 314 km3) both at
the beginning and at the end of the century, under each scenario. Finally
the most GY water intensive countries over the whole century is China
with a share of 32% and an absolute consumption of 537 km3, confirm-
ing that China’s rapid industrialization has led to a severe deterioration
in water quality in the country’s lakes and rivers (Ebenstein, 2012). The
main followers at a global level include USA and India (more than 174
km3); while in terms of the percentage of national water consumption
GBR, USA and Italy (at least 14%) are the largest importers.
The sectoral composition is more complex due to the source of produc-
tion and the level of industrialization, geographical location and natural
resource endowments. AFF is dominant, though its quota changes sub-
stantially between countries. Spain, Indonesia, GBR and Australia show
the highest quotas (more than 97%) for each narrative. However, there
are other sectors that are heavy GY water consumers. MET (Basic and
Fabricated Metal and Other Non-Metallic Mineral) requires 22% and 18%
of total GY water in China and Japan, respectively. CH (Chemicals and
Chemical Products) is also an important GY water consumer in Japan,
Sweden and China (more than 13%). TXT (Textiles and Textile Products)
has a significant impact in Italy (10%) whilst PAP (Pulp, Paper, Printing
and Publishing) is significant in Japan, Canada and Russia (around 14%).
These percentages are fairly stationary for each scenario over the whole
century, but in China and Japan under each SSP there are higher percent-
ages ofGY water consumption attributed to MET and CH at the expense
of AFF.
The role played by γ and international trade is evaluated in the next
section. In this context of severe over-exploitation of Wa, the assessment
of social water scarcity is meaningless because it would be grounded
on an un-sustainable production. Since that the computation of water
footprint is led by the sectoral output growth (x), through the water effi-
ciency coefficient (γ), it would growth indefinitely if the rate of growth of
x is higher than the saving of water through both technological progress
and international trade. For these reasons, I simulate the social water
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Figure 9: Shares of B, GN and GY virtual water use per country in 2010,
2050 and 2080.
scarcity only under a feasible (in terms of renewable freshwater con-
strains) industrial production.
In summary, the main results of this model are:
• the scope for productivity improvement and area expansion as as-
sumed in Ercin and Hoekstra (2012) is not sufficient to sustain the
energy and food needs given the current structure of intermediate
and final goods trade;
• the issue of water scarcity is ubiquitous independently from the
level of economic development, sectoral distribution and scenario,
with the exception of Russia and Brazil;
• even though the model does not allow for non-renewable re-
sources, the gap from the maximum theoretical value and the ex-
pected water industrial needs is so considerable, in particular in
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China and India (more than 6 times of Wa), that seems implausi-
ble that can be filled by non-conventional sources of water. Even
if one admits for this possibility, it would be assessed how long
the ecological system can be pumped by its water stocks and how
this process could affect the water cycle and then the climate (that
might have a feedback effect on water cycle itself);
• economic variables (GDP, efficiency and trade) are able to affect
over the short period the exploitation of Wa with the most remark-
able effect in India and China expected around the year 2025.
Next Section is dedicated to assess under which conditions the current
global supply chain is sustainable with the respect to renewable water
resources.
3.4 Sustainability Assessment
Given the great, and increasingly, over-exploitation of available water in
each scenario, I computed the technological development that would be
necessary to obtain sustainable GDP growth, without having a detrimen-
tal impact on the environment, and on freshwater resources in particular.
I elaborated a simple algorithm to update β so that technical progress
does not remain constant over time. Appendix B.1.1 explains the algo-
rithm applied to smoothly update γ though avoiding unrealistic techno-
logical ”jumps”. In fact it seems implausible that a country, with a fairly
unsustainable technology, is able to fill the gap (that is using an amount
of water no greater than 60% of its own Wa) in only one period (5 years-
length). Gains in efficiency and productivity in water management and
use can reduce the economic and environmental risks and enable higher
levels of sustainable growth, but how much higher? How far-reaching
do those gains have to be? Table 24 of Appendix B.2 compares the cu-
mulative percentage reduction of γ with respect the base year (2010).
Column 2 shows the historical change in gamma from 1995 to 2009 as
provided by WIOD. Note that this change is a weighted average of the
change in B, GN and GY, per unit of production that has occurred in
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each sector. Spain, GBR and USA experienced an increase of water use
per unit of production, that led to a reduction in water efficiency. It might
be surprising to see that water productivity has worsened in some coun-
tries, since improvements in cultivation and irrigation techniques should
have improved efficiency. This reasoning is not readily applicable at the
aggregate level, though, because I do not include production factors dif-
ferent from water and the output is measured in monetary terms. For
instance, higher water usage could partly compensate lower productiv-
ity of other inputs, including non-market factors associated with chang-
ing climate conditions. Another possible explanation is that water is not
priced effectively resulting in many countries not caring about water as
a scarce limited resource, or finally, it might be that the structural change
of economic production and trade has shifted some economies towards
less water efficient sectors. However, as expected, the majority of large
countries have reduced γ, ranging from less than -2% (Italy and Russia)
to -5% (Brazil, Canada, GBR and Japan) and even more: India -12% while
China, Australia, Mexico and Turkey with more than -20%.
From column 3 to column 6 I report the implied technological change
coefficients for the main countries of Model 1. Technological improve-
ments under SSP1 and SSP2 are larger because it is assumed there are
water efficiency gains for each water based indicator, with an average
variation that goes from -18% in 2050 to -36% in 2100. Notwithstanding
similar assumptions, there are heterogeneous variations between coun-
tries with minimum values observed in Australia and Spain (less than
-15% in 2050 and less than -30% in 2100) and maximum changes in the
case of Brazil, China and Mexico (more than -22% in 2050 and more than
-41% in 2100). These differences are due to increasing international link-
ages. In fact the impact of trade of intermediate goods and the structure
of economic transactions shape, in a variety of ways, the environmental
impact on water resources. The values under SSP3 and SSP5 are obtained
under the assumption that only γB of the agricultural sector is becoming
more efficient. Hence, the change in gamma is rather smaller than be-
fore, ranging from a minimum, in 2050, of less than -1% and in 2100 of
less than -2% (Brazil and Canada), to a maximum, in 2050, of more than
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-5% and in 2100 of more than -9% (Australia, India, Spain and Mexico).
However, Figure 8 demonstrates that the pace of water efficiency gains
are not sufficient to avoid a rapid over-exploitation of renewable water
resources.
Before going ahead it is worth spending few words on an important is-
sue that is strictly tied with technological progress and resource savings,
that is the rebound effect. In literature is commonly defined as the com-
bination of the direct effects caused by (energy) efficiency improvements
that lower the implicit price of energy and the indirect effects of reducing
(energy) costs, often leading to greater consumption. In this context, the
assessment of its impact might be ambiguous because in most countries
there is not a proper market for water and therefore it might not emerge
any impact on price (that does not exist, unless one finds some shadow
price). However, this does not mean that the rebound effect is irrelevant
for water consumption, indeed it underlines that consumers behaviour is
a crucial factor that must be paired with technological progress in order
to reach a sustainable path. The elaboration of new database that pro-
vides information on the single product, rather than sectoral level, are
encouraged in order to establish which bundle of goods would be pre-
ferred (or avoided), although the main challenge should be represented
by the amount of data required when dealing with global IO systems.
The third section reports the change in γ necessary to follow a sustain-
able path, i.e. respecting the sustainability constraint water use must be
less than 60% of Wa under different Climate Scenarios and precipitation
shocks. The entries from column 7 to 14 are greater than before, confirm-
ing severe water shortages due to strong growth in GDP. Under SSP5,
which represents the highest level of GDP, the change in gamma is par-
ticularly high. In each SSP scenario China, India and Turkey show an
improvement in water use efficiency of more than 73% (87% in India)
by 2050 to 91% by 2100. These values imply a promethean technological
progresses in efficiency gains so vast and so rapid that their actual real-
ization seems very improbable, especially when compared against his-
torical trends. The more water abundant countries (Brazil, Russia and
Canada) do not need almost any gain in water efficiency to keep the
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level of water exploitation under the threshold of 60% of Wa, with the ex-
ception of the most carbon-intensive Scenario (SSP5), where they need a
change in gamma of -50%, -39% and -62% by 2100, for Brazil, Russia and
Canada respectively. This means that it is crucial, for a rational and sus-
tainable water management, to make precautionary initiatives as soon as
possible (i.e. investment in water efficiency), even in those countries that
are currently water abundant, because otherwise they are forced to make
larger efforts over a shorter period.
Figure 10: Virtual Water Trade Balance under each SSP for the main
countries, where bubble size is proportional to the relative net
exports/imports with the respect of domestic water use.
The impact of virtual water trade in the context of sustainable water
exploitation will now be discussed. Figure 10 reports the trends, un-
der each SSP, for net exports and imports of virtual water for the largest
countries. Brazil and Canada become the main exporters of VW increas-
ing above 1000 km3 and 500 km3, respectively, for all scenarios and with
lower values for SSP3. More interesting is the paths attained by China,
Great Britain and India which suffer social water stress. Each of them be-
comes a net importer of VW, in this way they can ameliorate the impact
of water scarcity through global VWT. Great Britain imports 116 km3 in
2015 rising to minimum of 154 (SSP3) and a maximum of 203 km3 (SSP5)
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in 2100. India starts to be a net importer only after 2030s, reaching at
most 148 km3 (SSP2) in 2100, whilst China peaks in 2040 in each scenario
and thereafter reduces the amount of VW imported keeping it at around
300 km3 in 2100.
Surprisingly Russia, though it is a water abundant country with a mod-
est level of water exploitation, appears to be a net importer in each sce-
nario with a peak in the 2040s. Only after the 2070s it becomes a net
exporter, with the exception of SSP3, but with total exports always re-
maining below 200 km3 representing less than 5% of its own endowment.
Results corroborate those observed in the literature that water endow-
ment is not an explicative variable of VW. Finally the size of the bubbles
(Figure 10) are proportional to net exports of VW and domestic water
use, i.e. they represent the degree of water dependency on other coun-
tries, a large bubble shows it is highly dependent on VW while a small
bubble shows it is relatively independent. GBR shows the biggest cir-
cles meaning that the role played by VW is crucial to ensure a sufficient
amount of virtual water to its population. The possibility to save do-
mestic water resources through virtual-water imports neglects that many
water-scarce countries lack the ability to export energy, services or water-
extensive industrial commodities in order to afford the import of water-
intensive agricultural commodities. Moreover, import of food carries the
risk of moving away from food self-sufficiency towards more urbaniza-
tion Ercin and Hoekstra (2012). In addition, developing countries with
large water endowments may not have the industrial capacity to export
water-intensive products.
Table 6 reports the implied (virtual) water per capita under sustain-
able growth, led by a fast technological improvement. Technological
progress and trade that allows all countries to overwhelm the WSSS
threshold by 2025 providing more than 2000 m3 per capita per year, with
increasing trends through the whole of the century. Only India seems
able to escape from social water stress after the 2080s, notwithstanding a
huge technological progress and increasing imports of VW, while under
SSP3 the index decreases by 830 m3 under social water scarcity thresh-
old. In all the other cases the index fluctuates between WSSS and WSSC
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with values ranging from a minimum of 1200 m3 on 2025 to a maximum
of 1992 m3 per capita in 2100, slightly above the water stress index.
Table 6: Water Footprint per capita (1000 m3), as a proxy of actual water
scarcity, including the impact of Virtual Water Trade (net balance).
SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP5
COUNTRY 2025 2050 2080 2025 2050 2080 2025 2050 2080 2025 2050 2080
CHN 2.19 2.80 2.53 2.10 2.49 3.23 2.05 2.33 1.70 2.24 2.88 2.62
IND 1.32 1.41 1.91 1.29 1.22 1.36 1.24 1.02 0.68 1.26 1.61 2.28
ESP 2.74 2.90 3.35 2.74 2.98 3.37 2.85 3.36 4.57 2.67 2.65 2.32
UK 2.65 3.13 3.06 2.63 3.10 3.11 2.67 3.38 4.10 2.65 2.88 2.11
ITA 2.59 2.88 3.37 2.58 3.01 3.38 2.60 3.29 4.38 2.60 2.77 2.66
JPN 2.67 3.50 4.90 2.64 3.40 4.87 2.67 3.61 5.96 2.71 3.51 4.23
MEX 2.28 2.35 3.21 2.21 2.16 2.51 2.12 1.81 1.45 2.28 2.74 3.84
TUR 3.25 3.48 4.37 3.13 3.23 3.47 3.10 2.73 1.93 3.32 3.27 3.84
3.4.1 Uncertainties and Limitations
This study, as any other attempt to assess the ecologic-economic sustain-
ability through mathematical models, has uncertainties related to input
data (WIOD, IPCC, FAO, OECD) and limitations due to the assumptions
of the Leontief model used for numerical simulations. First of all, this
Chapter deals with aggregate annual averages, therefore it is not pos-
sible to trace the variation in water supply within a single year (inter-
annual variability) that determines the quality15 of the water at disposal.
As pointed out by Vorosmarty et al. (2000), blue water shortage is more
appropriately expressed at pixel level rather than at country level, the
former gives a more realistic relationship between the water resource
and the actual accessible water for people. There are no data in Wa that
identify the volume of water that is able to sustain ecosystems, nor does
it account for the volumes of water that are potentially available from
non-conventional sources (reuse, desalination, non-renewable ground-
water). Currently blue water availability estimation neglects the spatial
15For instance if the total amount of GN is kept unchanged for two years but the concen-
tration of the rainfall passes from a balanced distribution, toward a skewed distribution,
then the latter may be an index of extreme events which may harm the economy, the envi-
ronment and people
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inaccessibility of blue water concentrated in a certain part of a country,
this means that the current analysis exaggerates the Wa in two respects:
that all blue water is available for use at its source and is spatially acces-
sible from anywhere within the country. Future research should con-
sider changes in infrastructure, installed water-storage capacity, culti-
vated land use, and irrigated area to include those adaptive measures
that might play an important role in avoiding future risks. As noted
by Alcamo et al. (2007), increasing water availability is a double-edge
sword: it could have a positive influence by reducing river basin water
stress, however an increase in water availability in one season may not be
beneficial during that season, nor transferable to another season. Some
impacts and risks from climate change have not been quantified in this
study, including extreme weather events, damaging runoff events (due
to an increase of the P/PET ratio) and large-scale disruptions. From the
economic point of view, WIOD does not provide any information about
African countries that are among the most critical regions in which an
intensification of physical and social water scarcity is expected, therefore
future research shall include those critical countries. Additionally, this
study do not provide any insight about the consumer responsibility due
to the higher level of aggregation of the IO tables adopted, so it is en-
couraged an effort towards the elaboration of consistent databases able
to fill this gap.
From a methodological point of view in the literature there are several
attempts to overcome the rigidity of the technical coefficients (A) ei-
ther through the development of dynamic models (see Miller and Blair
(2009)) or by the introduction of alternative techniques (i.e. RAS and
Field of Influence). This step is crucial to provide an accurate descrip-
tion of the possible evolution of the economic structure conceived as the
share of production of each sector. Lack of data and the complexity of
the model involved forced us to keep constant the structure of matrix A.
Finally any (very) long-term study comes with a set of difficulties which
consist of intrinsic unpredictable events (e.g. historical or political), the
introduction of new technologies or the discovery of new resources and
the change in the preferences and consumption behaviour. Combining
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all these elements in a consistent and integrated modeling framework
presents a substantial computational challenge but will ultimately result
in persuasive and actionable insights for water (and ecological) risk man-
agement in the face of unescapable global change.
3.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, I developed numerical simulations, for four different cli-
mate Scenarios (SSP), based on a dynamic MRIO model in order to assess
the feasibility of OECD GDP growth forecasts, the social repercussions of
limited fresh-water resources and the effects of climate change. This re-
search shows that the factors that determine the sign and magnitude of
water-stress response vary between major economic and developing re-
gions, however, it shows that water scarcity is a global issue with serious
potential to cause economic harm. It has been demonstrated that cli-
mate change alone seems to have a smaller impact than socio-economic
drivers for most countries, except Turkey, Mexico and Brazil. Geograph-
ically, a number of salient results were found. In line with the latest re-
port from MIT on global water stress (Schlosser, 2014), countries that
are already experiencing water stress will be the most impacted in the
future under the combined effects of socio-economic shifts and climate
change. This is particularly true for India. The Falkenmark indicator
can tell nothing about a countries ability to alleviate social water stress
through virtual water trade. The use of I-O data allow us to trace differ-
ent sources of virtual water consumption for each water category (B, GN
and GY), economic sector and country.
Similar to Ercin and Hoekstra (2012) the impact of economic growth com-
bined with technological progress is now simulated to assess the condi-
tions under which a country should be concerned about physical wa-
ter scarcity. China and India must deal with severe and imminent wa-
ter shortage problems, as they are not able to pursue economic growth
without over-exploiting natural water resources. The same holds for the
most advanced economies, although this occurs later in time (around
2050), while only Russia, Japan and Brazil seem to be the less vulner-
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able. However, under the most carbon-intensive Scenario (SSP5) also
these regions are impacted by environmental constraints. Hence, water
constraints represent a physical limit to economic growth. A possible al-
ternative to these pessimistic scenarios is to boost technological progress
via investment in water efficiency (γ). India, China, USA and EU27 are
expected to require promethean technological improvements, far greater
than what historical trends suggest in order to avoid GDP losses. An-
other way to prevent this negative trend is to reduce overall demand by
diminishing the amount of water that is wasted, modifying the consump-
tion bundle towards less water-intensive products or slowing the rate
of population growth. In accordance with the current literature, many
water-stressed countries are mostly affected by socio-economic variables
rather than directly from climate change. From the point of view of social
water scarcity, it appears that trade is one of the more prominent ways of
escaping water stress, with the only exception of India.
This Chapter represents the first study where the impact of each fac-
tor contributing to water stress is quantified through a structural de-
composition analysis. I isolate and quantify the impact of each driver,
showing that the most important driver of water scarcity is GDP growth
which greatly overcomes any expected water saving due to technologi-
cal progress. Population dynamics and variations in Wa, due to climate
change, play a minor role in most of the countries under assessment,
with the exception of India. Uncertain regional climate change can play
a secondary role to either exacerbate or dampen the increase in water
stress due to socio-economic growth. The strongest climate impacts on
relative changes in water stress are seen in Brazil and Turkey, but strong
impacts also occur over Europe. This information is crucial for the com-
parison of alternative policies which are used for investments in water
efficiency, international trade agreements, population control measures
and the promotion of economic growth. Another novelty introduced in
this study is given by the computation of the sectoral impact. Due to het-
erogeneous production functions, there is no one best solution that can
be applied universally; a global agreement on VWT should be paired
with local initiatives. Depending on the context, some countries will
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find it more convenient to be more energy-intensive and to import food
(Japan and Sweden) while other countries are already heavily dependent
on foreign food (China and India among others) and thus they need to
find the best combination from alternative virtual water uses. In par-
ticular, China and India need to clean up production processes, due to
fast industrialization, to avoid the subtraction of a growing amount of
water for food production. In those countries policies based on GY re-
cycling and green technologies are fundamental to avoid extreme water
exploitation and to ensure a better quality of water. This Chapter sheds
light over the complex evolution of water-climate-economic systems, in
particularly under severe water constraints. Though based on simple
linear algebra, the IO model is able to ascertain non-linear trends in the
main variables (VWT, social and physical water scarcity) suggesting that
it is a useful tool to frame future environmental policies in order to man-
age scarce water resources in a complex and uncertain world. The out-
comes of this study should be interpreted in an holistic general manner,
considering the limitations and uncertainties associated with modelling
future climate change trajectories.
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Chapter 4
An Evolutionary approach
to International
Environmental Agreements
4.1 Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is the biggest challenge that humans are
facing, in order to avoid, or at least to restrain, the possible disasters
that might occur in case of an increase of global temperature higher than
2 degrees, as described in the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change report (see Edenhofer (2012)). The most important problem is
related to transboundary pollution of greenhouse gas emissions. The
formation and development of International Environmental Agreements
(IEA) has been the subject of a fast growing branch of the economic liter-
ature over the past decade, in particular non-cooperative games go back
to Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994). There are
several important design issues that self-enforcing IEA have to address:
despite the global benefits of reducing green-house gas discharges, no
agent has any incentive to reduce her own burden, there is not any supra-
national force able to enforce any agreement, there is a temptation to free
ride and a high level of asymmetry in historical responsibilities and in the
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(future and uncertain) benefits-costs distribution. At least this is the clas-
sical framework in which completely informed rational agents should
operate. Yet the number of signatories of IEA is increasing and, at local
level, many people are making efforts to reduce emissions and putting
pressure on businesses and governments to do the same. Contrary to
what observed historically, Barret (1994) shows, with a game with iden-
tical agents, that only a small number of coalitions are stable and that in
general the number of signatories size is small (around three) when the
difference in net benefits between the noncooperative and full coopera-
tive outcomes is high. Actually, it seems that the size of the IEA coalition
is a minor problem, since that the number of signatories has grown sub-
stantially in time (from 113 in Stockholm 1992 to 195 countries in the re-
cent IEA held in Lima on December 2014). Other authors tried to explain
this dichotomy by including asymmetries (Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013)
and McGinty (2005)), transfers (Colmer (2011) and Carraro et al. (2006)),
moral concerns (Jeppesen and Andersen (Jeppesen and Andersen)), un-
certainty (Kolstad (2007) and Heal and Kristrom (2002)) or by framing a
dynamic (de Zeeuw (2008), Rubio and Ulph (2007) and Calvo and Rubio
(2012)) or an evolutionary game (Courtois et al. (2004), McGinty (2010)
and Vasconcelos et al. (2013)). The consensus is that any case of failure
of the compliance of the IEA is due to a voluntary action to free ride.
Though often almost all parties agree that something should be done to
protect the global environment, a progressive increase in the yearly air
pollution is observed, at global level, measured by the concentration of
CO2. However there is a great heterogeneity between countries in terms
of the difference between international agreements and actual level of
emissions, for instance some Kyoto participants are well above their tar-
get while others are well below.1
There is a general consensus that “no one country” can solve the global
climate change problem Meserve (2008), neither waiting for a “single
worldwide solution” appears less problematic. In addition to the prob-
1In particular, paired with the bad performances of USA, Canada and Australia, there
are some successful examples of emission reductions with the respect to the Kyoto stan-
dards: Japan, France, Italy, Germany and UK among others (see Oliver et al. (2014)).
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lem of waiting too much, “global solutions” negotiated at a global level,
if not backed up by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and local
levels, however, are not guaranteed to work well Ostrom (2009). That
is, the first step of each country is to pursue domestic climate policies
consistent with domestic pressures (Bodansky et al. (2004)), reinforced
by an international agreement in line with the economic structure. The
people most hurt by impacts may not have adequate representation at
higher levels and may be unable to articulate clear solutions to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and help them adapt to the variety of threats
they face Agrawal (2008). “Think Globally but Act Locally” hits right at
a major dilemma facing all inhabitants of our globe.
This study aims to explain and simulate: i) under which economic con-
ditions a country fails to respect the IEA or when it attains better results
than expected, ii) the role played by consumers’ environmental awareness,
iii) under which conditions there is space for a country to implement
voluntary actions. As the empirical evidence suggests, even those coun-
tries which did not sign past agreements (USA) or which were exonerate
from emitting controls (developing countries), are implementing differ-
ent kind of local policies to regulate and limit pollution. One of the most
successful efforts made by many local governments across the United
States has been to reduce the level of fine-particulate air pollution (which
in some cases has reduced greenhouse gas emissions as well). Berkeley,
California, has adopted a general policy to reduce emissions substan-
tially over time. One of the programs is called Berkeley FIRST (Financing
Initiative for Renewable and Solar Technology) and is designed to reduce
the barrier of up-front costs. Other local-level efforts to overtly increase
the level of alternative energy production or reduce the level of automo-
bile use have been reported for many cities around the world including
Sorsogon, Philippines; Esmeraldas, Ecuador; Maputo, Mozambique; and
Kampala, Uganda, where efforts are supported by the Cities in Climate
Change Initiative, funded by the government of Norway and the UN
Development Account. Moreover also China and India, which were the
most claimer against the proposal of the EU in the last meeting of Copen-
hagen on December 2013, have implemented serious national policy to
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protect the environment. For instance India set up the National Solar
Plan through which partially substitute the fossil energy with a cleaner
one. Also China in the last five-year national plan has decided to allo-
cate 800 billion of dollar to counteract the high level of pollution of some
regions, such as Hebei, Shanxi and Shandong.
This Chapter follows the tradition of the literature that considers uni-
form emission reduction quotas. It differs from the previous literature
in three respects. First, the analysis is not based on a stylized model
where parties are modeled ‘as if’ they were individual rational agents,
but I ground their action on their economic structure. Second, I offer a
micro-foundation of the economic system with an Evolutionary Game
where consumers and firms interact, determining the level of emissions
for any given level of environmental standards fixed by the IEA. Finally,
the complexity of the model limits the possibility to analytically derive
every results, therefore the analysis is integrated with (parameterised)
simulations, using a handy Maple algorithm, to determine the alterna-
tive evolutionary equilibria that each country reaches when IEA is en-
forced.
The Chapter is structured as follow: Section 4.2 shows the results from
the evolutionary interaction between household and firms and the differ-
ent regimes, in terms of equilibria, that characterize each country. Section
4.3 describes the 2x2 one-shot IEA game and the conditions under which
countries find out convenient to coordinate their actions, while Section
4.4 presents the results from numerical simulations. Finally, Section 4.5
draws the conclusions and indicates the main policy implications.
4.2 GAME 1 - Evolutionary Micro-foundation
I assessed the evolutionary dynamics of production convection in a two-
step procedure which integrates the results from two games (Γ1 and Γ2),
the former at national-scale level and the latter at the global level (IEA).
Γ1 shows what it can be considered the dynamics of isolated economies
in which, due to interior conditions, it is established a certain percentage
(in terms of investment or as a quota of GDP) of “green” production. Let
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consider a normal-form (strategic) game with a player set composed by
individuals that comprise Ω = {H,F} finite populations, namely house-
holds (H) and firms (F). Each population splits in clubs depending on
the strategy s = {E,P} agents play or the behavior that agents follow,
that stand for ecologic (E) and polluting (P ), respectively. The normal form
representation of the Game is given by the next matrix payoff:
Table 7:
Normal form game Γ1.
Players FE Fp
HE hE , fE 0 , 0
HP 0 , 0 hP , fP
The dynamic evolution of the fraction of each club i.e., given the com-
plementarity of the two strategies {E, P}, is simply derivable from the
evolution of the proportion of ecological households and firms, namely
of α and β, according to the following replicators dynamics:
α˙ = α · (1− α) · [HE −HP ] (4.1)
β˙ = β · (1− β) · [FE − FP ] (4.2)
where Hs and Fs are the expected fitness of choosing the Hs and Fs
strategies respectively. In both cases the percentage of green players in-
creases if the fit given by the green strategy is higher than what expected
when the polluting strategy is played.2 Let introduce the payoff structure
for both players and strategies, the expected values and the evolutionary
dynamics which characterize Game 1.
4.2.1 Households
The utility of a household h depends on his material payoff (hs). Let
assume that the consumption of the two goods gives the same level of
2Note that the payoffs out of the diagonal are always zeros because I assume that when
people with different strategies are matched they do not sign any contract. To wit, the green
consumers do not want to buy polluting goods and viceversa.
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utility3, yet the relationship between the environmental standards (θ),
required to avoid health and social damages from polluting processes of
production, and the share of firms operating under green production (β)
shape the total payoff. In particular, the payoff of the green household is
a piece-wise function defined as:
hE =
{
u− c(θ − β), if β < θ.
u, otherwise.
(4.3)
where u > 0 is the constant level of utility from consumption. House-
holds who decide to play the green strategy carry a monetary cost (c > 0)
proportional to the difference between the environmental standard (1 ≥
θ ≥ 0) and the share of the green firm (1 ≥ β ≥ 0). This additional
cost represents the willingness to finance the ecological friendly produc-
tion. I assume that in case of no environmental concerns – i.e. β > θ –
the green household simply receives utility from consumption because
it is expected no environmental concerns. There is a double interpreta-
tion of c: the first stands on the assumption that green consumers pay
more because the good carries an extra-cost, imposed by the Govern-
ment, in order to finance the green start-up, yet the model do not take
into account the process of formation of prices nor the mechanism of re-
distribution of this extra payment. Secondly, from a broader perspective,
I report, among the several real-case initiatives, that many green startups
got off the ground using crowd-funding sites, such as ‘FoodCycle’, which
recycles food waste into nutritious meals for those in need. However the
potential gains from this kind of investments are not modelled. On the
other hand, the polluter household plays the polluting strategy hP and
obtains the following payoff:
hP =
{
u− δ(θ − β), if β < θ.
u, otherwise.
(4.4)
where δ represents how much the consumer (and public opinion) per-
ceives the possible damages from a polluting consumption, thus repre-
3In other words, green and polluted goods are perfect substitutes because both goods
are able, through their material characteristics, to satisfy in the same manner the needs of
consumers.
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senting a (kind of) moral cost. Here 0 < δ ≤ 1 is a parameter used
as a proxy of the level of environmental consciousness prompt by pub-
lic opinion and media. Given δ, the utility of hP decreases inasmuch
the environmental standards are not respected, i.e. when θ − β is high.
Since that the utility from consumption is the same in both cases, house-
holds simply compare the monetary cost of being environmental friendly
(c) with the moral cost (δ) of consuming polluting goods. It is simple
to recover the fit of each strategy and assess whether households pre-
fer the green or the polluting strategy. The expected payoff of choos-
ing the green and the polluting strategy are HE = E(HE) = βhE and
HP = E(HP ) = (1 − β)hP respectively. Households choose the green
(polluting) strategy if and only if HE > HP (HE < HP ). Note that if
β = 0 then HE > HP if and only if θ > θ0 ≡ uδ ; while if β = 1, it al-
ways holds HE > HP . Therefore, in case 0 < θ ≤ θ0 there is only one
interception between HE and HP , given either by:
β∗0 ≡
1
2
, if 0 < θ < min{θ0, 1
2
} (4.5)
or by
β∗1 ≡
θ(c+ δ) + δ +
√
∆β
2(c+ δ)
if
1
2
< θ < θ0, (4.6)
where ∆β = [θ(c + δ) + δ − 2u]2 − 4(c + δ)(δθ − u).4 Note that if the
environmental awareness is ‘sufficiently low’ (i.e. δ < u), then there is
a single interception between HE and HP for any value of θ ∈ [0, 1]. In
case β < β∗0,1, the expected payoff of the polluting strategy is greater
than that of the green one, while if β > β∗ the reverse holds (see Figure
4.11(a)). When θ > θ0, the two curves –HE andHP – can be either secant
(∆β > 0), tangent (∆β = 0) or without any point in common (∆β < 0)
when the expected payoff of the green strategy is always greater than
the polluting one. It holds that if δ ≤ c2+4u24u the determinant is always
positive, otherwise
∆β ≥ 0⇐⇒ θ ≤ θ1 ≡ δ + 2u− 2
√
(δ − c)u
c+ δ
.
4From the last term of ∆β , it is straightforward that θ < θ0 is a sufficient condition for
∆β > 0.
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When θ0 < θ ≤ θ1, HE and HP have two intersections: the first one is
either β0 or β1, described above, while the second is given by:5
β∗2 =
θ(c+ δ) + δ −√∆β
2(c+ δ)
. (4.7)
In this case, for 0 ≤ β < β∗2 and for β∗0,1 < β ≤ 1 the expected payoff
of the green strategy is greater than that of the polluting one, while for
β∗2 < β < β
∗
0,1 the reverse holds (see Figure 4.11(b)). Figure 4.11(c) shows
a case in which there is no interception between the two expected payoff,
i.e. θ > θ1. In this case the green strategy is always preferred for any
value of β.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 11: Examples of households equilibrium. Values of parameters:
δ = 0.7, c = 0.4, u = 0.3. (a) A single interception (θ = 0.35), (b) Two
interceptions (θ = 0.6), (c) No interception (θ = 0.75).
4.2.2 Firms
From the firm’s side I assume that the green firms are characterized by
the following payoff:
fE =
{
piE +
c(θ−β)α
β , if β < θ,
piE , otherwise.
(4.8)
5More precisely, if θ0 < θ < min{1/2, θ1}, the solutions are β1 and β0, while if
max{θ0, 1/2} < θ < min{1, θ1}, the solutions are β1 and β2. This difference does not
affect the qualitative dynamics.
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where piE > 0 is the profit from the green selling. Each green firm re-
ceives a subsidy which is equal to the total amount of extra-cost paid
by each green household multiplied by the share of green consumers
(α). This amount decreases as the share of green firms β approaches the
environmental standards (θ). This is justified by the fact that the green
technology is not yet developed to be as efficient as the polluting one
and its impact is still marginal. An instructive example is provided by
the last OECD report (2014) that confirms the tiny share (1%), by 2011,
of renewable resources in the production of primary energy, while oil,
gas and coal together cover more than four-fifths of the total amount
(30.7%, 29.2% and 21.5%, respectively). Therefore, the public subsidy
should help to boost the investment in new green startups to stimulate
investments in green sectors. On the other side, the polluting firms are
characterized by the following payoff:
fP =
{
piP − γ(θ−β)1−β , if β < θ,
piP , otherwise.
(4.9)
where piP > 0 is the net profit that, in line with what stated above, is
assumed to be greater than that of the non-polluting firms (piP > piE).
They can be interpreted as an average profit proportional to the market
share of the belonging sector. Moreover, γ(θ−β)1−β is a tax function which
depends on the relation between the actual level of green production (β),
the ecological standards fixed by the government (θ) and a multiplicative
factor (γ) which measures the monetary cost of the difference θ − β. The
total cost afforded by the FP depends on the stringency of environmental
policies and on the number of polluting firms. Since the polluting firms
must jointly cover the cost of environmental damages, the total amount
is determined by the percentage of polluting firms. Given the share of
households which choose the green or the polluting strategy, firms find
it convenient to choose the green (polluting) production if and only if
the expected payoff of FE is greater (lower) than the expected payoff of
choosing FP . As before, let us define FE = E(FE) = αfE and FP =
E(FP ) = (1 − α)fP the expected payoff of the green and the polluting
production respectively.
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The expected payoffs of firms depend on both α and β. Note that FE is
an increasing function of α, such that FE = 0 when α = 0 and FE > 0
when6 α = 1. On the other hand, the expected payoff of the polluting
strategy is linear in α, and it is decreasing in α if β > θ. Instead, when
β < θ the slope of the function FP depends on the sign of piP − γ(θ−β)1−β
which expresses the difference between the whole profits of polluting
industries and the (monetary evaluation) of the environmental damages.
Obviously when this last expression is negative, that is when β < β¯ ≡
γθ−piP
γ−piP , FE is greater than FP for any value of α.
Figure 12: The interception between the expected payoff of green and
polluting strategies in the plane {θ, β}.
Figure 12 shows the resulting interceptions between FE and FP in the
plane {θ, β}. When β > θ there is an internal value of α (α∗0), such that
firms are indifferent between the two strategies, which does not depend
on β. When instead β¯ < β < θ, there is an internal value of α (α∗1), such
that FE = FP , but this value is an increasing function of β. Note that
θ >
pi
P
γ is a necessary condition to induce at least one firm to deviate from
the polluting convention – i.e. when α = 0 and β = 0. More precisely the
6The value of FE at α = 1 depends on the relation between θ and β. If β < θ then
FE = piE +
c(θ−β)
β
, otherwise FE = piE .
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two alternative solutions are:
α∗0 =
piP
piP + piE
, (4.10)
α∗1 =
β[γ(θ − β)− (piP + piE)(1− β)] +
√
∆α
2c[(θ − β)(1− β)] . (4.11)
where ∆α is always positive.7 These results, combined with those of the
previous subsection, determine analytically the equilibria of the evolu-
tionary game. In what follows I establish the conditions under which
(Regimes) the dynamic system converges to an interior equilibrium and
when it is (locally) stable.
4.2.3 Regimes
Households and firms change their behavior according to the replicator
dynamics described by equations 4.1. Given the results above, depend-
ing on the value of θ I derive five Regimes (Ri) that qualitatively change
the dynamic properties of the system.8 For the sake of clearness, let as-
sume that the economy is, as a starting point, in the polluting convention
where β = α = 0 and that the government establishes a certain level of
environmental standard (θ > 0).
R1: When 0 ≤ θ < min{uδ , piPγ }, the isoclines and the phase diagram
of the system are shown in Figure 4.13(a). In this case there is no interior
(locally) stable equilibrium. The introduction of an environmental law
(θ > 0) is not sufficient to induce the system to detach from the polluting
productive convention. The possible explanations of the failure of the
policy (θ) could be: that consumers are not enough aware of the potential
environmental damages they may suffer from contaminant goods and
they thus weigh more the utility from consumption, or that the gain from
dirty production are so high to more than compensate the covering of the
7Note that the other solution in α of FE = FP is always negative. Moreover ∆α =
β2{(1− β)[2γ(piP + piE)((β − θ) + (piP + piE)(1− β)] + 4c(piP − γ)(2θ + β2) + γ2(θ −
β)2}+ 4c{βpiP (β2(2 + θ)− (θ + β)) + γ(β2θ2 − β − 2θ)− θ2}
8Figure 3 shows the phase diagram for each Regime. Note that the black circles indicate
the (locally) stable equilibria and the dotted line the level of stringency of the environmen-
tal law (θ).
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environmental costs. Note that given θ an increase in δ or γ may induce
the system to depart from R1 and to follow one of the other regimes.
R2: When piPγ < θ <
u
δ , the polluting convention becomes unstable
because the environmental law is ‘sufficiently high’ to induce the start-up
of new green firms, or the shift towards clean processes, as long as β < β¯,
that is the condition for which FE > FP . If β¯ < β∗0,1, then all the trajecto-
ries departing from the polluting convention converge to the point with
coordinate (α∗ = 0, β∗ = β¯). This is a corner solution (Figure 4.13(b)),
where, in order to avoid the cost of polluting strategy, some firms find it
convenient to choose the green technology even without any consumer.
This result is odd, but it signals the imbalance between the high cost for
polluting firms and the low awareness of households to environmental
concerns. Given that β∗0,1 ≤ 1/2, when γ < piP this case disappears be-
cause β¯ > 1/2. On the other hand if β¯ > β∗0,1, as long as β increases,
households find it convenient to choose the green production. This pro-
cess ends up when α = β = 1. Thus the only globally stable equilibrium
is the green convention (see Figure 4.13(c)).
R3: When uδ < θ <
piP
γ , households find it convenient to choose the
green strategy so that they induce the firms to supply more green goods
and services. The dynamical system is characterized by two locally sta-
ble equilibria, an interior point (α∗ > 0, β∗ > 0) and the clean convention
(α∗ = 1, β∗ = 1). In this case all the trajectories departing from the pol-
luting convention join the interior equilibrium where β∗ ≤ θ (see Figure
4.13(d)), therefore the policy has only a partial effect and it is not wholly
efficacious because θ is not strict enough to induce the expected share of
firms to shift their production from the polluting convention. Its impact
is indirect and simply stands on the stimulus from the demand side.
R4: When max{uδ , piPγ } ≤ θ < min{θ1, 1}, households and firms find
it convenient to choose the green strategy. The dynamical system is char-
acterized by two locally stable equilibria, the interior and the green con-
vention. In this regime all the trajectories departing from the polluting
convention end up to the interior equilibrium where β∗ ≤ θ (see Fig-
ure 4.13(e)), accordingly the same considerations of the previous regime
holds true here.
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R5: When θ1 < θ < 1 the only globally stable equilibrium is the green
convention (see Figure 4.13(f)) because the environmental law is suffi-
ciently high to induce any agent to prefer the ecological strategy. Note
that in this case the environmental standards have not to be necessarily
strict to obtain the green transition, rather its success is strictly tied with
the economic structure of the country. As it will be clear with the numer-
ical simulation (Section 4.4) the role of firms and consumers is crucial.
When the environmental consciousness is highly spread in the society
and the industrial profits are close to those coming from clean produc-
tion, then it is sufficient a (relatively) little stimulus from the Govern-
ment. This result shows that the country should not simply impose an
environmental law, rather it should put an effort to stimulate the citizens’
responsibility because it might be a channel to save resource otherwise
spent to recover the environmental damages.9
(a) (b)
9Value of parameters of Figure 13 are: (a) δ = 0.7, c = 0.3, u = 0.35, γ = 1.1, piE = 0.1,
piP = 0.3, θ = 0.15; (b) δ = 0.5, c = 0.5, u = 0.35, γ = 1.5, piE = 0.1, piP = 0.3, θ = 0.6;
(c) δ = 0.5, c = 0.1, u = 0.15, γ = 1.5, piE = 0.1, piP = 0.3, θ = 0.25; d) δ = 0.5, c = 0.1,
u = 0.15, γ = 1.5, piE = 0.1, piP = 0.6, θ = 0.35; (e) δ = 0.5, c = 0.1, u = 0.15, γ = 1.5,
piE = 0.1, piP = 0.6, θ = 0.45; (f) δ = 0.5, c = 0.1, u = 0.15, γ = 1.5, piE = 0.1, piP = 0.6,
θ = 0.55.
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(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 13: Phase diagram of the dynamical system in case of Regimes:
R1 (a), R2 (b-c), R3 (d), R4 (e) and R5 (f).
The red arrows show the directions of the trajectory. The isocline of the
share of green firms (β) is given by the dark green curve. The isocline
of the share of green households (α) is given by the horizontal dark blue
line(s). The value of θ is the light green horizontal line. The dot hori-
zontal line is the value of u/δ. The magenta curve shows the basin of
attraction of the two convention if applicable.
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4.3 GAME 2 - IEA
In designing the IEA game I follow the model of Endres and Finus (1999)
with the needed extensions given the results of Γ1. Assume two coun-
tries i = {N,S} with a welfare objective function Wi(θi),10 dependent
on national θi, defined as the difference between the industrial profits
(piE,i + piP,i), proxy for the benefits Πi(θi), and the costs or damages due
to the global pollution Di(θi, θ−i). The asymmetric nature of IEA implies
that N and S must be two different groups, where N stands for North-
ern and richer countries, whilst S means Southern and poorer countries.
For simplicity I model only the case with two countries, each one the
leader or the representative of its group in order to define a bilateral trea-
tise, as for instance the last agreement between USA and China held in
November 2014. Let assume, as in Pavlova and de Zeeuw (2013), a one-
to-one relationship between production and emission given by piP,i and
quadratic profit and damage functions. Notice that in this model, given
the evolutionary foundation of country’s economic structure, it is not as-
sumed that a country behaves as if it were an individual (given that it is
not an homogeneous entity), in fact it may even fail to engage the treatise
due to the economic structure rather than a deliberatively choice to free-
ride. For these reasons each country, when involved in an IEA, bargains
in order to define an uniform θ∗global. Let us assume:
• 2 countries which decide simultaneously;
• Single agreement on θ∗global based on the smallest common denomi-
nator (SCD)-rule which ensures external stability;11
• ”Good-faith” commitment which ensures internal stability.
Each party agrees and decides simultaneously over a uniform inter-
national environmental standard (θ∗global). Among the different bar-
10Note that, in line with the current literature, I do not include the households payoffs
in the welfare function. From a mathematical point of view its exclusion simplifies the cal-
culations without any significant loss in the meaning of the results. In fact, in equilibrium,
the total welfare of the households does not depend on θ, therefore its value simply cancels
out when I compute the first derivative.
11See Endres and Finus (1998) for the mathematical proof.
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gaining process, the focus is on uniform solutions, it is assumed that
governments already recognize the externality before negotiations start.
Though often almost all parties agree that something should be done to
protect the global environment, they disagree about the degree of emis-
sion reduction therefore negotiators claim for different clean production
standards. Frequently, since international agreements are voluntary and
governments do not have the same interests, a compromise is sought
which only reflects the Smallest Common Denominator (SCD).12 The SCD-
decision rule implies that if θi < θj , then θ∗global = θi. In an international
bargaining context, one would expect that proposals are strategically mo-
tivated, however, as demonstrated in Endres and Finus (1998), the SCD-
decision rule is immune to strategic offers. Furthermore, it is assumed
that each country behaves “as if” it believes that it is actually able to re-
spect the international treatise (good-faith commitment). This ensures the
internal stability and, in this context, it is fundamental because the aim
is to show a different source of IEA failure rather than free-riding. As
noted by Chayes and Chayes (1991, p. 311):
“International lawyers and others familiar with the opera-
tions of international treaties take for granted that most states
comply with most of their treaty obligations most of the time.
[...] Although there are some obvious exceptions where states
have signed treaties without a serious intention to comply, or-
dinarily the decision is made in good faith, presumably after
a process, however imperfect, that weighs the costs and bene-
fits of compliance. [What this implies is that] states’ behavior
in entering into treaties suggests that they believe they are ac-
cepting significant constraints on future freedom of action to
which they expect to adhere over a broad range of circum-
stances.”
Where states do not comply with an agreement, the reason is often that
states do not have the means to comply rather than that they do not have
12See Hoel (1992), Endres (1995), Endres and Finus (1998) and Finus (2001) for a theo-
retical explanation and empirical assessments.
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the desire to comply. This reasoning is utterly consistent with the model
developed below.
When the international environmental treatise is embodied in Γ1, each
country reaches an evolutionary equilibrium (α∗, β∗) dependent on both
parameters’ value and initial conditions, that are assumed unknown to
the governments. This implies that it would be no more necessary to
assume free-riding in order to have different performances (β∗ 6= θ∗global)
than what ratified during the IEA. Each country i={N,S} is characterized
by the following welfare function:
Wi = Πi − ai ·D (4.12)
and, in particular, the profit and damage function are defined as:
Πi = bi[di(θi · piE,i + (1− θi) · piP,i)− ((1− θi) · piP,i)
2
2
] (4.13)
D = (
∑
k={i,j}
(1− θk) · pik)2 (4.14)
where a, b, d  (0,1) ∀i, j{N,S}, with i 6= j, and D(θi, θ−i) is a quadratic
function of the global emissions, representing a proxy of the potential
damages caused by extreme climate events. Πi is composed by two com-
ponents: the first one is the benefit deriving from production, which
is reflected by an higher level of profit, and a second member which
stands for the local environmental deterioration and health problems due
to industrial discharges of polluting firms. In case ai is null, each na-
tion chooses the business-as-usual (BAU) solution given by θBAUi that
maximizes Πi. Pavlova and Zeeuw (2013) interpret 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 as the
vulnerability to environmental damages, to wit the probability to incur
in negative climate events with the consequent economic losses. In this
model it is exogenous and might be interpreted as the result coming from
a social debate in which are taken into account the opinion of the scien-
tific community, the environmental consciousness of citizens (δ) and the
pressure of public opinion.13 It is shown that the success of the environ-
13This interpretation recalls the concept of extended-peer-community introduced by Fu-
towicz and Ravetz in their core paper on Post-Normal Science. The interested reader is
referred to Futowicz and Ravetz (1994).
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mental policy depends on the preferences of consumers, the efficiency of
green technology and on the level of environmental awareness spread in
the society. The optimum share of emissions under the business-as-usual
hypothesis is:
θBAUi = 1− di
(piP,i − piE,i)
pi2P,i
(4.15)
Notice that θBAU is always  (0,1)14 and that, given d and piE,i, it in-
creases with the respect of piP because the government must fix more
stringent environmental standards in order to compensate the local eco-
logical damages. On the other hand, a rich country with piP,i high might
still find convenient to fix stringent environmental standards if it has an
advanced green technology, and then when piE,i is high as well. In fact in
this case it would be an advantage to speed up the green transaction be-
cause it can yield high profits without hurting the environment, avoiding
public expenditure to recover any possible environmental damage.
In contrast, if the global externality is recognized by each state (ai >
0), then each country is affected by emissions emanating from its own
and the foreign industry and there is the necessity to bargain in order to
reach an agreement. The uncoordinated equilibrium is given by the max
of equation 4.13 with the respect to θi (for each country), while the so-
cial optimum (SO) is computed over the sum of all the Welfare functions
involved. Thus there is a difference between the non-cooperative (unco-
ordinated) equilibrium and the cooperative (coordinated) equilibrium. I
am interested in an endogenous determination of abatement under differ-
ent economic conditions, showing the importance of local actions and
environmental consciousness. The chances that local actions and envi-
ronmental organisations will have a major role in future IEAs seem to
have improved recently. For instance several international environmen-
tal organizations, such as GreenPeace and WWF, have put pressure to
governments in order to actively protect and preserve the ecological sys-
tems, and they also help public opinion to become more sensitive to the
care of nature. Even a recent report of the World Bank (2015) explicitly
recognizes the role played by local communities in the management of
14Obviously in case of negative values, the country opts for no environmental laws.
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natural resources. The numerical simulations of Section 4.4 explain the
role of local environmental consciousness for the success of IEA policies.
If the global externality is recognized by both governments, each country
maximise Wi, and it will propose:
θNCi = K
NC
i {piP,j(bjbi + ajbi)[pi2P,i − di(piP,i − piE,i)]+
+ piP,iaibj [piP,ipiP,j + dj(piP,j − piE,j)]}
(4.16)
where
KNCi = [pi
2
P,ipiP,j · (bjbi + ajbi + aibj)]−1 (4.17)
with (j, i) = {N,S} and j 6= i. Given the high non linearity of the functions
involved, it is not possible to establish a simple relationship between the
optimal level of environmental standards and the parameters and vari-
ables involved. Section 4.4 shows the results from different numerical
simulations which give fruitful insights, here the exposition is limited to
two extreme cases which make the equation more tractable. I derived the
conditions under which a country behaves as the bottleneck of the inter-
national agreement, to wit the country that defines the smallest common
denominator. I compared the results under the hypothesis that countries
differ only either in the marginal industrial benefits (bi 6= bj) or in the
risk to suffer economic losses from climate change and global pollution
(ai 6= aj). Let assume that both green and polluted profits of the former
country follow the same proportion with respect to those of the second
country, that is pi
P,N
= mpi
P,S
and pi
E,N
= mpi
E,S
, with m> 1, and that the
green profits are pi
E
= npi
P
, with n  (0,1), in both country. Obviously N
is reacher than S because m > 1, which is a measure of income and tech-
nological inequality. Furthermore, let assume that both countries have
the same marginal benefits, b
N
= b
S
= b and d
N
= d
S
= d, but different
climatic risks: a
N
= z˜ · a
S
, with z˜ > 0. Differences in a might be due
to either different weights put to the environment, which can be related
to the economic development of a region, or to the geographical location
(e.g. Italy may suffer more from sea level rise than Russia). Country i will
be the bottleneck (i.e. let i = S and θN > θS , it results that θ∗global = θS)
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of the IEA game inasmuch as:
z˜ > z¯
NC ≡ 1 + b
a
S
(1−m)
(1 +m)
(4.18)
lim
m→+∞ z¯
NC
= 1− λ
S
(4.19)
(4.20)
where ba
S
= λ
S
> 0 is the benefit-risk ratio of country S given by the ben-
efit of local production and potential losses from global emissions. The
threshold z¯
NC
depends on both the income (and historical) inequality
(m) and λ
S
. Given that N is reacher than S then, independently from
λ
S
, if country N is more risky (z˜ > 1) it would like to see a higher joint
emission reduction, however the convention will be dictated by country
S (i.e. θ∗global = θS). The same result holds even when z˜ < 1 under the
assumption that λ
S
> 1 and that the level of inequality is sufficiently
high (m >>1). A typical example is given by China that is likely to suf-
fer from extreme climate events (e.g. desertification) but is finding more
convenient to develop further the industrial production and it is thus less
concerned about emission reductions.
Let now consider the opposite case of equal climate damage, a
N
= a
S
=
a but different opportunity costs of abatement: b
N
= zˆb
S
. In this case
country S will determine the stringency of the IEA game inasmuch as:
zˆ < z¯
NC ≡ a · (1 +m)
a(1 +m) + bS · (1−m) (4.21)
lim
m→+∞ z¯
NC
=
1
1− λS (4.22)
where in this case λ
S
=
b
S
a . A richer country proposes an higher envi-
ronmental convention inasmuch as it faces lower opportunity costs and
the poorer country expects low benefit-risk ratio. Let assume that N has
low opportunity costs (zˆ < 1) and that λ
S
< 1, then θN > θS always
because the threshold is greater than 1, while in case λ
S
> 1, and m
‘sufficiently high’, then z¯
NC
< 0 and thus country N dictates the IEA
because S, though poorer, faces a greater opportunity cost with respect
to the same climate risk. Results confirm an inverse relation between
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opportunity costs and damage costs, furthermore I show that the level
of inequality can lead to counterintuitive results where, for instance, a
riskier country prefers a lower level of emission abatement.
The coordinated equilibrium, denoted by the superscript C, is based on
the extended welfare function the social optimum that is obtained by
maximising the sum of the welfare functions of the two countries:
θCi = K
C
i · [piP,j [(bjbi + ajbi + aibi) · (pi2P,i − di(piP,i − piE,i)]+
+ piP,i[(aibj + ajbj)(piP,ipiP,j + dj(piP,j − piE,j)]]
(4.23)
where
KCi = [piP,i · piP,j(bjbi + ajbi + aibj + aibi + ajbj)]−1 (4.24)
which follows the same structure of the uncoordinated equilibrium, but
it includes the interaction effect of cost opportunity and climate risk
within each country. Given the non-linearity of this solution, I apply
the same comparative analysis, explained above, in order to establish
under which conditions θCN > θ
C
S and when θ
C
i > θ
NC
i for all i = {N,S}.
Let assume again that both countries have the same marginal benefits,
b
N
= b
S
= b and d
N
= d
S
= d, but different climatic risks: a
N
= z˜a
S
,
with z˜ > 0. In this case country S will always be the bottleneck of the
IEA game because m > 1. It means that, independently from the level
of climate risk, the poorest country always dictates the IEA. A possible
explanation is that, in a context of coordinated maximization, S knows
that, even when it is more risky (z˜ < 1), the same percentage of emission
reduction after the IEA has the same opportunity cost in both countries,
however in absolute values N will reduce more, since that the amount
of its polluted production is greater. More interesting is the compari-
son between uncoordinated and coordinated values, which returns two
thresholds (0 < ζCi < 1 < ζ
C
j ) which define the space where coordinated
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environmental standards are higher in both countries, that is:
θCi > θ
NC
i if z˜ > ζ
C
i (4.25)
θCj > θ
NC
j if z˜ < ζ
C
j (4.26)
ζCi ≡
1
2
√
b2 + 4a2i − b
ai
< 1 always (4.27)
ζCj ≡
√
a2i + aib
ai
> 1 always (4.28)
Hence for z˜  (ζCi , ζ
C
j ) both N and S find optimal to fix more stringent
emission reductions under a coordination regime. Differently from the
great bulk of literature, here coordinated actions are not necessary more
environmental friendly, but their success depends on the level of inequal-
ity, in terms of potential economic losses due to climate change. Notice
that the space for which coordination leads to curb more emissions in-
creases with respect to λi, in fact
∂ζCi
∂ai
> 0 and ∂ζ
C
i
∂b < 0, furthermore
∂ζCj
∂ai
< 0 and ∂ζ
C
j
∂b > 0. On the other hand, in case of different oppor-
tunity costs of abatement (bN = zˆ · bS) country S will be the bottleneck
if:
zˆ <
2a(1 +m)
2a(1 +m) + bi(1−m) = z¯
C
(4.29)
lim
m→+∞ z¯C =
2
2− λS (4.30)
thus the same reasoning for uncoordinated equilibrium holds here, with
the only exception is represented by the fact that now the benefit-risk ra-
tio is halved because the aggregate welfare function is considered. More-
over, in this case, the coordinated equilibrium is always higher than the
uncoordinated, in both countries, for each zˆ > 0.
In summary I have shown that when the economic framework, to wit
consumers and firms’s choices, is taken into account the structure of IEA
becomes less trivial than what exposed in the great bulk of literature. In
particular the relation between BAU, non-cooperative and coordinated
action is determined by the degree of international (income and techno-
logical) inequality, by level of polluting profits and by the benefit-risk
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ratio. Their combination could lead to (apparently) counterintuitive re-
sults, that actually are able to grasp several real case phenomena. First
of all, this Chapter established the conditions for which a poor and risky
country is less concerned about environmental issues (e.g. China) be-
cause it focuses more on economic growth. Secondly, the coordination
of action does not automatically imply more stringent international en-
vironmental standards, rather when the inequality is large and the ex-
pected loss from climate change is not too high in the bottleneck country,
the bargaining process could lead to ratify a smaller θglobal. This is a pos-
sible explanation of the fact that, in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for
many developing countries (non-Annex I Parties) the compliance of the
treatise was not mandatory.
4.4 Numerical Simulations with 2 asymmetric
countries
For sake of simplicity I identify different kind of countries structured
along two axes, representing two key dimensions: environmental con-
sciousness (δ) and economic performance (pi), which can be either high
or low. Their combination reflects the North-South dichotomy between
rich and poor countries but it adds the possibility to be green also in
low-income regions (see Figure 14). In particular, I compare three differ-
ent regimes of environmental consciousness depending on the level of δ
(high, medium or low). Section 4.3 gives some insights in very simpli-
fied worlds where only one parameter was allowed to change, i.e. under
a ceteris paribus framework it is showed the impact from climate change
and the opportunity costs ought to the green transaction. Numerical sim-
ulations allow to elaborate several alternatives, with many parameters
that vary at the same time, giving a range of possibilities which clarifies
the relation between the stringency of IEA standards (θ∗) and the actual
result (β∗) that each country should attain given its own economic struc-
ture.15 For simplicity, let assume that γ = 1 always, that the Rich country
15I run numerical simulations with Maple, the codes are disposable under request.
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Figure 14: The four categories of countries in this study.
N is characterized by pi
P,N
= 0.60 and pi
E,N
= 0.20 and that the level of
inequality is m = 2 such that industries of country S generate the half
of the profits: pi
P,S
= 0.30 and pi
E,S
= 0.10. Moreover, the cost that each
green household faces are kept constant, that is c = 0.50 (medium level)
and the utility from consumption at u = 0.10. This framework allows a
simple assessment of the relative impact of the environmental conscious-
ness by setting the level of δ to: high (0.90), medium (0.50) or low (0.3).
The other parameters, {a, b, d}i for each country i, vary in order to define
four alternative scenarios:
1. High Cost-Risk in Southern country (HS): a
S
> a
N
, b
S
> b
N
and d
S
=
d
N
so that {0.40, 0.80, 0.45}S and {0.20, 0.40, 0.45}N ;
2. High Cost-Risk in Northern country (HN): a
S
< a
N
, b
S
< b
N
and d
S
=
d
N
so that {0.20, 0.60, 0.45}S and {0.45, 0.90, 0.45}N ;
3. Asymmetric Cost-Risk distribution (AS): a
S
> a
N
, b
S
< b
N
and d
S
<
d
N
so that {0.60, 0.20, 0.45}S and {0.20, 0.60, 0.75}N ;
4. Extreme Asymmetry (EX): a
S
>> a
N
, b
S
<< b
N
and d
S
< d
N
so that
{0.90, 0.10, 0.45}S and {0.10, 0.90, 0.75}N .
Each scenario returns the level of expected welfare W∗i (θ
∗
global), under
the ‘good-faith’ commitment assumption (as if each country is able to
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attain the IEA standards θ∗global) and following the SCD-rule in which,
in case of different proposals, countries agree to ratify the less strin-
gent environmental standard. Moreover, I computed the actual welfare
Wˆi(β
∗
i )
16 which depends on the actual quota of green firms (β∗i ), the ex-
pected (G∗i = (1 - θ
∗
global)·piP ) and actual level (determined by the fraction
of polluting firms, i.e. Gˆi = (1 - β∗)·piP ) of greenhouse gas emissions
and the interior equilibrium in each country (α∗i , β
∗
i ). Finally, I com-
pared the result from an hypothetical 2x2 static game (Tables 8- 9) in
which both countries have dichotomic strategies: polluting (θ = 0) or be-
ing environmental friendly (θ = 1). There are four different outcomes:
W00i = bi(dipiP,i −
pi2
P,i
2 )−
ai(piP,i+piP,j )
2
2 in case both countries neglect en-
vironmental issues, W11i = bidipiE,i when they decide to get rid of any
polluting production process, W10i = bidipiE,i −
aipi
2
P,j
2 when country j
pollutes and i acts unilaterally to green up the production while the re-
verse holds for W01i = bi(dipiP,i −
pi2
P,i
2 ) −
ai(piP,i )
2
2 . The results from the
following normal form game give further insights on which country has
more convenience in being the bottleneck of the IEA.
Table 8:
Case 1 (left) and Case 2 (right).
Players SHSE S
HS
P S
HP
E S
HP
P
NE (0.036, 0.036) (0.027, 0.054) (0.081, 0.027) (0.06, 0.045)
NP (0.00, -0.036) (-0.045, -0.09) (0.00, -0.009) (-0.101, -0.27)
Case 1 and 2 have only one Nash Equilibrium (bolded) in pure strategy
in which S it finds convenient to pollute while N acts unilaterally to abol-
ish fossil fuels and any other polluting source. Case 3 and 4 present the
specular equilibrium where N opts for dirty productions while S is envi-
ronmental friendly. In any case, who finds optimal to choose the strategy
θ = 1 receives the greatest payoff. These simple games are worth be-
cause, depending on the Nash equilibrium, they predict who will be the
16In order to compute the actual welfare it is assumed that even when country i does
not attain the IEA (β∗i 6= θ∗global), the other one does.
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Table 9:
Case 3 (left) and Case 4 (right).
Players SASE S
AS
P S
EX
E S
EX
P
NE (0.09, 0.009) (0.081, -0.009) (0.135, 0.005) (0.13, -0.031)
NP (0.126, -0.099) (0.081, -0.225) (0.225, -0.157) (0.202, -0.355)
Note: The subscript E stands for ecological strategy (θ = 1),
while P stands for polluting actions (θ = 0).
bottleneck of the IEA game when θ is allowed to get any value in the con-
tinuum <within the interval [0,1], in fact the polluter in any of the above
Nash Equilibria is who dictates the IEA. However, when the decision is
not discrete both countries find convenient, in the examples below, to set
up green environmental standards, such that θ∗global >0.
4.4.1 Case 1
In the first scenario S faces a medium risk, higher than that of N , to
incur in damages due to global pollution and even higher opportunity
cost. Under the BAU hypothesis, given this structure, S finds convenient
to not impose any environmental restrictions while N would have an
incentive to halved its polluting production. When environmental exter-
nality is recognized, both countries are involved in international agree-
ment and, differently from what expected, they agree for more stringent
policies under the NC framework. Given the SCD-rule the bottleneck
(bolded) is the poor country that, notwithstanding the peril of environ-
mental damages, does not want to curb excessively its economic growth.
Under coordinated actions S is again the bottleneck, thought it fixes a
slightly lower percentage of green production (θ∗NCS > θ
∗C
S ). Note that
here, and in the subsequent examples, the expected payoff is always
greater under the most stringent environmental standard. When θ∗global
is embodied in Γ1 it becomes evident the crucial role played by the level
of environmental consciousness (δ): only when it is high, keeping constant
the other parameters, both countries are able to precisely respect the trea-
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tise under the non-cooperative framework, while if they had coordinated
their action they would attain a quota of green firms slightly below what
ratified. In each Case I obtain that β∗N = β
∗
S and thatα
∗
N ≥ α∗S . The reason
is rather simple: the fraction of green firms is the same because in each
(sub-)scenario, dependent on δ, the value of the parameters (c, u, δ, θ),
which determine β∗, are the same in both country.
Table 10:
High Cost-Risk in Southern country.
BAU (a = 0) NON-COOP COORD
Scenario Outcome N S N S N S
θ∗ 0.50 0.00 0.75 0.50 0.96 0.46
’Good-Faith’ W∗ 0.054 0.072 0.034 0.023 0.030 0.017
G∗ 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.320 0.161
α∗ 0.75 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.67 0.59
δ HIGH β∗ 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.404 0.404
Wˆ 0.054 0.072 0.034 0.023 0.026 0.016
Gˆ 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.18
α∗ 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.10 0.47 0.15
δ MEDIUM β∗ 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26
Wˆ 0.051 0.072 0.019 0.017 0.013 0.015
Gˆ 0.42 0.30 0.42 0.21 0.44 0.22
α∗ 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.24 0.00
δ LOW β∗ 0.125 0.00 0.125 0.125 0.098 0.098
Wˆ 0.044 0.072 0.001 0.008 -0.007 0.001
Gˆ 0.52 0.30 0.52 0.26 0.54 0.27
On the other hand, the fraction of green consumers, that makes the firms
indifferent, is bigger in the richer country because, even thought the ratio
(n) between polluting and green profits is the same in both countries,
the absolute difference piP − piE is greater in this region. More green
consumers is thus required to make the polluted firms, in the rich region,
indifferent.
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4.4.2 Case 2
∀i={N,S}, the parameters di, piP,i and piE,i are the same as in Case 1 then,
based on equation 4.15, under the BAU hypothesis the results of Case 1
hold here, where S is again the bottleneck in the NC framework. Case 2 is
in line with the great bulk of literature since that the Social Optimum re-
quires more stringent environmental standards (θ∗CN > θ
∗NC
S ), that yield
lower emissions and higher welfare. If both countries have ratified θ∗CN
they would attain a complete green transaction with only green firms
and consumers, to wit they obtain environmental performances better
than what ratified independently from the level of environmental con-
sciousness.
Table 11:
High Cost-Risk in Northern country.
BAU (a = 0) NON-COOP COORD
Scenario Outcome N S N S N S
θ∗ 0.50 0.00 0.77 0.36 0.75 0.77
’Good-Faith’ W∗ 0.121 0.072 0.044 0.017 0.10 0.033
G∗ 0.30 0.30 0.382 0.19 0.146 0.072
α∗ 0.75 0.00 0.62 0.50 1.00 1.00
δ HIGH β∗ 0.50 0.00 0.275 0.275 1.00 1.00
Wˆ 0.121 0.054 0.025 0.016 0.079 0.024
Gˆ 0.30 0.30 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.00
α∗ 0.47 0.00 0.43 0.21 1.00 1.00
δ MEDIUM β∗ 0.30 0.00 0.163 0.163 1.00 1.00
Wˆ 0.115 0.054 -0.005 0.013 0.079 0.024
Gˆ 0.42 0.30 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00
α∗ 0.23 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 1.00
δ LOW β∗ 0.125 0.00 0.023 0.023 1.00 1.00
Wˆ 0.099 0.054 0.05 0.008 0.079 0.024
Gˆ 0.52 0.30 0.59 0.295 0.00 0.00
The latter does not play any role because, in this Case, θ∗CN > θ1 which
is the threshold upon which the system converges to the ‘green-green’
equilibrium (see Regime 4.13(f)). Notice that in column 5-6 the welfare
associated with α∗i = β
∗
i = 1 is lower than that of Table 11 because each
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country assumes that the other fits the IEA standard (that is lower than
1). δ plays a crucial role only under the NC framework, in fact when it
is low both countries reaches an interior equilibrium close to (0,0) where
the emissions are maximum. Inasmuch as inequality increases the level
of emissions increases as well showing that a more equal distribution of
environmental risks and industrial profits would lead to better environ-
mental status.
Table 12:
Asymmetric Cost-Risk distribution.
BAU (a = 0) NON-COOP COORD
Scenario Outcome N S N S N S
θ∗ 0.17 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.45 1.00
’Good-Faith’ W∗ 0.165 0.018 0.120 -0.112 0.132 -0.06
G∗ 0.50 0.30 0.438 0.219 0.332 0.17
α∗ 0.47 0.00 0.57 0.44 0.66 0.57
δ HIGH β∗ 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.38 0.38
Wˆ 0.163 0.018 0.113 -0.012 0.131 -0.06
Gˆ 0.558 0.30 0.50 0.25 0.372 0.186
α∗ 0.00 0.00 0.353 0.187 0.463 0.17
δ MEDIUM β∗ 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.247 0.25
Wˆ 0.162 0.018 0.107 -0.136 0.126 -0.07
Gˆ 0.60 0.30 0.558 0.28 0.452 0.226
α∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.233 0.00
δ LOW β∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.08
W∗ 0.162 0.018 0.09 -0.145 0.113 -0.11
G∗ 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.30 0.552 0.28
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4.4.3 Case 3 and Case 4
Case 3 defines a more realistic scenario where richer country is less risky
but faces higher opportunity cost since it has to convert advanced, and
profitable, polluting production process through high technological and
infrastructural investments. Case 4 proposes an extreme version of Case
3 to underline the impact of unequal distribution of risks and profits be-
tween countries. Obviously, in both cases, N dictates the IEA because
has less convenience in reducing the emissions since it faces high cost-
risk ratios (λ(3)N = 3 and λ
(4)
N = 9).
Under the BAU hypothesis both countries have low incentive in pro-
moting environmental laws, therefore the quota of green firm is (almost)
null independently from δ which plays a marginal role when it is not
supported by governmental policies. The SO requires more stringent
standards and returns higher level of welfare. Under a NC regime they
converge to low green production convention when the environmental
consciousness is not ‘sufficiently’ high.
Finally a cross comparison between different scenarios allows to clarify
the importance of local environmental consciousness in attaining higher
level of clean production. Notice that in Case 1 with θ∗NC = 0.50 both
countries converge to β∗ = 0.125 when δ is low, while in Case 3 with
θ∗NC = 0.26 both countries converge to β∗ = 0.17 if δ is high. This clearly
shows that local participation can have the positive impact to fasten the
process of cleaning production and to save resources for alternative use,
because they allow governments to fix less stringent standards and to
avoid additional expenditures to recover environmental damages.
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Table 13:
Extreme Asymmetry.
BAU (a = 0) NON-COOP COORD
Scenario Outcome N S N S N S
θ∗ 0.17 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.29 1.00
’Good-Faith’ W∗ 0.247 0.009 0.22 -0.23 0.224 -0.17
G∗ 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.25 0.427 0.213
α∗ 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.34 0.58 0.45
δ HIGH β∗ 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.192 0.192
Wˆ 0.246 0.009 0.21 -0.257 0.223 -0.19
Gˆ 0.558 0.30 0.558 0.279 0.484 0.242
α∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.199
δ MEDIUM β∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09
Wˆ 0.243 0.009 0.20 -0.273 0.217 -0.21
Gˆ 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.30 0.546 0.273
α∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
δ LOW β∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wˆ 0.243 0.009 0.20 -0.273 0.21 -0.22
Gˆ 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.30 0.60 0.60
4.4.4 Uncertainties and Limitations
Madani (2013) and Kolstad (2011) have stressed that prescribing policy
actions on the sole base of oversimplified game models can results in bi-
ased actions with potential harm for the well-being of billions of people
around the globe. While simplifications are essential to modeling com-
plex systems, the effects of simplifying assumptions on the theoretical
outcomes should not be ignored when interpreting the results. For these
reasons I have to spend few words on the limitations and the interpreta-
tions that come out from the current study.
One of the caveats, which must be mentioned when interpreting this
model, is that it uses rather specific functions and parameter values to
derive the bargaining outcomes and the evolutionary paths. I assumed
quadratic profit and damage function in line with the great bulk of lit-
erature because I aimed to show a different source, from free-riding, of
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the heterogenous environmental performances. However a promising
extension of this model would be to assess the outcomes when more
realistic damage and profit functions are involved. This would open
the door towards an empirical assessment of the factors that hamper or
facilitate the green transition. Secondly, climate change is strictly tied
with other factors, not included in this model, such as population and
economic growth, technological progress and spillover, heterogeneous
impact of different pollutants, stock of emitted GHGs remaining in the
atmosphere, creation of new green jobs, trade and international trans-
fers and the time and cost of conversion from a fossil-based economy
towards a new one fed by renewable energies. Obviously, taking into
account all these features in an unique, simple and tractable mathemat-
ical model is unattainable. From a theoretical point of view it is offered
an innovative perspective where grounding a multi-scale analysis. How-
ever, Game 2 is based on one-shot game, while in reality parties do have
a chance of switching strategies, players can make multiple moves and
counter-moves during the course of the bargaining process and there is a
time lag between proposals and the final ratification of the IEA. Finally,
to conclude, in accordance with the observation of Kolstad (2011), I have
shown the importance of income inequality which is often neglected in
classical IEA games.
4.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
This Chapter considered two countries, with different economic struc-
tures, negotiating emission reductions (defining an unique global envi-
ronmental standard) and it compared the outcomes from several com-
binations of abatement costs, environmental consciousness and con-
sumers’ preferences, both analytically and with numerical simulations.
This mathematical framework confirmed that ‘global solutions’, if not
backed up by a variety of efforts at national, regional, and local levels to
prompt environmental consciousness, are not guaranteed to work well.
To best of my knowledge this study is the first combining two different
games in a consistent framework, which is a methodological novelty. I
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showed that the different evolutionary paths at micro level, determined
by the interactions between firms and consumers, are essential to explain
different environmental performances and the heterogenous capacity of
each country to precisely attain, to fail or to overcome the international
environmental standards.
From the micro point of view, the model was able to identify five dif-
ferent ‘Regimes’, under which each economy reaches different equilibria,
that define the range of ‘success’ of global standards bargained between
countries. It results that IEA alone are ‘weak’ policies if not backed up
by local initiatives and a sufficient level of ecological awareness. Indeed,
from the numerical simulations, it emerged that the very same interna-
tional standards might lead to very different results. This is an impor-
tant finding, in particular in sight of the next Conference of Paris on next
December, because it suggests that national governments should focus
not only in acquiring bargaining power with the respect to other coun-
tries, but in prompting their own citizenship to care about environment.
If public opinion is particularly ‘biased’ toward environmental preserva-
tion, then the government could impose lower standards and thus saving
resources for other public investments.
From the macro point of view it was assessed the impact of inequality,
asymmetric risks and opportunity costs distribution. Firstly, there is an
inverse relation between opportunity costs and damage costs: given a
certain level of inequality, a country will establish more environmental
friendly standards inasmuch the benefit-cost ratio is high. Secondly, his-
torical inequality, in terms of different level of profits generated by the in-
dustries and different technological development of both green and pol-
luting firms, and heterogenous risks play a key role. Case 4 confirms that,
in case of extreme inequality, the environmental standards are low, which
determines higher level of emissions and a lower welfare for the poorest
country. This might explain why the Kyoto protocols were not manda-
tory for the developing countries. Even though I treat the case with two
countries, this Chapter provides a possible insight for the emergence of
multiple coalitions composed by (almost) homogeneous countries.
The main contribution, with the respect to the current literature on
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IEA, stands on the modelisation of the economic structure which gives
further insights to explain the gap between the promises of the agree-
ments and the actual results. The notion of free-riding might be mislead-
ing when dealing with collective entities, like countries, which do not
behave as (rational) individual. Rather, what one observes, in terms of
national performances, is the outcome of a complex system where agents
interact to fulfil their needs and desires. In this respect, the model high-
lights the role of environmental consciousness and citizen’s responsibil-
ity thought as a key feature for the possible transition towards a fossil-
free economy. Another remarkable extension of the current study is to
explicitly model the formation of δ, its influence on both government
decisions and international agreements. As seen above, many ONGs, lo-
cal communities or simply groups of people have put pressure towards
a definitions of serious and ambitious environmental standards. More-
over, this variable stands behind the consumer’s choices and its contri-
bution is crucial to boost a kind of ‘innovation’ from the demand-side
aimed at change the consumption bundle and to force markets to shift
towards the supply of sustainable goods and services.
Finally, from the numerical simulations and from subsection 4.2.3 and
Section 4.3, it emerged that the results are robust and have clear eco-
nomic explanations. The combination of two games seems a reasonable
compromise between the complexity of the problem at hands and the
elaboration of a theoretical model able to grasp the most important re-
lations, with a tractable system of equations (in fact most of the results
are derived analytically). Another promising extension of the current re-
search could be to define a more general framework in which combine
the micro and macro levels in line with a multi-scale perspective. This
seems to be suggestive because it opens the debate around the coordina-
tion between international agreements and the active role of citizenship.
Combining all these elements in a consistent and integrated theoretical
model presents a substantial challenge. This study wants to pave the way
towards more comprehensive game where real and relevant factors are
seriously taken into account in a reasonably simple and tractable model.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Materials:
Chapter 1.
A.1 Structural Decomposition Analysis
IO allows to identify and quantify the main drivers of change through
the so called structural decomposition analysis (SDA) which allows to dis-
entangle the technological change from a shift in the final demand (see
Miller and Blair (2009), Ch. 13). Let assume to have the total output (x)
of two consecutive periods, t and t + 1, expressed in a common base-year
price,1 then it is possible to decompose the variation as:
∆x = xt − xt−1 = 1
2
[∆L · (ft + ft−1) + ∆f · (Lt + Lt−1)] (A.1)
where the first term, on the right hand side, expresses the change of the
IO structure (technology and trade) and the latter the effect from a vari-
ation of the final demand. It has long been recognized, in the literature
on SDA, that there is not a unique criteria to do a decomposition. The re-
sults may differ significantly across the alternative procedures (see Diet-
zenbacher and Los (1999); Su and Ang (2012) for comparisons). To over-
come the non-uniqueness problem, Dietzenbacher and Los (1999) have
1In order to transform each matrix in a common base-year price, I must divide each
element by (1 + r) where r is the rate of inflation from year t to t + 1.
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proposed to use the average of all possible decomposition forms. In case
of n determinants (or variables), the number of alternative decomposi-
tions is n!. They also showed that the average of all decompositions can
be adequately approximated by the average of the two so-called polar
decomposition forms. The first polar form is derived by starting the de-
composition with changing the first variable first, followed by changing
the second variable, changing the third variable, and so forth. The sec-
ond polar form is derived exactly the other way around, i.e. changing
the last variable first, followed by changing the second-last variable, and
so on.
By following Su and Ang (2012), I present the additive decomposition of
equation 2.2 to describe the increase from year t - 1 to year t of the total
water use:
∆w = wt − wt−1 = ΘIE + ΘTECH + ΘCONS (A.2)
where ΘIE represents the intensity effect, that is the variation of water use
for any unit of output (γ), computed as:
ΘIE =
1
2
[∆γˆ · Lt · ft + ∆γˆ · Lt−1 · ft−1] (A.3)
Afterwards I calculate ΘLEON that captures the variation of Leontief co-
efficients, from which it is possible to recover the impact from the change
in the technological composition (H) and in the trade structure (T ) of in-
termediate goods exchanges. Static comparative analysis allows to quan-
tify the variation in water requirements given a change of matrix L, by
keeping all the other variables unchanged, as:
ΘLEON =
1
2
[γˆt−1 ·∆L · ft + γˆt ·∆L · ft−1] (A.4)
Finally, ΘCONS represents the variation of virtual water due to a shift in
the volume of final demand, both at domestic and international level:
ΘCONS =
1
2
[γˆt−1 · Lt−1 ·∆f + γˆt · Lt ·∆f ] (A.5)
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The additive chaining technique Su and Ang (2012) allows to recover
the whole variation, from the first and the last year of interest, simply by
summing consecutive one-year decompositions:
∆w(T,0) = wT − w0 =
T∑
τ=1
∆w(τ,τ−1) (A.6)
I start by computing the matrix H(35x1435) which gives the sum of tech-
nical coefficients of A, for each sector, by including all the intermediate
imports of each country. The component H should be interpreted as the
contribution to water footprint of changes in the mix of intermediate in-
puts with no consideration of the geographical origin of intermediate
inputs. For country C I have HC of size 35x35:
HC =
R∑
j=1
Aj1 (A.7)
Matrix T(1435x1435), which entries are the ratio between regional techni-
cal coefficient with respect of total technical coefficient (H), captures the
impact of different a different trade composition of intermediate goods.
For country C I compute TjC ∀jR, e.g. in case of country 1:
Tj1 = Aj1 H1 (A.8)
where  indicates the Hadamard product, which, in this case, is the
element-wise ratio for two matrices of the same dimensions. Recall that
matrix A includes both T and H , it is possible to rewrite ∆L with the
respect to H and T through matrix A. In particular, I apply the multi-
plicative decomposition of the Leontief inverse:
∆LPOLAR =
1
2
[Lt−1 ·∆APOLAR · Lt + Lt ·∆APOLAR · Lt−1] (A.9)
hence:
∆APOLAR =
1
2
[(∆T ◦Ht + ∆T ◦Ht−1) + (Tt ◦∆H +Tt−1 ◦∆H)] (A.10)
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where ◦ is the Hadamard product, which is the element-wise product for
two matrices of the same dimensions. At this point it is worth to decom-
pose the matrix of final demand ∆F in order to find the trade structure
and the impact of product mix distribution over time. It is possible to
assess the impact of population size and in per capita consumption. This
is possibly extendible by comparing it with water per capita, trying to
find some relations between this two dimensions. Let define F˜ as a RSxR
matrix where each column accounts the national distribution of final de-
mand by considering both domestic consumption and imports, for each
sector. Let q be the overall level of the final demand, then for country C
we have:
qC =
R∑
j=1
F˜jC (A.11)
which is a column vector with the distribution of domestic demand plus
imports of country C over all the 35 sectors. Let D˜ be the trade structure
for final products, then for each country C I must compute D˜1C , D˜2C , ...,
D˜RC , or in general for each jR:
D˜jC = F˜jC  qC (A.12)
Afterwards, let decompose q by taking into account the population size.
Let Q be the vector of total demand in each country and Φ =
∑N
c=1 qC be
the product of population and consumption per capita, that is also given
by Φ = q
POP
· q
CAP
. Moreover, let q˜ be the percentage distribution of total
final demand for each sector, i.e for countryC we have that ΦC is a scalar,
then:
q˜C = qC/ΦC (A.13)
The final demand vector F˜kC of country C, for any j = 1,2,...,R, is given
by:
F˜kC = D˜kC ◦ (q˜C · qCAP,C · qPOP,C ) (A.14)
Polar decomposition technique reduces the computation at only two
equations, the first one in which the static comparative analysis starts
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from the component (D), while the second equation beginning from the
last element (POP ). As showed by Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) the
polar decomposition is a good approximation of the average of all the
possible decompositions, which number increases almost exponentially
with the number of variables. In this case F˜ depends on 4 variables, this
would imply the computation of 4! = 24 equations. In this case the polar
decomposition for the final demand is given by:
ΘCONS = DPOLAR +QC +QCAP + POP (A.15)
where DPOLAR is the polar decomposition of the final demand trade
structure, which is the counterpart for final demand of the component
T :
DPOLAR =
1
2
[∆D ◦ qt + ∆D ◦ qt−1] (A.16)
QC represents the variation of in the distribution of the demand among
sectors, it quantifies the role played by changes in the product mix of final
demand for a given level of final demand and for a given ‘geographical’
composition of final demand.:
QC =
1
2
[(Dt−1 ◦ (∆(˜q) ·Qt) + (Dt ◦ (∆(˜q) ·Qt−1)] (A.17)
Finally, POP andQCAP indicate the impact of population and consump-
tion per capita growth, respectively:
QCAP =
1
2
[(Dt−1 ◦ ( ˜qt−1 ·∆qCAP · POPt) + (Dt ◦ (q˜t ·∆qCAP · POPt−1)]
(A.18)
POP =
1
2
[(Dt−1 ◦ ( ˜qt−1 · qCAP,t−1 ·∆POP ) + (Dt ◦ (q˜t · qCAP,t ·∆POP )]
(A.19)
Therefore, equation (2.2) can be rewritten as:
w = vˆ · (I − T ◦H)−1 · (D ◦ (q˜ · qCAP · POP )) (A.20)
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A.2 Tables
Table 14: Global Water Trade Balance (km3) by sector for a selection of
countries: 1995, 2001 and 2009.
BLUE WATER
COUNTRY SECT 1995 2001 2009
AFF 3.75 5.94 0.65
AUS EWG -0.75 -0.88 -2.39
DUS -0.10 -0.13 -0.35
Other 0.00 0.00 -0.01
AFF -0.59 1.14 1.57
BRA EWG 2.20 4.56 5.67
DUS -0.05 -0.06 -0.25
Other -0.01 0.02 0.02
AFF -2.44 -3.51 -5.04
CAN EWG 20.77 24.77 17.55
DUS 0.48 0.63 0.31
Other -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
AFF 12.68 6.13 13.13
CHN EWG 7.48 8.46 36.14
DUS 0.70 1.06 6.18
Other 0.02 0.02 0.13
AFF 15.64 19.88 15.92
IND EWG 1.30 0.54 -0.61
DUS 0.16 0.22 0.16
Other 0.00 0.01 0.00
AFF -4.11 -4.31 -4.50
ITA EWG -3.60 -4.48 -3.84
DUS -0.11 -0.22 -0.38
Other -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
AFF -22.21 -16.77 -14.55
JPN EWG -8.71 -7.73 -7.54
DUS -0.60 -0.59 -0.82
Other -0.15 -0.12 -0.12
AFF -2.48 -2.03 -10.29
RUS EWG 9.09 14.96 8.86
DUS 0.28 0.47 0.06
Other -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
AFF -4.80 -15.81 -8.34
USA EWG -22.61 -39.50 -29.95
DUS -0.05 -1.39 -1.89
Other 0.19 0.09 0.13
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Table 15: Global Water Trade Balance in 1995, 2001 and 2009 for a selection
of countries.
Blue water
1995 2001 2009
AUS 2.89 4.94 -2.11
AUT -0.03 0.21 1.04
BEL -2.88 -4.13 -4.96
BGR 0.16 0.09 0.05
BRA 1.55 5.65 7.01
CAN 18.80 21.88 12.78
CHN 20.87 15.67 55.58
CZE -0.74 -1.06 -1.29
DEU -19.42 -19.43 -21.55
DNK -1.47 -1.36 -1.48
ESP -2.78 -0.68 -2.46
FIN -0.24 -0.50 -0.74
FRA -6.33 -6.67 -9.07
GBR -10.68 -14.07 -15.46
GRC -0.61 -1.17 -1.66
HUN -0.54 -0.89 -0.79
IDN -0.66 -0.88 -2.16
IND 17.09 20.64 15.47
IRL -0.31 -0.61 -1.29
ITA -7.84 -9.02 -8.74
JPN -31.66 -25.21 -23.
KOR -6.86 -6.44 -7.42
MEX 0.48 -3.46 -3.21
NLD -4.95 -5.45 -5.93
POL -0.88 -1.97 -2.27
PRT -0.79 -1.14 -1.16
ROU 0.64 0.39 -0.08
RUS 6.86 13.39 -1.37
SWE 1.37 1.94 1.21
TUR 0.92 0.80 -0.47
TWN -2.66 -2.75 -1.77
USA -27.27 -56.60 -40.05
ROW 58.66 79.01 69.18
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Table 16: Additive SDA from 1995 to 2009 for a selection of countries.
4 Blue (2009-1995)
IE % TECH % SIZE % 4% 4 (Km3)
AUS -46.4 -9.3 41.9 -13.8 -2.2
AUT -84.6 59.3 34.0 8.7 0.8
BEL -1.9 -15.5 19.9 2.5 0.0
BRA 3.1 9.4 38.5 51.0 38.0
CAN -14.2 -12.1 35.3 8.9 7.7
CHN -61.0 22.9 116.5 78.4 138.4
DEU -36.1 7.5 19.7 -8.8 -0.7
DNK -9.0 1.1 14.8 6.9 0.0
ESP -11.7 15.5 47.1 50.9 7.4
EST -10.8 -10.3 37.2 16.2 0.0
FRA 10.3 -22.3 -1.4 -13.5 -3.0
GBR -3.5 -22.6 21.4 -4.8 -0.1
GRC -12.7 -42.7 45.6 -9.8 -0.5
IDN -35.2 13.3 49.6 27.6 3.8
IND -14.5 -19.0 59.5 26.1 63.0
IRL -34.7 5.1 58.4 28.9 0.1
ITA 7.8 -2.3 12.4 17.9 2.6
JPN -12.5 -3.0 5.4 -10.0 -2.4
KOR -43.4 28.3 29.3 14.3 0.3
MEX -31.7 -2.6 44.2 9.9 2.0
NLD -17.3 -9.3 27.1 0.4 0.0
POL -10.5 -11.6 73.6 51.4 0.7
PRT -66.2 25.1 27.8 -13.3 -0.6
RUS -7.9 -18.3 35.3 9.2 5.1
SWE -11.9 -10.2 18.7 -3.3 -0.6
TUR -63.6 17.4 54.4 8.2 1.9
USA -5.7 -15.0 24.8 4.1 7.1
ROW -79.1 41.2 70.2 32.3 156.7
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Table 17: Sectoral classification in WIOD (based on Nace rev 1.1).
ID Description Nace codes
AFF Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 01, 02, 05
C Mining and Quarrying 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
Fd Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15, 16
Tx Textiles and Textile Products 17, 18
19 Leather, Leather and Footwear 19
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 20
Pp Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing 21, 22
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 23
CH Chemicals and Chemical Products 24
25 Rubber and Plastics 25
OMet Other Non-Metallic Mineral 26
Met Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 27, 28
29 Machinery, Nec 29
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 30, 31, 32, 33
34t35 Transport Equipment 34, 35
36t37 Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 36, 37
EWG Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 40, 41
F Construction 45
50 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 50
51 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 51
52 Retail Trade, Repair of Household Goods 52
H Hotels and Restaurants 55
60 Other Inland Transport 60
61 Other Water Transport 61
62 Other Air Transport 62
63 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities 63
64 Post and Telecommunications 64
J Financial Intermediation 65, 66, 67
70 Real Estate Activities 70
71t74 Renting of Machinery and Equipment and Other Business Activities 71, 72, 73, 74
L Public Admin and Defence; Compulsory Social Security 75
M Education 80
N Health and Social Work 85
O Other Community, Social and Personal Services 90, 91, 92, 93
P Private Households with Employed Persons 95
HH Households HH
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A.3 SDA Plot
Figure 15: SDA- World summary
Figure 16: SDA: W component - water intensity (selected countries)
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Figure 17: SDA: H component - production technology (selected countries)
Figure 18: SDA: T component - trade structure of intermediate inputs
(selected countries)
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Figure 19: SDA: QC component - change in the product structure of final
demand (selected countries
Figure 20: SDA: D component - change in the trade structure of final
demand (selected countries)
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Figure 21: SDA: Per capita total final demand component (selected
countries)
Figure 22: SDA: Population component (selected countries)
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A.4 Network and Community Detection Plots
Figure 23: Kernel Density distribution of KinS .
Figure 24: Kernel Density distribution of KoutS .
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Following Roson and Sartori (2015), to better capture the trend of the
distribution over time, I compute some descriptive statistics (kurtosis,
skewness and standard deviation), for both the d and q degree distri-
butions, which are summarized in Table 18. These values are positive
and far greater than what expected in case of Gaussian distribution, con-
firming the fat-tail behavior of both d and q. Moreover the Lilliefors test
always rejects the hypothesis of normal distribution of the samples.
Table 18: Statistical test of fat tail behavior.
First Order Degree (d) Second Order Degree (q)
Year Kurtosis Skewness St. Dev Kurtosis Skewness St. Dev
1995 45.69 5.39 11.33 80.79 7.42 14.95
2001 41.24 5.27 11.45 77.74 7.36 15.22
2009 32.55 4.77 11.02 51.92 6.23 14.71
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Appendix B
Supplementary Materials:
Chapter 2.
B.1 Technological assumptions
The effect of technological development is considered in terms of
changes in water productivity in each sector and water category. It is
assigned a percentage decrease to green and blue water coefficients for
each scenario based on the scope for improvements in productivity as
given by De Fraiture (2007), who show levels of potential improvement
per region in a qualitative sense. I bring from Ercin and Hoekstra (2012)
the estimates of technological progress, even though they are adapted
to fit the IO nature of the model applied. For scenario SSP3 and SSP5
it is assumed that γB (blue water) of the AFF sector has a different rate
depending on five macro-area (Tab 19, column B), as a result of improve-
ments in irrigation technology. For scenario SSP1 it imposed that γB and
γGY of both DUS and EWG sectors gradually diminish up to -20% from
2010 to 2050. It is also applied a reduction of both γGN (as a result of
improvements in rainfed agriculture) and γGY (to reflect improvements
in waste-water treatment levels) of AFF sector in each macro-area (Tab
19, column A). Note that it is followed a gradual technological improve-
ment, to wit γ diminishes every period in order to obtain a total reduc-
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tion equal to the percentages showed in the table below. A simple ex-
ample might clarify the point. Let assume that sector i needs 100m3 of
water per unit of production (γ) and that one wants a whole reduction
of -20% from 2010 to 2050 (40-years length) in order to obtain 80m3 per
unit at the end of the time span considered. Given a compound rate law,
with a constant coefficient β, it must hold in each period t (5-year length)
that β = 0.9725. Considering that γt+1 = γt · β, then the sequence of
technological progress can be rewritten as {γt} = {100; 97.25; ....; 80} for
t = {0, 1, ...., 8}. Note that the same coefficient of technological speed (β)
is kept constant till 2100.
Table 19: Technological improvements (β factor reduction) for the main
macro-areas from 2010 to 2050.
Region A B
OECD - 20% - 20%
EST-EU - 20% - 30%
LAM - 30% - 20%
ASIA - 30% - 40%
ROW - 30% - 30%
B.1.1 Sustainable Technological change
The procedure is described as follow:
• Step 1: computing WSpt = γt−1·xtWat , for each country i, that is the
theoretical water exploitation given the technology of the previous
period (γt−1).
• Step 2a: if for a country i happens that WSpi,t > 1, then find β∗t such
that the new γ∗t (= γt−1 · β∗t ) provides an amount of water equal to
Wai,t, to wit having WS
p∗
i,t = 1;
• Step 2b: if for a country i happens that WSpi,t (0.8, 1), then find
β∗t such that the new γ∗t (= γt−1 · β∗t ) provides an amount of water
equal to the 80% of Wai,t, to wit having WS
p∗
i,t = 0.8;
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• Step 2b: if for a country i happens that WSpi,t (0.6, 0.8), then find
β∗t such that the new γ∗t (= γt−1 · β∗t ) provides an amount of water
equal to the 60% of Wai,t, to wit having WS
p∗
i,t = 0.6;
• Step 3: computing the average technological improvement as pit =
γ∗t
γt−1
-1.
I decided to split Step 2 in three alternatives to avoid big ‘technological
jumps’, in fact it seems implausible that a country, with a fairly not sus-
tainable technology, would be able to recover the gap (that is using an
amount of water no greater than the 60% of its own availability) in only
one period (5 years-length).
B.2 Tables
In what follows I provide the tables with the quantification of the ex-
pected change of population growth and climate change and the impact
of the main drivers (GDP, technology and climate) through the Structural
Decomposition Analysis. Given the complexity of these tables I provide
a brief resume of the key points per each table (when needed):
• Table 20 : Each column shows, for each SSPs, the percentage change
of population size within each subperiod, that is the first column
shows the growth from 2010 to 2020, the second from 2020 to 2050
and the last from 2050 to 2080. A comparison with the change in
Wa (see Table 21), allows to disentangle the main factor that drives
the variation of the projected Falkenmark indicator.
• Table 21 : Each column shows, for each SSPs, the percentage change
of population size within each subperiod, that is the first column
shows the growth from 2010 to 2020, the second from 2020 to 2050
and the last from 2050 to 2080.
• Table 22 and 23: I report only the entries for B and GY since that
GN is exclusively used in the Agricultural sector. In particular I
compare the percentages, with the respect to the total of each water
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base indicator, between 2010 and 2100. For simplicity I show the
values under SSP1 and an average of the shares under SSP3. This
is due to the common assumption of SSP1-2 and of SSP3-5 scenar-
ios which generates almost the same results (less than 1% in the
absolute difference). The sectors are: AFF stands for Agriculture,
Hunting, Forestry, Fishing with Food, Beverages and Tobacco; E is
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; CH is Chemicals and Chemical
Products; MET is obtained by Basic and Fabricated Metal; PAP is
Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing. Sums lower than 100% are
due to the use from other sectors that are not reported given their
marginal impact.
• Table 24 : Comparison between historical values (column2), tech-
nological change as provided in Ercin and Hoekstra, sustainable
path with and without dam capacity.
127
Ta
bl
e
20
:P
ro
je
ct
ed
po
pu
la
ti
on
gr
ow
th
un
de
r
di
ff
er
en
ts
ce
na
ri
os
.
∆
P
O
P
%
SS
P1
SS
P2
SS
P3
SS
P5
IS
O
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
A
U
S
16
.9
6
40
.5
0
17
.3
5
16
.7
0
38
.6
6
18
.0
3
12
.9
0
13
.2
1
-6
.6
8
20
.5
5
64
.7
3
38
.3
9
BR
A
6.
83
3.
18
-1
6.
43
8.
10
10
.0
2
-8
.7
5
9.
39
18
.9
5
5.
19
6.
69
2.
45
-1
6.
93
C
A
N
11
.4
1
29
.2
1
14
.7
1
11
.0
2
26
.0
1
14
.1
6
7.
80
2.
15
-1
2.
05
14
.2
8
51
.2
9
36
.5
8
C
H
N
2.
22
-1
0.
70
-2
8.
10
2.
83
-8
.4
2
-2
4.
65
3.
31
-5
.6
5
-1
6.
32
2.
21
-1
0.
68
-2
8.
05
ES
P
6.
22
10
.9
7
-3
.0
2
5.
84
8.
18
-3
.4
0
3.
52
-7
.2
0
-2
3.
05
8.
19
23
.9
9
13
.7
6
G
BR
7.
07
17
.9
4
9.
52
6.
73
15
.6
8
8.
67
4.
61
-0
.8
0
-1
2.
27
8.
81
32
.5
1
28
.5
8
IN
D
11
.1
6
13
.8
9
-1
0.
30
13
.3
5
24
.9
1
0.
81
15
.3
1
39
.5
5
21
.4
2
11
.1
1
13
.6
9
-1
0.
41
IT
A
2.
40
2.
44
-8
.5
3
1.
90
-0
.3
7
-8
.3
2
0.
01
-1
3.
78
-2
5.
97
3.
87
12
.9
1
6.
27
JA
P
-0
.8
3
-9
.3
8
-1
7.
65
-1
.3
6
-1
2.
98
-1
8.
34
-2
.6
3
-2
2.
49
-3
3.
44
-0
.0
9
-3
.2
6
-6
.7
6
M
EX
9.
53
7.
48
-1
1.
43
11
.2
5
17
.8
6
-0
.2
0
13
.5
6
35
.9
9
21
.4
6
8.
64
1.
92
-1
5.
52
R
U
S
-1
.2
0
-7
.4
0
-1
4.
89
-0
.6
9
-3
.7
0
-4
.4
5
-0
.8
2
-5
.2
7
4.
25
-0
.6
7
-2
.7
5
-1
1.
83
TU
R
9.
70
9.
45
-1
1.
11
11
.3
5
18
.3
5
-0
.8
9
13
.5
6
32
.2
1
20
.6
1
9.
66
9.
34
-1
0.
93
U
SA
8.
49
22
.0
8
13
.1
9
8.
17
19
.8
2
11
.7
4
5.
92
1.
66
-1
0.
07
10
.4
9
38
.7
2
32
.9
5
128
Ta
bl
e
21
:E
xp
ec
te
d
W
a
va
ri
at
io
n,
du
e
to
cl
im
at
e
ch
an
ge
,u
nd
er
di
ff
er
en
ts
ce
na
ri
os
.
∆
W
a
%
SS
P1
SS
P2
SS
P3
SS
P5
IS
O
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
20
20
20
50
20
80
A
U
S
-4
.0
6
-6
.6
0
-1
.3
1
-3
.7
3
-3
.3
4
-4
.0
2
-2
.4
0
-3
.7
4
-3
.3
2
-8
.7
8
-3
.7
7
-1
2.
26
BR
A
-7
.8
1
-3
.8
7
-6
.7
6
-4
.6
6
-6
.2
9
-6
.5
7
-3
.4
7
-9
.2
8
-8
.1
5
-1
0.
88
-2
1.
92
-2
6.
06
C
A
N
-0
.2
0
0.
20
-1
.7
0
-2
.8
8
-0
.6
9
-1
.7
8
-1
.9
1
-1
.0
3
-3
.0
3
-0
.4
0
-2
.5
7
-1
.2
4
C
H
N
1.
41
1.
62
0.
06
-0
.8
7
-0
.5
5
1.
10
-2
.2
2
1.
36
-0
.8
4
2.
43
4.
42
2.
62
ES
P
-1
0.
06
-6
.5
9
-4
.4
2
-9
.5
5
-2
.6
0
-4
.8
7
-5
.1
0
-8
.7
9
-1
7.
00
-1
3.
16
-1
6.
32
-1
8.
51
FR
A
-4
.4
3
-6
.2
3
-3
.1
0
-6
.7
5
-5
.0
6
-1
.6
3
-7
.2
3
-6
.0
1
-1
1.
81
-1
0.
96
-1
2.
09
-1
3.
38
G
BR
-1
.9
5
-1
.9
6
0.
11
-1
.8
8
-3
.6
5
1.
86
-3
.3
9
-2
.3
5
-0
.7
9
-1
.9
6
-6
.5
7
-3
.5
1
ID
N
2.
28
1.
25
-0
.0
2
-0
.5
4
0.
66
-1
.5
7
-1
.2
8
-2
.4
0
0.
20
0.
99
-0
.2
2
-5
.3
1
IN
D
4.
93
6.
40
-1
.9
8
5.
99
3.
37
0.
44
5.
21
0.
89
7.
76
-0
.8
6
29
.9
7
4.
67
IT
A
-8
.4
0
-5
.3
0
-2
.7
8
-6
.1
0
-2
.2
8
-3
.7
7
-5
.7
7
-5
.4
1
-1
2.
51
-9
.4
5
-1
4.
86
-1
4.
13
JA
P
-0
.3
1
-1
.6
8
1.
00
-3
.2
3
-0
.4
1
-1
.5
7
-4
.6
6
-0
.1
6
-3
.6
5
5.
37
1.
63
-7
.0
6
M
EX
-3
.2
5
-6
.3
5
-4
.7
2
-3
.6
0
-1
.8
5
-5
.6
2
-5
.8
2
-2
.8
5
-7
.0
3
-4
.7
2
-1
4.
77
-1
2.
96
R
U
S
-1
.9
3
0.
48
-0
.3
4
-2
.2
5
-0
.5
4
-1
.0
9
-0
.7
7
-1
.8
0
-1
.5
1
-1
.1
2
-2
.1
7
-3
.0
0
SW
E
-1
.4
6
1.
49
-1
.3
9
1.
78
-3
.0
5
1.
39
-1
.2
6
1.
13
1.
55
-1
.0
3
-2
.6
4
-4
.7
7
TU
R
-8
.2
2
-5
.4
9
-4
.1
9
-9
.6
0
-0
.7
2
-5
.6
3
-5
.4
4
-1
1.
03
-1
3.
30
-6
.2
2
-1
8.
46
-1
1.
12
U
SA
-2
.7
1
-3
.8
3
-1
.1
1
-6
.3
6
-1
.4
0
-1
.8
6
-5
.1
3
-1
.4
6
-3
.9
9
-1
.2
3
-1
0.
26
-2
.4
2
129
Table 22: Sectoral decomposition of Blue water use under SSP1/2 and
SSP3/5.
% Shares BAFF BE
ISO 2010 SSP1 SSP3 2010 SSP1 SSP3
AUS 77.53 88.29 72.79 21.87 11.38 26.46
BRA 14.58 23.00 7.61 85.04 76.62 91.93
CAN 2.49 5.28 1.98 95.55 92.21 95.55
CHN 46.21 57.18 26.98 47.89 38.04 64.92
ESP 69.39 78.44 57.35 29.24 20.33 40.29
FRA 20.93 31.12 14.94 72.51 62.51 77.41
GBR 31.10 41.86 22.39 59.70 49.82 66.65
IDN 84.00 90.48 72.12 15.86 9.44 27.66
IND 90.44 94.47 82.22 8.59 4.98 15.98
ITA 27.93 38.12 18.77 68.92 58.48 76.86
JPN 10.43 12.78 5.21 86.61 83.08 90.34
MEX 70.20 78.88 50.46 28.93 20.49 48.09
RUS 27.66 30.60 15.84 69.69 66.55 80.84
SWE 0.62 01.06 0.39 98.91 98.42 99.10
TUR 63.11 74.35 51.91 35.54 24.54 46.10
USA 59.24 75.49 52.96 37.01 21.63 41.64
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Table 23: Sectoral decomposition of Grey water use.
% Shares GYAFF GYPAP
ISO 2010 SSP1 SSP3 2010 SSP1 SSP3
AUS 97.37 97.87 97.87 0.99 0.74 0.76
BRA 80.48 74.92 80.16 3.03 3.73 2.97
CAN 70.62 70.85 71.03 13.54 12.67 12.81
CHN 55.64 46.23 54.15 6.59 7.80 6.70
ESP 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRA 69.35 67.53 67.98 7.04 7.19 7.13
GBR 98.15 97.95 97.97 0.32 0.35 0.35
IDN 98.58 98.42 98.80 0.21 0.23 0.18
IND 67.78 63.12 69.71 6.06 7.40 6.05
ITA 67.18 60.79 61.35 6.42 7.05 6.95
JPN 38.88 25.34 25.89 13.79 12.90 12.93
MEX 83.28 77.62 82.80 0.23 0.30 0.23
RUS 52.65 40.68 44.87 13.51 16.01 14.90
TUR 86.49 85.48 85.82 3.85 4.51 4.33
SWE 73.61 70.72 72.06 2.40 2.43 2.42
USA 80.77 80.66 80.79 4.14 3.78 3.80
% Shares GYCH GYMET
ISO 2010 SSP1 SSP3 2010 SSP1 SSP3
AUS 0.43 0.35 0.35 1.00 0.89 0.87
BRA 5.71 7.22 5.70 8.09 10.85 8.60
CAN 6.23 6.59 6.49 9.17 9.49 9.25
CHN 13.41 16.47 13.99 22.36 27.00 23.04
ESP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRA 13.53 14.72 14.43 6.58 7.30 7.17
GBR 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.79 1.00 0.98
IDN 0.51 0.58 0.44 0.23 0.22 0.17
IND 12.51 13.05 10.73 12.46 14.94 12.28
ITA 8.59 11.71 11.36 7.45 10.53 10.22
JPN 27.96 33.89 33.91 18.26 26.58 26.00
MEX 0.68 0.87 0.67 10.89 15.07 11.47
RUS 14.78 22.24 19.64 13.19 15.59 14.85
TUR 6.56 6.17 6.13 3.10 3.83 3.72
SWE 0.97 1.01 0.99 19.90 22.90 21.54
USA 5.29 5.48 5.40 8.73 8.97 8.89
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B.3 OECD Projections
Starting from 2030 China should face a continuous declining trend, in
each SSP, of the population size that goes from 1337 million (MM) in 2010
to 1028 MM under SSP3, while it decreases to less than 665 MM under
SSP1-5. India shows the same inverted U-shape path under SSP1-5 with
a peak of 1600 MM in 2050 and a minimum of 1170 MM in 2100; whilst
under SSP3 it is expected a linear growth up to 2608 MM in 2100. For
Japan it is projected, under each SSP, a reduction of population size that
reaches at most 105 MM (SSP5) and at least 46 m (SSP3). USA and EU27
are converging to the same size, in 2100, under each SSP from a mini-
mum of 260 MM (SSP3) to a maximum of 731 MM (SSP5). Population
dynamics of Brazil and Russia are expected to be particularly similar un-
der each SSP, except SSP3 in which Brazil should face a population sizing
up to 276 MM, in 2100, while Russia should keep the level of 2010 of 149
MM. In the other cases they both show a declining path toward mini-
mum levels, in 2100 under SSP4, of 135 MM for Brazil and of 88 MM for
Russia.
Figure 25: Population trends under four SSP scenarios.
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Figure 26: GDP growth under SSP1-2-3-5, where the size of the bubbles are
proportional to the income per capita.
Figure 26 shows the patterns of economic growth for each scenario:
India is projected to be the first economy at the end of the century,
in terms of GDP, with China, USA and European Union as followers.
Each scenario indicates substantial differences both in terms of speed of
growth and levels of GDP. SSP4 presents a convergence around 50 Tril-
lions of $ in those countries, while under SSP1 India overcomes 87 Tril-
lions (Tr) and China reaches more than 60 Tr, after a peak of 73 in 2050.
SSP3 sees a rapid growth of China and India which, after overcoming
the level of USA and EU27 (China in the year 2025 while India in 2075),
converges to 37 Tr of $, far below any previous case. Under the Business
as Usual case (SSP5) India grows exponentially, reaching 144 Tr of $, fol-
lowed by USA (120 Tr), EU27 (110 Tr) and China (97 Tr). In each scenario
Russia and Brazil attain a very similar path converging to a minimum of
around 5 Tr of $ (SSP3) to a maximum of around 17 Tr of $ (SSP5).
In terms of income per capita there are more inequalities and variations
under different SSPs. India is the poorest in each SSP, ranging from a
minimum of 9590 (14160) $ per capita per year in 2050 (2100) under SSP3
to a maximum of 30060 (127520) under SSP5. USA and EU27 are keep-
ing the first and second rank, respectively, in each SSP, ranging from a
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minimum of 67240 (79870) $ per capita per year in the United States and
from 43390 (64680) $ per capita per year in the European Union (SSP3) to
a maximum of 84740 (168990) $ and 59490 (154530) $ per capita per year,
respectively, under SSP5. Finally Russia and Brazil, though close in ab-
solute values, should diverge in terms of income per capita with Russia
ranging from a minimum of 35140 (46640) $ per capita per year on 2050
(2100) under SSP3 to a maximum of 63790 (147750) $ under SSP5; whilst
Brazil should go from a minimum of 17080 (17680) $ per capita per year
on 2050 (2100) under SSP3 to a maximum of 41620 (138470) $ under SSP5.
B.3.1 GDP Risk
In this subsection I run another comparative analysis in order to provide
an hint about possible economic impacts, in terms of GDP lost, due to
water constraints. I apply the same algorithm of the above subsection,
yet, instead of updating β, I estimate, in each period t, the level of sectoral
output (x?t ) that is consistent with a sustainable exploitation of water (see
Appendix D B.3.1). This procedure provides a measure of the implied
GDP growth in a context of sustainable exploitation of Wa and it is a
proxy of the possible economic loss, due to environmental hurdles, that
a country might face in this century.
The procedure I follow is:
• Step 1: computing WSpt = γt·x˜tWat , for each country i, that is the theo-
retical water exploitation given the technology level as assumed in
Ercin and Hoekstra (2014) (γt) but with the sectoral output under
no water constraints (i.e. OECD’s forecasting).
• Step 2a: if for a country i happens that WSpi,t > 1, then find x∗t
such that the new x∗t (= x˜t · ϑ∗t ) provides an amount of water equal
to Wai,t, to wit having WS
p∗
i,t = 1;
• Step 2a: if for a country i happens that 1 > WSpi,t > 0.8, then find
x∗t such that WSp∗i,t = 0.8;
• Step 2a: if for a country i happens that 0.8 > WSpi,t > 0.6, then find
x∗t such that WSp∗i,t = 0.6;
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• Step 3: computing the absolute and relative lost of GDP, through
the matrix F and Z (see note 17 pag. 9), due to water shortages.
Figure 27 draws ∆GDP , defined as the difference between (water-) sus-
tainable GDP and GDP growth as provided by OECD. There a great va-
riety of results due to heterogenous economic structures and environ-
mental assets between countries, that are tied by complex inter-industrial
linkages. As expected there is a serious threat to the potential economic
development of China and India and to the prosperity of the most high-
income economies. China shows a miscellaneous set of alternative paths
of future potential GDP loss, with values ranging from 19 Tr in 2025 to
88 Tr in 2100. However the trend is far from being linear and simple, in
fact after attaining the biggest harm in 2060, in each scenario but SSP5,
it is able to recover better economic condition, though with high poten-
tial wastes ranging from 28.81 (SSP3) to 88.45 (ssp5) Trillions of dollar in
2100. India is the most affected country, where water constraints might
be a barrier that threaten the possibility of tackling poverty and food
shortages. It would experience an increasing trend of potential GDP loss
if it does not act immediately through investment in better technologies
and international agreements in order to exploit the potential benefit of
VWT. In our context, worse economic conditions are paired with seri-
ous social water scarcity generating a dangerous mix of economic and
environmental poverty. Among the other states I found several differ-
ent paths with some regions almost unaffected by water shortages and
others that face high risks. In particular Japan, Canada, Brazil and Rus-
sia show GDP trends very close to the unconstrained world with val-
ues fluctuating around zero (no change). However, there is a non-linear
trends following a peculiar behavior under SSP1-3-4: in 2025 they suffer
the biggest economic effects, with potential GDP loss ranging from -16%
(Russia under SSP1) to -2.41% (Japan, SSP3). Afterwards, ∆GDP nar-
rows and eventually, in 2100, it becomes positive (with a maximum in
Brazil of +12.84% under SSP3), meaning that they find water shortages
in other countries economically convenient for them. This trend arises
an interesting trade-off due to heterogenous, and sometimes opposite,
economic implications of environmental constraints. This might also ex-
140
plain the extreme need of international environmental convention to face
severe and imminent ecological problems and the great difficulty to find
fair, efficient and rational agreements. In any case SSP5 is the worst sce-
nario because each country deals with an increasing potential economic
loss, reaching in 2100 40 Tr in Russia and Brazil, more than 80 in EU27
and China and more than 100 Tr in USA and India. Notice that these
results are due to the fact that GDP forecasts in case of SSP5 are the high-
est, meaning that the same environmental conditions generate greater
economic impacts. Moreover in this case the technological development
assumed is quite low. Change in precipitations, due to Climate Change,
is not sufficient to compensate the variations in water requirements due
to production needs, thus it’s impact is marginal in this context.
Figure 27: GDP (potential) lost in Trillion of $ under different scenarios,
where bubble size is proportional to the percentage of GDP at risk due to
water constraints.
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Appendix C
On Ecological Economics:
A Philosophical Perspective
Ecological Economics (EE) is a novel, wide and heterogeneous branch
of research which aims at studying “the relationships between human
housekeeping and nature’s housekeeping” (Common and Stagl, 2005, p.
1). Notwithstanding the common root (eco from the greek oikos: ‘house’)
the historical evolution of Ecology and Economics has been quite diver-
gent: the former has focused its subject exclusively on the nature and its
laws, the latter has studied human interactions without caring about the
environmental consequences and constraints.
EE assumes that human (economic) systems are subject to natural
constraints (i.e. the second law of thermodynamic). From this consider-
ation comes up several definitions of EE, such as: “Ecological Economics
seeks to ground economic thinking in the dual realities and constraints
of our biophysical and moral environments” (Daly and Farley, 2011, p.
xxi) or “Ecological Economics is the relationship between ecosystems
and economic systems in the broadest sense, [so it represents] the science
and management of sustainability” (Costanza, 1991, p. 3) or again “[EE
studies] the relations between environmental conflicts and the languages
of valuation. [The aim] is to explain how the unavoidable clash between
economy and environment (which is studied by ecological economics)
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gives rise to the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ (which is studied by po-
litical ecology)” (Martinez-Alier, 2002, p. 10-31). Clear features come
out from these definitions: there is a wide consensus that economics and
ecology are strictly interwoven, therefore they must be studied jointly, al-
though the boundaries of the disciplines are dialectical and not precisely
defined. EE, thus, deals with the interactions of ecological and economic
systems, as proposed by the ‘Co–Evolutionary Paradigm’ (Gowdy, 1994,
Kallis and Norgaard, 2010). Given the contextual nature of Evolution,
depending upon specific time and space scale, it is no more possible to
assume time symmetry because once a path is taken, many other are
irreversibly closed. This fact, jointed with the intrinsic (ontological) un-
certainty, the unpredictability of the future and feedback effects (increas-
ing non-linearity) makes the role of decision-maker of key interest, as
pointed out by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1991): “The new environmental
problems are characterized by the following traits: facts are uncertain,
there are values in dispute, the stakes are high and decisions are urgently
needed”. This discipline is not thus simply driven by a cognitive inter-
est to understand and explain the world as it is (positivism), rather, by
definition, it claims how to manage natural and human systems in order
to ensure a sustainable (co-)evolution. This purpose is clearly normative
and, as many of the ecologist thinkers pointed out, the issue of stating
transparently the set of ethical values is at the core of EE (Futowicz and
Ravetz, 1994, Martinez-Alier, 2002).
Ecological Economics seemed to emerge as a new and different
‘paradigm’ (Kuhn, 1962), or better, a novel ‘Pre-Analytic Cognitive act
[or] Vision’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 41). The aim of this last Section is to
clarify if and how this novel approach may transcend, rather than sim-
ply opposing to, the limits of the orthodox textbook economics. The two
‘schools’ do not simply differ in how they conceptualise the interaction
between human and ecological systems, rather EE is thought to be able
to incorporate also the social dynamics and to amplify the potential ap-
plication of economic studies to face some urgent socio-ecological chal-
lenges (e.g. climate change, urbanization, population growth, resources
and wastes management, distribution and equity among others). How-
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ever, one of the main problem of EE is its status of heterogeneous field of
research in which the many contributions, although inspired by a (par-
tially) common set of ethical values and purposes (equity and sustain-
ability, among others), are not coordinated or developed in a structured
manner. In order to answer to two important questions, what is Ecological
Economics? what is Sustainability?, after a brief summary of Neoclassical
Environmental Economics, I discuss some crucial features of EE: entropy
law and irreversibility, complexity, evolution (qualitative change) and
value incommensurability. Finally, I suggest that the label ‘Ecological’ is
misleading and I introduce a new definition of Economics.
C.1 A brief overview of Neoclassical Environ-
mental Economics
The label ‘neoclassical’ (NC), attached to a particular economic approach,
was introduced by Veblen (1900). Even though it is far from being an ho-
mogeneous ‘school of thought’ (Lawson, 2013) it is commonly used as
a synonymous of the mainstream perspective. The list of the main fea-
tures, not pretending to be exhaustive, ascribed to the NC theory are: the
methodological individualism, the acceptance of the (instrumental) ra-
tionality axiom, the axiomatic imposition of equilibrium, the maximiza-
tion principle, the reliance on utilitarian ethic, the belief in an absolute
reductionism, the hypothetical deductive method, the mechanicistic on-
tology and the deductive-nomological model of (scientific) explanation.
Space and time force me to focus only on two elements which, in my
opinion, are relevant to understand the differences between NC and EE:
i) the relation between economic and environmental systems, and ii) the
fact/value dichotomy.
NC aimed to establish a completely autonomous economic discipline
where any influence from social or ecological factors were seen as ‘dis-
turbing factors’ which would cancel out in an ideal economic world.
From a social point of view, rather than adjust the models to take into
account non-market behaviour, all behaviour are reduced to market be-
haviour, and all motivation ascribed to self-interest (Mirowski, 1986,
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Sandel, 2013). From an ecological point of view, because an isolated
system has no outside, no environment, natural resources are consid-
ered scarce only inasmuch as they can be converted in market goods to
fulfil alternative purposes. Indeed, the main body of mainstream eco-
nomics had paid practically no attention to natural resources until the
early 1970s, when NC economists began to show interest in the natu-
ral environment and they developed two new sub-disciplines: environ-
mental economics (EV) and natural resource economics (RE). Those new
fields kept the main NC assumptions: the environment is seen as another
kind of capital to be priced, sometimes through fictitious market, and al-
located efficiently. Why doing so? Why every value should be priced?
Daly and Farley (2011) put it clearly: “Traditional economists assume
that only preferences for market goods [matter] and implicitly assumes
that non–market goods contribute little to welfare [which is the ultimate
end]” (p. 4). The main result, attained by Arrow and Debreu (1954), was
the ‘proof’ that, in an ideal world, markets efficiently allocate ‘scarce’
resources between alternative (and competing) ends. In a world where
preferences are given, in order to make ‘rational’ choices, to wit com-
paring pleasures and pains, everything must be expressed in an uniform
unit of measure (reductionism), that is money. This conclusion follows
from a crucial assumption on monetary conversion: it is alleged that mar-
kets are neutral with the respect to the process of evaluation. The reduc-
tionist program moves from the attempt to develop methods for captur-
ing in monetary terms the ‘value’ of environmental assets. Consumer
sovereignty requires that each value must be reduced to individual pref-
erences. The most common method is the ‘contingent valuation’ in which
people are asked how much they are willing to pay (WTP) to preserve
some environmental goods or services, or how much they are willing to
accept (WTA) in compensation for environmental loss or degradation.
Many authors put in evidence several problems of these techniques, in
primis the fact that most of the time WTA differs from WTP (framing
bias). Moreover, people have limited cognitive capacities that hamper
the possibility to properly evaluate all the consequences from environ-
mental shocks, they lack of knowledge and information (Barrotta, 2013),
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or simply they do not want to attach a monetary value to certain kind
of natural resources (value incommensurability). Another fallacy of the
WTA and WTP approaches simply relies on the distributional issue: be-
cause richer people can afford higher prices for environmental goods, it
does not mean that they care more about environment. These approaches
are founded on a ‘category mistake’ (Sagoff, 2008) because they confuse
private desires with public judgements. The public ‘preferences’ an in-
dividual expresses, as a citizen, are statements of belief about the good
of the community which are open to reasoned argument. Thus the in-
clusion of non-hedonistic ethical judgments (e.g. attribution of environ-
mental rights, preservation of bio-diversity) into a cost-benefit (CB) logic
is illegitimate because it is inconsistent with the CB rationale itself. These
judgments cannot be priced because they do not concern the expected
benefits to those who make them.
Sandel (2013) makes clear that markets are far from being neutral:
once a good is transformed into a commodity only who is rich enough
to afford it can enjoy from its consumption. The distribution is there-
fore crucial in the process of evaluation. Secondly, he claims that mar-
kets ‘corrupt’ the value of specific goods (for instance renting parts of
the body for marketing purposes, renting uterus, trading rights for CO2
emissions and so forth) when they are monetised because they are evalu-
ated with inferior or distorting tenets. A very simple example may clar-
ify the point. Sandel (2013) reports a recent initiative introduced in a pri-
mary school, in Dallas (USA), in order to stimulate students to read more:
two dollars per book. Independently from the success of this operation,
what matters here is to underline that the monetisation of the ‘enjoy-
ment from reading’, and of the attitude to learn more, alters the frame
in which children perceives the value of reading. There is an inversion
between means and ends: insofar pupils gain money from reading, then
the end becomes to earn more, while learning is transformed into a mean
of this new purpose. This practice makes the value of reading perfectly
substitutable with any other remunerative activity. To wit, a child may
prefer to sell lemon juice rather than study if she can earn more. At the
end of the process we could observe an increase in the number of juices
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sold, a richer child but a (potential) read-lover less. There are at least two
main consequences: the commodification of the world alters the process
by which people develop their own preferences and, secondly, environ-
mental policy needs to answer to public democratic debate, not to mech-
anisms borrowed from the market. This stance is in line with a broader
concept of rationality and with the request of pluralism made by ecolog-
ical economists, as discussed in the next subsection.
I have to add another caveat to the process of commodification based
on the alleged belief that Economics is a value-free science as advocated
by Robbins (1932), who asserted in his Essay: “Economics is entirely neu-
tral between ends; [....] in so far as any end is dependent on scarce means,
it is germane to the preoccupations of the economist”(p. 24, emphasis
added) and further supported by Friedman (1953). It is concerned with
ends in so far as they affect the disposition of means. The rejection of the
fact/value dichotomy moves both from within and outside the market
system: i) there is, as seen, a categorical mistake Sagoff (2008) when one
wants to reduce any value to preference, and ii) there are moral limits
to what can be included in the market process (Barrotta, 2013, Sandel,
2013). Let assume that there exist an unique common measure upon
which compare alternative choices and that the market is the best in-
stitution to find the ‘true’ value of goods. Everything becomes compara-
ble and, most important, substitutable. To wit, if a person is indifferent
between the preservation of the Amazon forest and a given amount of
money, then the two option must be equal in every (relevant) aspect. Re-
grettably, once the forest is destroyed it is not possible to compensate the
ecological damage through money, not even if all the externalities are in-
ternalized in the price. One may rebut this point, claiming that money
might be invested in order to compensate for the damages. Let assume
that we have the time, the technology and the knowledge sufficient to re-
store the very same (ecological) functions of the forest; other two caveats
may arise. First of all, the potential aesthetic satisfaction from the enjoy-
ment of the forest is lost forever and the rights of those people who were
against the monetary evaluation of natural stock gone without any possi-
ble compensation (in fact they refuse to put a price to the forest, therefore
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refund them with money seems unreasonable). Secondly, how much can
we extend this kind of reasoning? What is the price of the whole stock
of forests all over the world? And of the whole natural resources? If
rational choice must be based simply on monetary comparison, then we
should accept either that there exist a finite price for the whole stock and
flows from nature (that is to conceive a world without any natural re-
source but with an incredible amount of capital, though it is difficult to
imagine made of what!) or that, if that price does not exist (or it is infi-
nite), then we cannot decide whether we prefer a world without nature
or not. Obviously this seems absurd. Physical laws, ecological limits and
moral commitments posit absolute boundaries to the extension of mar-
kets. Indeed, from a political point of view, if in democracy one head is
one vote, within markets ‘one dollar is one vote’. This subtle difference
implies vast asymmetries inasmuch as economic inequality grows. A so-
ciety utterly governed by markets leads to opposite results than what
Popper (1945) viewed for his Open Society: because markets do not care
about motivation and justification, they are closed to any critical debate
and therefore each problem would be solved in an authoritative mode.
Its mechanistic nature would, automatically and necessarily, force the
whole society to organize its life based on a given vector of price.
After World War II, NC focused on the study of economic growth,
seen as a panacea solution to attain welfare improvement, poverty re-
duction, jobs creation and so forth. From a theoretical point of view, this
target is based on the assumptions seen above plus the non-satiety as-
sumption for which more consumption must always be preferred (that
means that humans are doom to be always unsatisfied!). The chain of
NC reasoning can be resumed as follow: economic reality is an indepen-
dent entity which works in a deterministic and mechanical way, it is com-
posed by independent individuals who rationally fulfil their (given) own
preferences, with respect to exogenous constraints. Because they receive
utility only from the consumption of market goods and they can decide
only through arithmetic calculation, everything must be monetised. Fi-
nally, if one aims to increase the global welfare, continuous economic
growth is the only conceivable solution. How is it possible a continuous
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economic growth in a world of limited resources, space and time?1
In order to combine the growing request for sustainability and
intergenerational equity, NC economists replied with the concept of
‘Weak Sustainability’, which is based on the very strong assumption of
substitutability among different forms of capital (physical, natural and
human). It states that an economy is sustainable if it saves more than
the combined depreciation of natural and man-made capital Pearce and
Atkinson (1993). As seen, the necessary precondition is the monetary
evaluation of each capital stock. It appears an odd inversion where na-
ture is viewed as a subsystem of the economic world, or more precisely,
it represents a general practice in which any conceivable problem is re-
duced in terms of economic evaluation neglecting the real (physical and
ecological) effects. This position stands behind the Whitehead’s ‘fallacy
of misplaced concreteness’ by which he meant the error of treating an ab-
stract model, made with the purpose of understanding one aspect of re-
ality, as if it were adequate for understanding everything, or entirely dif-
ferent things, things that had been abstracted from in making the model
(Whitehead, 1929).
C.2 Entropy Law and Strong Sustainability
EE asserts that it is impossible to abstract the economy from its envi-
ronment, rather the ecological economist should study how they interact
and which actions should be done to pursuit a sustainable Co-Evolution
of them. This worries becomes more and more stringent inasmuch as
the economic sub-system approaches to the size of the earth, which is all
that we have. Though subtle, this difference make NC and EE paradigms
incompatible.
Physical laws and Economics are more interwoven than one would
1See for an illustrative example Georgescu-Roegen (1960). Moreover, Georgescu-
Roegen (1971) critics the economic assumption of time symmetry by distinguishing the
Time (stream of consciousness), which is irreversible, from time (measures of an interval).
Moreover even if we neglect any Entropic constraints, most economic process (e.g. urban-
ization) requires a time to be converted in a way to restore the initial condition (uncontam-
inated nature) that is far longer than human existence.
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expect prima facie: EE is the nearest descendant of the Second Law of
Thermodynamics (SLT ), which states that the Entropy (dissipation of
available energy/matter) of any closed system is doomed to increase
indefinitely. The pioneering studies of Georgescu-Roegen (henceforth
GR) went even further in claiming that “[T]hermodynamics is at bot-
tom a physics of economic value - as Carnot unwittingly set it going-
and the Entropy Law is the most economic in nature of all natural laws”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1976, p. 8-9) which implies that “[O]ur whole eco-
nomic life feeds on low entropy” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 277, original
emphasis). GR did not simply rely on an analogy, rather he established
the manifold consequences of the SLT , for the economic process (and for
the academic activity), that can be resumed as: i) the anthropomorphic
origin of any science and form of knowledge; ii) the irreversibility and
the unidirectional path of actual phenomena; iii) the qualitative change
of the material (and organic) universe which is involved in an evolution-
ary process, and iv) the inescapable absolute scarcity of low entropy and
the unavoidable natural laws and limits.
Admittedly the concept of Entropy is not easy to catch for an
economist by training, actually “it is not easily understood even by
physicists” (ter Haar, 1959, p. 37). Following GR, I report the most
tractable, for my purposes, definition of Entropy thought as “an index
of the amount of unavailable energy in a given thermodynamic system at
a given moment of its evolution. [An] equivalent formulation is that the
entropy of a closed system continuously (and irrevocably) increases toward
a maximum, [i.e.] all kinds of energy are gradually transformed into heat
and heat becomes so dissipated in the end that man can no longer use it”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1976, p. 7-8, original emphasis). The very qualita-
tive distinction between low (available) and high (unavailable) entropy
is by no means objective, indeed energy is considered available inasmuch
as can be transformed into work devoted for whatever human activity. It
serves an anthropomorphic telos: the ‘enjoyment of life’. It implies that
the observer is not only non-neutral in its epistemological endeavour
(Heisenberg principle), but rather its own Pre-Analytical Vision shapes
the context in which natural (and social) laws are drawn. Another cru-
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cial feature that matters here is the concept of closed, but not isolated,
system. EE starting point is the acknowledgment of the fact that econ-
omy, as any other human activity, is embedded in the natural system
and therefore it cannot be abstracted from it. The economic system is not
self-sufficient because it needs a continuous inflow of low entropy from
the natural environment in order to fulfil its purposes, actually “[T]he
economic process consists of a continuous transformation of low entropy
into high entropy, that is, into irrevocable waste or, with a topic term, into
pollution” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 281, original emphasis). From
a physical point of view, low entropy represents the ‘ultimate mean’ of
any economic activity and there are essentially only two sources of it:
terrestrial stocks of (non-renewable) concentrated minerals and (renew-
able) solar flow of radiant energy. The first is limited in the absolute
amount, while the second in its rate of arrival. Jointly, they represent
an absolute scarcity for the fulfilling of unlimited human desires or, in
other words, “any time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost of de-
creasing the number of human lives in the feature” (Georgescu-Roegen,
1976, p. 59). Although the debate on technological progress cannot be
treated here, one point deserves to be clarified in order to make the above
statement meaningful. The biologist Alfred Lotka introduced in the early
1920s the fundamental distinction between the endosomatic use and the
exosomatic use of energy by humans. The former is due to body organs
and is fairly distributed among humans, while the second refers to the
instruments produced by man but not belonging to his body. Human
history has developed through a rapid adaptations of exosomatic organs
(hammer, machines, etc.) that depend on terrestrial low entropy. If it is
true that “the price of technological progress has meant a shift from the
more abundant source of low entropy – the solar radiation – to the less
abundant one – the earths mineral resources” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971,
p. 304), then a faster technological progress would mean a faster trans-
formation of low entropy in irrevocable wastes and, therefore, a lower
level of available resources for future generations. The concerns of many
ecological economists for equal intra– and inter– generation distribution
stands on the fact that the exosomatic evolution has turned production
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into a social undertaking.
Inasmuch as the economy grows, and its size approaches to that of
the earth, we pass from the ‘cowboy’ economy (Boulding, 1966) to the
so called ‘full-world’ (Daly and Farley, 2011). The trade–off between the
potential welfare-gain due to economic service and the (possible) loss of
ecological services and functions (with negative impact on human wel-
fare too) becomes more stringent. This fact, together with the limit of
economic evaluation, claims for the combination of economic and phys-
ical indicators (e.g. footprints) to trace the techno-economic feasibility
and sustainability of current production processes. This view led to the
introduction, as opposed to Weak Sustainability, of the term ‘Strong Sus-
tainability’ (Munda, 1997) which is based on the assumption that certain
sorts of ‘natural capital’ are deemed critical (e.g. water), and not read-
ily substitutable by man-made capital. Baumgartner and Quaas (2010)
identify four core attributes of (Strong) Sustainability: i) focus on the
relationship between humans and ecological systems, ii) orientation to-
wards long-term (uncertain) future, iii) normative foundation in the idea
of justice and iv) concerning for non-wastefulness of limited natural re-
sources in order to not jeopardize future generations. Fair enough, but
how do we attain it?
Daly (1976) argued in favor of a ‘Steady-State’ economy with two con-
stant elements (in the medium term), population and stock of artifacts,
while everything else (technology, distribution, information, etc.) is al-
lowed to change. However, GR alerted that this dream is doomed to fail
because “even with a constant population and a constant flow per capita
of mineral resources, mankind’s dowry will ultimately be exhausted if
the career of the human species is not brought to an end by other factors”
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 296). From this standpoint many authors
posit the challenge of a controlled and voluntary ‘Degrowth’ which aims
at reducing the material consumption without decreasing the well–being
toward a fair distribution of resources both within and between genera-
tions. Though fascinating, also this position faces many problems. GR,
in primis, recalled that any society based on exosomatic tools will inex-
orably dissipate the available energy/matter unless it reverts its evolu-
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tion to a ‘berry–picking economy’. Secondly, many developing countries
are now living in a state of poverty and deprivation such that the search
for economic improvements seem more urgent than environmental con-
cerns. Finally, one must face the vexata quaestio of what needs, other than
the biological ones, are necessary for humans to be humans and to have
a decent life. Once we have established the optimal bundle of consump-
tion, how long can a constant population be maintained with a constant
level of consumption? Actually this is not a technical problem, rather a
moral one. In order to provide a meaningful answer we should debate
on the length of the horizon of our (current generation) responsibility. If
it seems fair to be worried for the destiny of human beings in the next
100-200 years, it seem out of our imagination to feel responsible for the
fate of humans who will live after a thousand (or say million!) years from
now.
In order to understand the reasons and the need of a pluralistic and
multi-dimensional (extra-economic) stance, I have to add a further is-
sue. GR dedicates a whole chapter2 to the problem of measure both in
science and economics, most notably how scholars define cardinal mea-
sure. Geometry and mechanics are based on two attributes measurable
with cardinal numbers: indifferent distance (length) and indifferent time
interval, each one expressing qualitatively homogeneous entities which
only vary in quantity. The search for cardinal measures enable the sci-
entist to aggregate, along a common scale, by “indifferent subsumption
and subtraction in a definite physical” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1976, p.98,
original emphasis). He identifies other two kind of measures: weak
cardinality (quantified qualities) where some qualities (e.g. heat, hard-
ness, etc.) are transformed into cardinal numbers, at the expense to leave
some qualitative residuals out from paper-and-pencil calculations; while
purely ordinal measures regard to qualitative differences not reducible
to cardinal number. An example is given by historical dates that cannot
be reduced to cardinal number or subsumed in any meaningful way. If
the economic world were composed by quantum units, with stable prop-
2See “Measure, Size and Sameness: Some Object Lessons from Physics”, (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1976, Ch. IV, p. 95-113).
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erties, then there would be no problem in measuring them with cardi-
nal numbers, nor in converting them into a common scale (money) with
a strict monotonic transformation. The epistemological consequence in
economics should be the triumph of mathematical formalism, and pro-
portional laws, and the exclusion of any ‘disturbing factor’. However,
the very invocation of these ‘disturbing factors’ (psychology, sociology,
history, low entropy, etc.) is the proof that some qualitative residu-
als have been left out. Obviously, the attempt of describing economics
through pure ordinal variables would be pernicious; while recognizing
that most of the economic phenomena are quantified qualities is crucial
because it introduces the concept of size. In modern terms this is trans-
lated in the debate on optimal scale, so important mostly from a macro
ecological-economic perspective: “The nearer the subsystem approaches
the total system in scale, the more it must become like the total system
in its basic characteristics: finitude, non-growth, material closure, and
reliance on the flow of sunlight as its main energy source. The path of
progress for the economy must shift from quantitative growth to qual-
itative development” (Daly, 2007, p. 27). The recognition of a limit to
the process of (monetary) reductionism stands behind the effort of many
contemporary ecological economists to compute the ecological indirect
effect of economic activities in order to provide extra-market knowledge
to the problem of attaining sustainability. The roots of this stance stand
on the writings of Popper-Lynkeus (1912) and, most notably, of Neu-
rath (1973). He moved his theory in response to von Mises who claimed
that without monetary conversion (unit of measurement) there would be
impossible any rational decision. Instead, Neurath focused on the ethi-
cal and political dimensions in which each decision must be judged. In
modern terms, it is a recognition that “Social costs and social benefits
have to be considered as extra-market phenomena; they are borne and
accrue to society as a whole; they are heterogeneous and cannot be com-
pared quantitatively among themselves and with each other, not even in
principle” (Kapp, 1970, p. 49). Moreover, recognizing that even the most
abstract branches of knowledge, logic and mathematics, incorporate un-
provable and hence arbitrary assumptions, implies the impossibility of
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ethical neutrality. On the contrary principles and values must be stated
explicitly and they must become part of dialogue and of the political pro-
cess (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991).
The strengths of the concept of sustainability are also its weaknesses.
If one wants to be open to plural and irreducible stances, omnicompre-
hensive, fair with the current and future generations, concerned about
natural limits and ecological balances, then one should accept the con-
flict between different positions and the vagueness of these concepts.
However, I do believe that the pros are more than the cons. Once one ad-
mits the value-laden nature of economic knowledge, the purpose-laden
origin of economic process and the inexorable conflict of exosomatic so-
cieties, then the concept of sustainability seems to be adequate not so
much for its content, but rather for its tenets. I think we should look at it
as an empty-box (rather than a black-box) which continuously needs to
be filled with contingent and heterogeneous ethical purposes based on
the perceived urgent (global and local) challenges where anyone, from
the scientist to the layman, participate in the process of problem-solving.
Democratic participation and critical debate are important ingredients of
this process. Given its focal importance I will pass through this concept
again and again in what follows.
C.3 Incommensurability and Ends
Incommensurability is the pillar of EE, however in order to understand
its role I should briefly recall the never–ending debate within philoso-
phy of Science. Gattei (2008) provides a clear overview of this concept
in science and its evolution. The term incommensurability derives from
the standard employment of this concept in geometry and mathematics:
“two quantities are said to be incommensurable if there is no common
measure whole units of which divide both of them” (p. 74). In philos-
ophy of Science the term has been introduced to question whether the
scientific knowledge might be regarded as a cumulative enterprise, un-
derstood as a mere accumulation of new problems, solutions and stan-
dards, resulting in increasing (quantitatively and qualitatively) knowl-
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edge. This topic is vast and complex, but only one point deserves to be
mention in this context, that is the debate on rational decisions among
competing scientific theories. Here incommensurability stands for the
impossibility to decide only on the base of pure rational thinking because
there is not a neutral language (Feyerabend, 1975), and not even a neutral
algorithm (Kuhn, 1962), and because it does not exist a meta-rationality
(Frola, 1964) that, a priori, provides the standards and the criteria for a
rational choice. Though these observations were posited by ‘irrational-
ists’ philosophers, we find similar conclusions (at least with regard to the
process of decision, abstracting from any ontological contention) from
other opponents. Geymonat (1945) observes that we should look at his-
torically determined relationships to make sense of the development of
theories, and their selection (without invoking any metaphysical incom-
parability). Even Popper (1945) thought that reasoning would be re-
garded as a social process of inter–subjective confrontation, therefore so-
cieties should set up those institutions which facilitate critical debates
(i.e. ‘democratic control’) avoiding any authoritarian answer. If histori-
cal, social and political factors have a role in the development of scientific
theories (with more or less agreement), why should we get rid of them
in case of economic decisions? How incommensurability could be a re-
source, rather than a limit, when dealing with economic and ecological
systems? I develop two focal issues with which, hopefully, I argument
in favour of a pluralistic approach to economic epistemology in order to
supersede the reductionist program and the NC monism. The first one
is the problem of Qualitative change and the emergence of complexity;
while the second refers to the political consequences of multi-level ends-
means relation.
Recognizing the evolutionary nature of biological and social sys-
tems implies an (economic) epistemology devoted to the study of com-
plex systems governed by non-linear relationships, characterized by the
possible ‘emergence of (unexpected) novelties’ by combination (Heinzel,
2012). For instance, in his classic The Great Transformation, Polanyi (1944)
showed that the economic system is embedded as a component of human
culture, and like our culture, it is in a constant state of evolution charac-
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terized by qualitative changes in the economic structure, human inter-
actions and institutions. Complexity is a multidisciplinary concept de-
rived from mathematics and physics, however extra complications arise
in economics due to the nature of social interactions. This is linked with
the understanding of how tightly or loosely coupled are processes at dif-
ferent scales (O’Neill, 2004), which helps to elucidate hierarchies of inter-
acting systems. The latter observation is the ontological justification for
the vision of a multi-level reality, where each strata is conceived as irre-
ducible (contra-reductionism) to those at lower level, though they may
depend on them. The dependence of economic systems on the Entropy
Law makes this stance evident: each economic process feeds by low en-
tropy but the enjoyment of the output of production is a result of a ‘men-
tal state’ which is not reducible neither to the physical characteristic of
goods nor to the ‘amount’ of available energy used. It poses a limit to the
current efforts, of many ecological economists, to compute the indirect
effect of economic activity on the available resource (i.e. footprint) or to
reduce the whole economic process to the amount of energy embedded
in each product. Georgescu-Roegen, again, noticed that the economic
process depends on the sorting activity, of low entropy, of humans who
purposively convert the flux of available energy (and matter) into the fi-
nal output of the economic process: the enjoyment of life. He captures
the two essential features of the hierarchical view of reality and teleo-
logical nature of economy when he admitted that “we cannot arrive at a
completely intelligible description of the economic process as long as we
limit ourselves to purely physical concepts. Without the concepts of pur-
posive activity and enjoyment of life we cannot be in the economic world.
[....] The economic process, to be sure, is entropic in each of its fibers, but
the paths along which it is woven are traced by the category of utility to
man. It would therefore be utterly wrong to equate the economic process
with a vast thermodynamic system [....] which allow no discrimination
between the economic value of an edible mushroom and that of a poi-
soned one.” (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, (p. 282-283, original emphasis).
This point needs to be coupled with a discussion around the ends-means
relation.
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Values, such as liberty and equality, are sometimes said to be incom-
mensurable in the sense that their value cannot be reduced to a common
measure. Daly (1991) put it paradoxically: how can it be that the only
things that are supposed to have value in public discourse are value-free
(and I dare to add ends-free) facts? The problem of value incommen-
surability is twofold: it regards a single individual when she faces hard
choices and the society as a whole, when conflicting interests (and ide-
ologies) clash. Ends are not exogenous but they are generated in the very
process of action. Means and ends mutually interact and determine. As
noted by Crespo (2007) the ends-means relation is not linear, rather it can
be divided between: i) ends that are only means for attaining something
else (first-order or instrumental ends), ii) ends that are desirable in them-
selves and that are parts of the final end (second-order or constitutive
ends), and iii) ends which are only desirable in themselves (third-order
or final ends). Even admitting the Utilitarian ultimate end, hedonistic
satisfaction, there is no reason in principle to conceive the other inter-
mediate ends as purely means considered as commensurable and inter-
changeable. For example, self–interested people may find satisfaction by
the accumulation of wealth, by increasing political power or by having a
career in a professional work, which are constitutive ends. If one admits
that claiming ‘power is twice more important than career’ is odd, if not
inconceivable, then one has to recognize that the monetary reductionism
is unattainable unless one accepts the validity of ‘wealth is twice more
important than career.’ How should one decide among them? Once one
accepts that the final end cannot be grasped directly and that we have to
pass from its parts, it might be recognized that incommensurability could
be a resource rather than a limit. Even though the debate on ends is not
possible within the instrumental rational logic, it does not mean that it
is impossible to put reasons in favour or against certain ends, or even to
propose new ends (e.g. sustainability). Following this line of thought the
question is shifted from “how to allocate scarce means to efficiently fulfil
given ends?” to “how to set up those social institutions which facilitate
a critical debate on the ends that are currently pursued in the society in
order to improve them or to reduce the possible conflicts?”
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Based on the arguments exposed so far, many ecological economists
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991, Martinez-Alier, 2002, among others) claim
for an extension of the participation in the decision process, beyond ex-
perts, by including local communities and layman. This view is strictly
tied with the Popperian idea of Rationality, in a broader sense, and the
Senian’s quest of the role of ethics in economic decisions. When we move
from the social realm to the scientific arena, Popper advocates in favour
of what has been labelled as a pancritical rationalism,3 for which being
rational requires the complementary notion of reasonableness. Here we
find all the ingredients present both in the Senian theory of economic
choice and, as seen, in the EE stance. The most important one is recog-
nizing that rationality is social and critical. Depending on how we learn
to be rational we may have heterogeneous economic attitudes, mostly
based on the social structure of norms, beliefs and rules of conduct. Why
hedonistic self-interest attitude should be regarded as the only (and sci-
entifically relevant) raison d′eˆtre of economic agents? Sen (1977) rec-
ognized that, though important, it is not the only source of a person’s
choice. Rather, morality and ethics (e.g. commitments, trust and sympa-
thy) play a crucial role, especially when dealing with public goods such
as environmental services, bio–diversity preservation and clean air.
Finally, a crucial prerequisite toward a rational debate on ends stands
upon the process of ‘self-criticism’ in which evaluating our own prefer-
ences and values. Recognizing that they are not exogenous is crucial to
understand human choices and, above all, to establish democratic so-
lutions to urgent problems, without succumbing to any sort of tyranny
(consumers sovereignty implies the ‘tyranny of tastes’). Self-awareness
rises from the fact that humans are not only users of symbols but also
the object of the symbolism. Neglecting the fact that people are actively
involved in the process of choice, by thinking about their preferences
in the elaboration of choice theory, seems an arbitrary (and normative!)
‘choice’. Acknowledging this crucial feature of human beings is the first
step toward the concept of (consumer and firms) responsibility,4 in par-
3See (Popper, 1945, p. 225).
4The concept of consumer’s responsibility is captured by the parameter δ of the Evolu-
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ticular with respect to ecological systems and future generations.
C.4 Concluding Remarks
This Appendix briefly overviews two different branch of Economic stud-
ies, i.e. NC and EE, underlying the implication of somehow different
Visions. EE, notwithstanding its limitations, is thought to be able to pro-
vide a framework capable to embrace the major stances coming from
philosophy of Science, ecology, anthropology (with its psychological and
sociological facets) and economy itself. Value incommensurability has
been introduced as a resource, rather than a limit, and the pluralistic
approach of EE should facilitate the process of conciliation and debate
between conflicting ends. This approach is crucial because it is focused
on human responsibility which requires the need to think and to criti-
cally debate on which state of the world is better rather than another.
Rational debate on moral issues is possible and necessary. Popper’s ir-
rational belief on rationality is completely in accordance with the EE
stance, at least when there are suitable institutions which facilitate this
process. Markets cannot be such institution because, by equating money
with decisional power, they distort the choice in favor of more affluent
people, independently from their reasons or expertise. Regrettably, text-
book economics cannot deal with conflictual ends with its narrow logic.
Modern standard economics is based on commensuration and commen-
suration is only possible when each value is reducible to price. Nev-
ertheless, as noticed by Crespo (2007) there are also frequent occasions
on which the relevant decision criteria on ends are purely economic and
where standard tools might work. Economics should open the door to
non-academic problem solving processes where local (rural, aboriginal,
urban or whatever) communities and layman are taken into account both
in defining the main issues and in proposing alternative solutions, as ex-
posed in Chapter 4.
I am not suggesting any concrete proposals. I would only like to stress
that, given the previous conclusions I propose that ‘Ecological’ may be
tionary Game exposed in Chapter 4.
160
seen as a misleading label and even superfluous. Even though it is based
on the Entropy Law and natural limits, it does not mean that its approach
should be limited to treat always and necessarily the environmental im-
plications of the economic process. Indeed, admitting that economy is
embedded in its environment should be seen as obvious as stating that
economic process are made by human. Not for that we call it ‘Human’
economics. Rather, this Vision amplifies the NC approach by broadening
its anthropological and physical content. EE is focused on the evolution-
ary features of qualitative change, time irreversibility and epistemic un-
certainty, on ends incommensurability and class conflicts, physical laws
and natural limits (as we currently know) and bounded rationality all of
which hold to human systems without any need to add the ‘Ecological’
label. Indeed, we find many predecessor of EE with no primary concern-
ing on ecological issues in Shumpeter, Neurath, Malthus, Sen and as we
have seen even Popper, among many others.
Finally, I dare to introduce a new definition of Economics, not pre-
tending to be exhaustive but rather evocative of the direction where (eco-
logical) economics should move: Economics is the human practice which
aims to provide new knowledge on the relation between absolute scarcity (low
entropy), relative scarcity, social and individual ends in order to boost the re-
alization of those institutions which facilitate a critical debate on incommen-
surable ends and the definition of new ends and new (non-violent) solutions
towards the conciliation of the exosomatic development of society (with its bur-
den of class and environmental exploitation) and the improvement of human
well-being with the respect to (inescapable) natural limits.
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